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In a post-Cold War, post-9/11 world, the advent of US global supremacy resulted
in the installation, perpetuation, and dissemination of an Absolutist Security Agenda

(hereinafter, ASA). The US ASA explicitly and aggressively articulates and equates US
national security interests with the security of all states in the international system, and

replaced the bipolar, Cold War framework that defined international affairs from 19451992. Since the collapse of the USSR and the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the
US has unilaterally defined, implemented, and managed systemic security policy.

The US ASA is indicative of a systemic category of knowledge (security)
anchored

in variegated conceptual

and material components,

such as morality,

philosophy, and political rubrics. The US ASA is based on a logic that involves the
following security components: 1., hyper militarization, 2., intimidation, 3., coercion, 4.,
criminalization, 5.,

panoptic surveillance,

6.,

plenary security measures,

and 7.,

unabashed US interference in the domestic affairs of select states. Such interference has
produced destabilizing tensions and conflicts that have, in turn, produced resistance,

vi

revolutions, proliferation, cults of personality, and militarization.

This is the case

because the US ASA rests on the notion that the international system of states is an
extension, instrument of US power, rather than a system and/or society of states
comprised of functionally sovereign entities.

To analyze the US ASA, this study utilizes: 1., official government statements,
legal doctrines, treaties, and policies pertaining to US foreign policy; 2., militarization
rationales, budgets, and expenditures; and 3., case studies of rogue states. The data used

in this study are drawn from information that is publicly available (academic journals,
think-tank publications,

government publications,

and information provided

by

international organizations).
The data supports the contention that global security is effectuated via a discrete

set of hegemonic/imperialistic US values and interests, finding empirical expression in
legal acts (USA Patriot ACT 2001) and the concept of rogue states.

Rogue states,

therefore, provide test cases to clarify the breadth, depth, and consequentialness of the US

ASA in world affairs vis-a-vis the relationship between US security and global security.
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Whosoever undertakes to set himself up as [the ultimate] judge in the field of Truth and Knowledge is shipwrecked by
the laughter of the gods. Albert Einstein (1953).1

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

In a post-9/l 1 world, US global supremacy has resulted in an attempt to install
and disseminate an absolutist security agenda (hereinafter, ASA).

The US ASA

explicitly and aggressively articulates and equates US domestic security interests with the
security of all states in the international system. Since the collapse of the USSR and the
9/11 terrorist attacks, the US has sought to unilaterally define, implement, and manage

systemic security policy. The ASA is based on a security logic that involves a blend of
militarization, intimidation, coercion, criminalization, panoptic surveillance, plenary
security, US domestic security as the basis for global security, and US interference in the

affairs of select states. Generally speaking, US interference, based on security interests,
historically and presently, has produced destabilizing tensions and conflicts that have, in
turn, produced revolutions, proliferation, and militarization on the world stage. 2 This is
the case because US security is premised on the notion that the system of states is an

extension and instrument of US power, subject to its specific security interests.
The US ASA involves

utilization of interactive material and intangible

components that inform, complement, and produce a rubric of security, such as ideology,
morality, military capacity, and politics.

This being the case, a macro-systemic

perspective is employed to analyze and derive conclusions about the post-9/11 security

' Albert Einstein, Ideas & Opinions, ed. Carl Seelig, trans. Sonja Bargmann, intro. Alan Lightman (New York:
Random House, 1994) 30.
2 See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics 2 nd ed., forward Stanley Hoffmann
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).

context. A systematic set of concepts and practices, empirical and intangible, function in
tandem within an interdependent set of organizational relationships to articulate and

implement security policy. 3

Morality, politics, nationalism, ideology, and law, for

example, are abstract as well as empirical components of a system of security that do not
occur in a vacuum.

Components function in an interactive and interdependent context,

and are both products and producers of knowledge and conceptualization within a larger
system of organization, hierarchy, and power.

Security components reflect "a way of

thinking having the proportions of a world view." 4
A systemic and systematic epistemology of security is comprised of diverse,
organized, and complex variables.

While security may seem a stable and closed

category, it is rather complex and open, comprised of various constituent epistemic and
material components.

Security components are dynamic

and multidimensional,

composed of various epistemologies (nationalism, culture, the scientific method) of truth

and understanding. The US ASA seeks to provide a unitary, homogenous template for
the apprehension, comprehension, and articulation of global security based on specific
universal and objective postulations of morality, ideology, politics, legality, economy,
and military power that operate in an ordered hierarchy. Disaggregating the ASA fleshes
out the "teleological mechanism" that under-girds the post-9/11 global security context. 5

3 See Ervin Laszlo, The Systems View of the World: A Holistic Vision for Our Time Advances in Systems Theory,
Complexity, and the Human Sciences (Cresskill: Hampton Press, 1996); Ervin Laszlo, The Systems View of the World:
The NaturalPhilosophy of the New Developments in the Sciences (New York: George Braziller, 1972).

4 Charles McClelland,

"General Systems Theory in International Relations," InternationalSecurity Systems: Concepts
& Models of World Order,ed. Richard B. Gray (Itasca: F. E. Peacock, 1969) 21.
s Ludwig Von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory: Foundations,Development, and Applications (New York:
George Braziller, 1968) 16-17. Also see, Ludwig Von Bertalanffy, A Systems View of Man, ed. Paul A LaViolette
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1981).

Implementation of an ASA supports the contention that the US has seized the

"unipolar moment" that manifested itself after the socioeconomic and political implosion
of the USSR. 6 Although divergent perspectives have arisen claiming that the "unipolar
moment" can be considered illusory or genuine, empirically it is the case that the
"geopolitical [and military-power] structure of the post-Cold War world ... is [embodied
in] a single pole of world power that consists of the US [being] at the apex" of systemic
organization and management of global affairs.7 While a distribution of material power
capabilities is vital to explaining the dynamics and structure of the international system,
an analysis of the US ASA takes into account the various and equally important nonmaterial components that have a considerable effect on the whole of international affairs.
For example, a phenomenon, an abstraction, that is, terror, is a primary impetus of the
global security agenda pursued by the US as opposed to identifiable state actors. Given
the globalized nature of the modern world system, the dissemination of a universal
culture (consumerist), enemy (terror), political system (procedural democracy), mode of
hyper-consumption (transnational corporate power, global economy), development aid

(substantial US influence in the IMF, Word Bank, WTO), and environmental security
factors (ozone depletion, global warming), amongst several others, have a profound effect
on how security is conceptualized and implemented in a post-9/11 world.

Each is

grounded in different knowledge systems that have distinct priorities, concepts, and
explanations of international affairs and security.

6 See Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," Foreign Affairs 70.1 (1990/91) 23-33.

7 Krauthammer

24. Also see Robert Jervis, "International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?" International
Security 17.4 (Spring 1993) 52-67; Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,"
InternationalSecurity 17.4 (Spring 1993) 5-51; Christopher Layne, "Rethinking American Grand Strategy: Hegemony
or Balance of Power in the Twenty-First Century?" World Policy Journal(Summer 1998) 8-41.
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Thus, this study seeks to expound upon the composition,
consequences of the post-9/11 security context.

dynamics, and

To accomplish this goal, the following

overarching research question grounds this study:

how has the event of 9/11 further

enabled the US to legitimately articulate, disseminate, and implement an absolutist
security agenda on the world stage?8 This dissertation contends that post-9/11 security
policy, although part of a historical trajectory of (hegemonic) US power, differs from
traditional US policy in that there is no longer a viable counterweight to rein in US power
prerogatives.

Since the Post-World War II period and the subsequent Cold War, US

power and global aspirations were effectively balanced by the USSR. After the demise
of the USSR, the US was, relatively speaking, given free reign to define the contours and
parameters of post-Cold War global affairs. The event of 9/11 is indicative of continuity
as well as change in how US security policy is defined and implemented.

Asserting

profound influence/ control over world affairs through force and the threat of force

remains the case, but the barriers to obtaining such influence/control have been
significantly attenuated.

Indeed, with the advent of an "age of terror" (formally

inaugurated on 9/11/2001), the US has been able to "legitimately" posit a new world
order based on its exclusive domestic national security interests.

There is no viable,

legitimate alternative (according to US security policy) to defining global affairs than the
US template; for example, socialism and communism as competing or alternative
ideologies are considered antiquated forms of governance that hold no place in the US
managed world order. US absolutist security policy decrees this is the case because any

8

Regarding the dynamics and consequences of paradigmatic change in scientific understanding, see Thomas Kuhn,
The
ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

Structure of Scientific Revolutions 3

4

alternative forms of governance are incompatible with the US ASA, which flippantly
ignores the diversity inherent in a system of sovereign states. The US disseminates its
policy of "US security = global security" through a variety of means, such as law, force,

propaganda, alliances, and economy. With no significant opposition, the US is able to
postulate and proffer its ASA as being the singular course of action to effectuate a secure
state of affairs in the conduct of state interactions. This occurs on a variety of levels, and
the event of 9/11 has enabled the US to "legitimately" wage multifarious warfare against
material and non-material threats and enemies.

This has resulted in total war being

formally waged against concepts, ideas, groups, states, and individuals.

In an age of

terror, the US has constructed and disseminated a particular epistemology of how and
why to securitize, and this directly impacts what security in essence means for all actors
in the international system.

Methodology & Purpose
The US ASA will be examined via a discursive and interpretative content analysis
of US security policy toward select "enemies" of global peace and freedom (rogue
states), unilateral criminalization of terror (USA Patriot Act 2001), and the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction (hereinafter, WMD) vis-a-vis North Korea. US policy
toward rogue states provides a means for examining the ASA. The power to define what
a state is and should be is indicative of the degree of influence the US wields in
international affairs, and how the US has been able to repackage Cold War concepts to
suit a unipolar security context. The event of 9/11 provided the US with an imprimatur
of legitimacy and necessity in retaining its power to manage and define security vis-a-vis

5

good and malevolent states in absence of the ominous Soviet threat that had legitimated

US policy during the Cold War. The category of rogue state has been redefined to create
a viable state enemy in an age of unmitigated, ubiquitous terror.

9/11 provided an

ideological, moral, and military justification for the US to augment rather than decrease

its influence and control over world affairs. Rogue states, which previously defied US
power by resisting US hegemony politically and militarily, are now defined as statesponsors of terror that arm to threaten the peace of the world. As for terror and its
criminalization, it exemplifies the "change" in global security under the ASA, which
involves creating a systemic epistemology of security based on US plenary notions of
macro threat prevention and preemption.

As is the case with the power to categorize

states, the event of 9/11 enabled the US to pursue its traditional hegemonic agenda
clothed in the garb of a paladin striving to preserve the entire world from an insidious and
deadly enemy (terror) that could be "found" virtually anywhere and in any form.
While this study can be termed "critical," it is imperative to note what this study
does and does not seek to accomplish.

Regarding the former, this study aspires to

provide an analysis of security. Polemics, the correctness or impropriety of a particular
political model of international society and/or world politics, and the like are not in line
with this study's notion of critical analysis.

Rather, this study follows a Foucauldian

conception of critical analysis: "when I say 'critical,' I don't mean a demolition job, one
of rejection or refusal, but a work of examination that consists of suspending as far as
possible the system of values to which one refers when testing and assessing it." 9

9 Michel Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, and Culture: Interviews & Other Writings 1977-1984, trans. Alan Sheridan,
ed. and intro. Lawrence D. Kritzman (New York and London: Routledge, 1988) 107.

6

Although subject to in-depth critique, the US, in and of itself, is not the object of
critique. Rather, a critique of US power and its global security agenda provides a means
to explain and understand security in a post-9/11 security context. Einstein's observation

of US power in 1921 retains its validity:

"the US is the most powerful among the

technically advanced countries in the world today.

Its influence on the shaping of

international relations is absolutely incalculable."10
An examination of US security policy from the Cold War through the present
suggests continuity as well as change."

Continuity can be observed in the sustained

relevance of key concepts that continue to anchor the international system; for example,
states remain the primary international actors. Yet, change in how international affairs are

conceptualized since the establishment of the modern world system in Bretton Woods,
New Hampshire (1944) has also occurred. In particular, the US being at the apex of
power in a unipolar position, supported by the most advanced technology and military
organization in the world to wage war against a concept (terror), has significantly

impacted traditional notions of sovereignty and other basic ordering principles of
international relations. Through calculated use of the event of 9/11, the US has been able
to augment its power by retaining the language and categories of a system of states,
particularly notions of security, sovereignty and self-determination, while reconfiguring

the content of international order in a unipolar image in the name of global security.

10 Einstein 7.
" See James R. Kurth, "A Widening Gyre: The Logic of American Weapons Procurement," American Foreign Policy:
Theoretical Essays 3 rd ed., ed. G. John Ikenberry (New York: Longman, 1999) 14-36; Ole R. Holsti, "Models of
International Relations & Foreign Policy," American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays 3rd ed., ed. G. John Ikenberry
(New York: Longman, 1999) 37-64; G. John Ikenberry, "The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos," Foreign Affairs 75.3

(May/June 1996) 79-91.
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The US ASA bestrides the divide between continuity and change. Although US
security policy has been characterized as moving in cycles between isolationism,
internationalism, bilateralism, multilateralism, and intense to detached involvement in
international affairs, there is an historical hegemonic imperative that under-girds US

foreign policy.' 2

As Christopher Layne notes, the US's "grand strategy," that is,

commanding an absolute preponderance of power, did not fundamentally change between
1945-1991.

Hegemonic "ambitions, interests, and alliances," backed by tremendous

military power and moral convictions, have been the enduring hallmarks of US security

policy.' 3 "Continuity is the leitmotif of US foreign policy, and the unilateral pursuit of
national interests ... has strong precedent. What makes today's unilateralism different
from that of the past[, however,] is the international and domestic context in which it is

being carried out[, that is,] the war on terrorism, the absence of a counterweight to US
power, and the single-mindedness ... of American primacy"14

A Single-Minded Epistemology of Security
The US is held out as the singular means to obtain universal eudemonia
(Aristotle), that is, universal happiness, stability, purpose, and freedom based on US

2 See Mel Gurtov, "American Crusades: Unilateralism, Past & Present," Confronting the Bush Doctrine: Critical
Views From the Asia-Pacific, eds. Mel Gurtov and Peter Van Ness (London: Routledge-Cruzon, 2005) 1-39; Amy
Kaplan and Donald E. Pease, eds., Cultures of United States Imperialism (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993);
Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage Books, 1994); John Bellamy Foster, Naked
Imperialism: The U.S. Pursuitof Global Dominance (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2006); J. A. Hobson,
Imperialism: A Study (New York: Cosimo Press, 2005); David Ryan, US Foreign Policy in World History (New York:
Routledge, 2000); Michael Hudson, Super Imperialism: The Origin and Fundamentalsof US World Dominance 2 "ded.
(London: Pluto Press, 2003); Charles-Philippe David and David Grondin, eds., Hegemony or Empire? The
Redefinition of US Power Under George W. Bush (Burlington: Ashgate, 2006).

" Christopher Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing," America's Strategic Choices, eds. Michael
Brown, et al., (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology University Press, 1997) 244-82.
1

Gurtov 1.

8

security logic and precepts. US security policy is no longer overtly belligerent and
imperialistic.

Under the ASA, US power, policy, and interests are presented as

munificent and indispensable for establishing the objective conditions requisite for
perpetual global peace, freedom, and security. By arrogating to itself the exclusive right

to define one of the most essential tasks of every state actor, that is, security, the US
perpetuates an epistemology of security to effectuate a "transubstantiation" between the
US order-combine, that is, the general political, social, moral, legal, cultural, ideological,
and economic components of the US state, the states system, and international society.

This transubstantiation is, at the very least, plausible because the specter of 9/11 provides
a basis for articulating and implementing the US ASA. Furthermore, although 9/11 can

be traced to US interference in the affairs of other states/polities, it has been effectively
utilized by the US to not only justify victim status but also legitimate US exceptionalism
in order to pursue an unhampered, aggressive ASA for the sake of global peace and
justice. By manufacturing security needs based on the 9/11 event, the US is able to posit
an absolutist security policy as the only satisfactory response to fulfill all states' needs.
Under the US ASA, the US becomes the singular author of what constitutes threats and
what measures address such threats; US policy becomes a requisite precondition for any

discourse vis-a-vis global security. The event of 9/11, in and of itself, has enabled the US
to pursue an unfettered campaign to exercise plenary control over world affairs based on
the ubiquitous threat of malevolent terror.
Historically, the basis for US security policy has fluctuated between unilateralists,
"who in the grand tradition of George Washington and the Founding Fathers eschew
entangling relationships, and internationalists [in the Wilsonian tradition], who advocate

9

cooperation and see security relationships as effective instruments for controlling the
behavior of partners." 15 The US ASA, however, offers a template for global order based
on a

security

management

strategy

that blends

unilateralism,

bilateralism,

and

multilateralism (backed with overwhelming military and economic power), with US
security as the lodestar defining global security policy.

This strategy promotes and

consolidates "a new global political and economic order congenial to American state
interests ... [and] this ... has been central to the constitution of the post World War II,
'new world order.'

The US has employed a combination of coercive and consensual

means and [has] succeeded in encouraging (and often forcing) other states" to abide by
and implement its policy.16

The US ASA augments traditional notions of exertion of

"naked" power and multilateralism by promoting:

Disciplinarian neo-liberalism and constitutionalism as the basis
of global restructuring and politico-juridical reform; the hyperextension of an emerging market civilization; explicit and
implicit US dominance of global economic policy; the forcible
implementation of US ideological and moral values and
modalities via force, economy, and procedural democratic
political systems; and the US as the vanguard and indisputable
'author' and manager of world affairs.17

Where the present ASA fundamentally departs from pervious security policy, rubrics,

etc., is that US security after 9/11 constitutes an explicit universal, objective, systemic,

"5 Fraser Cameron, US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff? 2 "d ed. (London:
Routledge, 2005) 183. Also, see Charles Williams Maynes, "Principled Hegemony," World Policy Journal 14.3 (Fall

1997) 31-37.
16 Stephen Gill, Power & Resistance in the New World Order (New York: Palgrave-MacMillan,
2003) 69.

17 Gill 67. Also, see Benjamin Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism Are Reshaping the World
(New York: Ballantine Books, 1996).
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superior system of security.1 8 Security, premised on US state-specific criteria, is posited
as being comprised of axiomatic, organic categories such as freedom, peace, democracy,
and justice that cannot be challenged. Resistance to the US ASA is dubbed aberrant and
irrational, and merits stern, militaristic, and overtly hostile responses premised on
objective truth.

These changes have far-reaching consequences on the character and

conduct of international affairs. The realm of "facts" as presented under the ASA, for
example the singular meaning given to 9/11 by the US, is inextricably linked with a
specific moral terrain and form of ethical judgment.

Through acts of authoritatively

naming the constituent elements of the world, systems of knowledge are able to
"identify" or "discover" first principles and bestow them upon objects/states of affairs
that pre-exist human cognition.

Perceptions, however, are based upon and function

within inter-relational, relative, prescribed knowledge systems that can only appeal to
internal, self-contained rationalization.

The US ASA proceeds by utilizing specific, moral perceptions as immutable
bases of an objective international reality based on the specter of 9/11 terror and its

indeterminate

replication.

Perception, conception,

explanation,

and understanding

devolve from the establishment of an epistemology of truth. Epistemology establishes
the range of human possibility, and ultimately has the potential to "capture," appropriate,
and delimit ordering concepts. The ASA provides the US with a claim of a "monopoly of
wisdom" pertaining to the conceptualization and implementation of security.19 The idea
18

Noam Chomsky and Michel Foucault, The Chomsky-FoucaultDebate On Human Nature, forward John Rajchman

(New York: New Press, 2006) 1-35.
19 E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crises, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of InternationalRelations (New
York: Harper and Row, 1964) 52.

11

of the world that "we entertain becomes a filter through which we pass our data."2 0 Ideas
are based on systemic epistemologies

and form the conceptual "media" of global

security, for example, procedural democracy, peace, and security as defined by the US.
As Marshall McLuhan observes, "we become what we behold ...

[epistemic] tools, and therefore our tools shape us." 2'

we shape our

This state of affairs is noteworthy

because power and its exercise are premised on the capacity to fix signification via

naming things.

Epistemologies thus create

circumscribed conceptual

spaces of

possibility and actuality, which are established and mediated by an authority that governs
by establishing
epistemologies

objective
assumes

signifiers.2 2 The

contextual

"space"

manufactured

by

a weighty role in setting the limits and possibilities of

legitimating the ideologies that under-gird security frameworks and policy.
A reevaluation of fundamental international ordering concepts such as security,
sovereignty, hegemony, and rogue states is in order given the changed global security

context since the event of 9/11. Reappraisal of security in particular is merited since "the
more a man is imbued with the ordered regularity of ... events the firmer becomes his
conviction that there is no room left by the side of this ordered regularity for causes of a

different nature." 2 3 Systemic concepts that have structured security discourse and policy
since 1945 have been subject to reconfiguration under the US ASA. For example: a.)
Terror and radical fundamentalism are not deterred by rational calculations; b.)

20 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A TheoreticalAnalysis (New York: Columbia Press, 2001) 10.
21 Marshall McLuhan, UnderstandingMedia: The Extensions of Man, intro. Lewis H. Lapham (Cambridge:

Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2002) xi.
22 Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining & UnderstandingInternationalRelations (New York: Oxford
1990) 83.
23

Einstein 51.
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Sovereignty has become more and more hollow, attenuated by the hegemon to implement
its ASA; c.) Containment, given ubiquitous terror, can apply to any and all state activities
in the realm of defense and wellbeing; and d.) Balance of Power has been reconfigured so
as to privilege one state's power as the singular ballast for the international system based

on objective moral, economic, and political principles/precepts backed by overwhelming
military power.
Generally speaking, a totalizing US war on terror has sought to change the form
and substance of international security policy, creating a "system [of security] with
neither close nor center."2 4

The US ASA and the war on terror contradict three

fundamental principles within the context of a states system, that is, the Treaty of
Westphalia, UN Charter, and Nuremberg Court.2 5 Each privileges sovereignty and self-

determination of states in the conduct of international relations; the US ASA has sought to
Also, the US war on terror has radically

reconfigure these fundamental principles.

redefined the context and concept of "foes," and what constitutes a global security
"threat." The US has "redefined who is a [global] ally [of peace] and who is an enemy ...
[and the] relevance of the long-standing strategic doctrines of containment and
deterrence." 2 6 In light of the US ASA and notions of terror, the previous bi-polar security
system, premised on clearly defined foes presenting clear threats, is no longer the case.
"With the demise of communism and the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the US
See Roland Barthes, "The Death of the Author," trans. Stephen Heath, The Norton Anthology of Theory and
Criticism, eds. Vincent B. Leitch, William E. Cain, Laurie A. Fink, Barbara E. Johnson, John McGowan, and Jeffery J.
Williams (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001) 1472.
24

25 Bruce Urquhart, "World Order & Mr. Bush," New York Review of Books,
9 Oct. 2003.
26 John W. Dietrich, ed., The George W. Bush Foreign Policy Reader: PresidentialSpeeches With Commentary
(New

York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005) 10.
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global strategy is entering a phase in world history never witnessed before by any 'great
power,"' that is, a single power is primus inter pares in a system of sovereign states. 27

The US ASA, therefore, involves the trans-nationalization of "political processes and
systems, involving changes and shifting structures in world politics, political economy,
ideology, and power relationships" in line with US security mandates.28 In sum, the US

seeks to substantially re-configure a sovereign states-system to conform to a unipolar
system via homogenization of security policy.
Mass dissemination of discrete US values, interests, and material practices find

empirical expression in, amongst other things, officially US-designated "enemies" of
global peace and prosperity. While states such as Russia and China are significant rivals
to US power, they are nevertheless not "official" enemies of global order. Indeed, these
states are immediately crucial to global economic and political stability; they possess
large economies, nuclear weapons, overwhelming military power, and are full, active

participants in conducting global affairs.

Indeed, states such as Russia and China can

benefit from the US unipolar system (especially economically), so long as essential
notions of sovereignty are in fact respected in the formulation of US foreign policy. The
US, in turn, has vested interests in ensuring a peaceful and productive coexistence with
Russia and China, and vice versa. Other weaker state actors, on the other hand, such as
Iran, North Korea, Burma, and Cuba, possess pernicious values and incongruous interests
that range from mild to fervent opposition to US global leadership and security

27 Thanh Duong, Hegemonic Globalization: US Centrality & Global Strategy in the Emerging World Order

(Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2002) 10.
28 Duong

11-12.
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interests.29

These specific enemies, that is, rogue states, are part of a grand ideological

justification for US global military and economic supremacy in a post-9/11 security
context.

According to US President George W. Bush, all enemies of the US hate a

"world, shaped by American courage, power and wisdom, [which] now echoes with
American ideals ... a [world] defended by democracy, nurtured by free markets, spread
by information technology, carried to the world by free trade ... [US enemies] hate our
values and resent our success. 30

The event of 9/11 has enabled the US to moralize its security policy, to
objectively interpret "facts" and "threats," to frame security in moralistic and ethical

terms. The US "struggle" against enemies of peace and freedom is therefore presented as
a righteous campaign to bring freedom, peace, and stability to the world.

The US

campaign has universal moral and ideological overtones that have the effect of fueling as
opposed to tempering resistance to US power, thereby fomenting global insecurity. The
contest between the objective embodiment of goodness and truth (the US) versus
objective, unadulterated "evil" (rogue states, ubiquitous terror) creates a binary,
precarious, and constricted universe of international thought, action, and possibility.
Subscribing to such a binary opposition establishes a global template that procures
synthetic yet volatile standards of a simplified universe of right and wrong.

29 See Michael Klare, Rouge States & Nuclear Outlaws: America's Search for a New Foreign Policy (New York: Hill
and Wang, 1995); Thomas H. Henriksen, "The Rise and Decline of Rogue States," Journal of International Affairs
54.2, (Spring 2001) 349-373; Raymond Tanter, Rogue Regimes: Terrorism & Proliferation (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1998); Robert S. Litwak, Rogue States and US Foreign Policy: Containment After the Cold War (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000); Noam Chomsky, Rogue States: The Rule of Force in World Affairs
(Cambridge: South End Press, 2000); Clyde Prestowitz, Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism & the Failure of Good
Intentions (New York: Basic Books, 2003); T. D. Allman, Rogue State: America at War With the World (New York:

Nation, 2004).
George W. Bush, speech, The Citadel, Charleston, South Carolina, 23 Sept. 1999, The George W. Bush
Foreign
Policy Reader: Presidential Speeches With Commentary, ed. John W. Dietrich (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005) 22.
3
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Utility of Universal Foes
The "rogue state" is an epistemic category that is part of the antiquated bipolar
global security context, yet it has been reconfigured, resurrected by the event of 9/11.

The concept of the rogue state, introduced during the Clinton administration (1992-2000),
is "peculiarly American" (F. Cameron).

"Although the 'rogues' are all authoritarian

states, there are substantial differences between their political systems and their degree of
hostility toward the US. Yet [the US] maintains a single policy toward the 'rogues' based
on a mix of political and economic sanctions, international non-proliferation regimes, and
punitive military action." 3 '

The category presently refers to those states that overtly

"threaten" global peace and freedom by supporting terror and seeking to acquire WMD.
The leap from "threat," to "threat to US," to "threat to global order/society" is axiomatic
under the US ASA.

Overt criteria that merit the imposition of the label rogue state are:

being non-democratic and authoritarian, commission of "gross" violations of human

rights, and engaging in unwarranted militarization. 32 The application of these criteria is
selective; for instance, present US allies such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, and Jordan
are non-democratic, authoritarian, engage in "gross" violations of human rights, and/or
possess large militaries. 3 3 The US ASA, with its moralistic, ethical, militaristic, and
unfettered pursuit of absolute security, has enabled the US to be the sole arbiter in

31 Cameron

142.

See International Security Research Group, ISRG Nuclear ProliferationDossier: Rogue States, 11 Nov. 2007
<http://www. security-research.at/proliferation/?page_id=2>; George W. Bush, "Prevent Our Enemies From
Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction," The National Security Strategy of
the United States ofAmerica 2002, Washington, D.C., The White House, 2002, 11 Nov. 2007
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss5.html>.
32

See Parker T. Hart, Saudi Arabia and the United States: Birth of a Security Partnership(Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1998); Michael Herb, All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and DemocraticProspects in the
Middle Eastern Monarchies (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999).
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determining when a state is rogue, despite empirical criteria. Toward the end of the
Clinton administration, "rogue state" was replaced with "state of concern." In a unipolar
world, the more forceful category of rogue state has been reintroduced. After 9/11, the
category came to include sponsoring terrorism and proliferation of WMD; the threat
posed by rogue states unequivocally justifies an absolutist, unipolar security policy. 34

While terrorist organizations will continue to seek a WMD capability independent of
state programs, the sophisticated WMD knowledge and resources of a state could enable
a terrorist capability. State sponsors of terrorism and all nations that fail to live up to
their international obligations deserve greater scrutiny as potential facilitators of WMD
terrorism.3 5
Select states that have complied with US mandates have been removed from the
list. During the late 1990s, North Korea, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria,
Cuba, and Sudan were rogue states. The US-Pakistani alliance following the 9/11 attacks
effectively removed Pakistan from the list, as did the US invasions of Afghanistan and

Iraq after the 9/11 attacks. Libya is working toward removal by falling into line with US
global security policy, for example, by formally renouncing WMD.

In general, the

remaining rogue states have been officially branded as being part of an ominous "axis of
evil." 36 In the State of the Union Address 2002, US President George W. Bush declared

See International Security Research Group, ISRG Nuclear Proliferation Dossier: Rogue States, 1 1 Nov. 2007
<http://www.security-research.at/proliferation/?page id=2>.
3

3 US Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 28 April
2006, Chp. 7 The Global Challenge of WMD Terrorism, 15 May 2007 <www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64660.htm>.

See Bruce Cummings, Ervand Abrahamian, and Moshe Ma'oz, eds., Inventing the Axis of Evil: The Truth About
North Korea, Iran, and Syria (New York: New Press, 2004); Hugh Brogan, The Penguin History of the United States
ofAmerica (London: Penguin Books, 1990); Graham Fuller, Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan: Its Character &
Prospects (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1991), 31 May 2007 <http://www.rand.org/pubs/authors/f/fullergraha
m.html>.
36
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that the US views rogue "states, and their terrorist allies, [as constituting] an axis of evil,
arming to threaten the peace of the world." 37 Select "communist," hyper-nationalist, and
"radical" Islamic state ideologies are viewed as posing direct ideational and material
threats to the US NationalSecurity State 's global leadership, security policy, and weal of

global society.

A preponderance of US power, in conjunction with unipolarity, a

ubiquitous security discourse based on moral and ethical considerations, and intense
enmity toward rogue states, drives post-9/11 global security policy. "Without enemies ...
a nation [is] without purpose and direction.

The various components of the [US]

National Security State need enemies to justify their ... budgets, to aggrandize their work
... to give themselves a mission in the aftermath of the Soviet Union; ultimately, to
reinvent themselves."

38

The rogue state category has thus been reconfigured to reflect an

absolutist, unipolar framework, and without the ballast of the USSR the US has free reign
to determine what types of states pose a threat to the world community.

In positing an enemy, it is interesting to note that judgment is being passed by the
unipolar power pertaining to a state's essential right to exist. Yet, judgment is a practice
that occurs without objective criteria. That is, power judges "without criteria. We are in
the position of Aristotle's prudent individual, who makes judgments about the just and

unjust without the least [objective] criterion." 39 The political and moral dimensions of
judgment are based on subjective and relative precepts that have no intrinsic correctness

37 George W. Bush, State of the Union Address 2002, 29 Jan. 2002 (Washington, D.C.: The White House); John W.
Dietrich, ed., The George W. Bush Foreign Policy Reader: PresidentialSpeeches With Commentary (New York: M. E.

Sharpe, 2005) 59-62.
38 William Blum, Rogue State: A Guide to the World's Only Superpower (Monroe: Common Courage Press 2000) 15.
9 Jean Francois Lyotard and Jean-Loup Thebaud, Just Gaming, trans. Wlad Godzich (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1999) 14.
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or validity beyond the precepts themselves.

Every political judgment modifies the

"facts" on which it is passed; judgment, while devoid of objective criteria per se, is a
form of political thought that is itself a form of political action.40

Indeed, while one may

dispute an empirical fact, it is impossible to dispute the motives and intentions that
underlie the interpretation of a fact.
interpreting.

A fact has significance based on who or what is

Judgment is therefore an act of imagination, enabling an actor to have the

power to invent criteria for "objective"

judgment. 4 1

To have criteria for "true" objective

judgment would assume, as the US ASA does, that there is an objective consensus that
can be obtained between US security, global security, and peace, freedom, and justice.
The event of 9/11 has provided a means for the US to pursue such a course of action.
Yet, to put forward a singular framework that determines what constitutes global security
involves establishing truths with core principles that are, in actuality, malleable and
illimitable. In the case of rogue states,

the US is exquisitely attuned to the rise of a government, that
will not lie down and happily become an American client state,
that will not look upon the free market or the privatization of the
world known as 'globalization' as the summum bonum, that will
not change its domestic laws and public policies to favor foreign
investment at the expense of the poor, that will not be
unconcerned about the effects of foreign investment upon the
long-term welfare of its own people, that will not easily tolerate
the decrees of the IMF, USAID, or the US war on terror and the
militarization of law enforcement, or the WTO, that will not
allow an American or NATO military presence/installation upon
its soil. 4 2

40

See Carr, Twenty 1-10.

41

Lyotard, Gaming 17-18.

42 Blum 23.
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The US ASA aggressively promotes state-specific conceptual and moral systems that, in
turn, inform the US postulation of security. 43

As stated by US President George W.

Bush, the Evil "Empire has passed, but evil remains ... our nation is on the right side of
history-the side of man's dignity and God's justice ... The vacuum left by America's
retreat would invite challenges to our power. And the result, in the long run, would be a
stagnant America and a savage world." 44
When considering the US ASA, one must keep in mind that "categories express

not only the forms but also the conditions of existence ... The truth [embodied in
categories] is not 'detached ... like a finished article from the instrument that shapes
it.'

45

The process of conceptual and material "production" of security is part of a larger

enterprise of obtaining "absolute security." 46 In the ASA, absolute security involves a
state's total exercise of control over the classification of action taken against threats to
security-with "threat" being so vague and expansive that implementing

security

becomes a destabilizing as well as totalizing affair. The US is able to justifiably assume
this posture because of the war response the US has articulated to 9/11 based on

intangible and un-falsifiable jingoistic, moral, and ethical considerations.

The US ASA

(especially the war on terror) is hyper-nationalist in thought and practice-perhaps even
more so than the rogue states that have been designated enemies of global order. Fervent

43 See Helen Milner and Jack Snyder, "Lost Hegemony?" InternationalOrganization42.4 (Fall 1988) 749-750.

44 George

W. Bush, speech, The Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California, 19 Nov. 1999, The
George W. Bush Foreign Policy Reader: PresidentialSpeeches With Commentary, ed. John W. Dietrich (New York:

M. E. Sharpe, 2005) 26-27.

45 Guy

Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: Zone Books, 1995) 144.

46 See David C. Hendrickson, "Toward Universal Empire: The Dangerous Quest for Absolute Security,"
World Policy

Journal19.3 (Fall 2002) 1-3.
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belief in ideals, forms, and practices of US political, social, and economic thought undergird the vanguard role of the US on the world stage.

Hyper-nationalism, however,

negatively impacts the rational material self-interest of states, particularly because
nationalism is a precursor of imperialism: "wars, begun for motives of security ...
become wars of aggression and self-seeking." 4 7

Destabilizing the States System

This study contends that the US ASA, premised on a preponderance of power,
produces insecurity, instability, and generates enduring threats to US national and global
security by fomenting conflict and instability by ignoring the principle of state
sovereignty.

In practice, the ASA alienates and isolates, foments distrust, discord, and

undermines cooperative incentives or inclinations amongst states within a system of
states. This occurs because the US ASA empties fundamental states system concepts of

substantive content while retaining the language and form of such concepts. In defining
enemies of global peace and freedom, the US ASA is specular in nature, that is, it
designates certain states as viable enemies that in actuality pose little or no genuine
threat.
Image opposed to substance informs the unilateral postulation of rogues. Terror
in particular has provided the impetus for an unbridled US ASA.

This is the case because

what stays with us, above all else, is the sight of images, and
their fascination, are necessarily what we retain, since images
47 E. H. Carr, "Realism and Idealism," Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War & Peace 2 nd ed., ed.
Richard K. Betts (New York: Pearson, 2005) 77; Einstein 3.
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are, whether we like it or not, our primal scene. And, at the same
time as they have radicalized the world situation, the events in

New York can also be said to have radicalized the relation of the
image to reality ... The role of images is highly ambiguous. For,
at the same time as they exalt the event, they also take it hostage.
They serve to multiply it to infinity and, at the same time, they

are a diversion and a neutralization ... The image consumes the
event, in the sense that it absorbs it and offers it for consumption
... [giving] it unprecedented impact in imposing a single
framework for international security policy.4 8

The spectacle of terror, beyond the actual event, exclusive of the other's perspective as to
motive, justification, and the role assumed by the US in perpetuating terror, is utilized to
effectuate homogenization of the states system.

The US has been able to effectively

package its ASA as a necessary and indubitable response to the wanton 9/11 attacks on

the US homeland based on hatred, iniquity, jealousy, and other intangible moralistic
criteria. One cannot argue with a position rooted in morality because of the fundamental
distinction that exists between a fact and an interpretation, between moral, factual, and

material elements. The fact of the actual attacks is undeniable; the meaning, significance,
and interpretation of the fact, however, is boundless, and the US seeks to privilege its
interpretation as the only interpretation that can be possibly extracted from the event of

9/11, an interpretation that embodies an objective world view:

In all its specific manifestations ... the spectacle epitomizes the
prevailing node of [security] ... In form and content the
spectacle serves as total justification for the conditions and aims
of the existing system. It further ensures the permanent presence
of that justification. 49

Jean Baudrillard, The Spirit of Terrorism & Requiem for the Twin Towers, trans. Chris Turner (London/New York:
Verso, 2002) 26-27.
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To retain the rogue state category is to provide justification for the US ASA.

To

topple regimes without a semblance of legitimacy is to risk using what the states system
would term an "illegitimate" use of force.

Unipolarity does not explicitly equal

absolutism in the context of a states system, so hegemonic warfare is waged in overt and
subtle ways. Without "just"cause, the US cannot simply outright discard the system of

states' precepts of sovereignty in its dealings with (rogue) states; indeed, the invasions of
Iraq and Afghanistan have attenuated US credibility and status in some parts of the world
community.

This would wholly empty the states system of validity.

The US cannot

simply discard world opinion in total; to do so would result in a total paradigm shift, and
complete abandonment of a states system. Hence, the event of 9/11 has been utilized as a
means to explicitly bypass the restraints placed upon states by the states system.
Global

security now hinges on terror.

Due to the 9/11

attacks, terror, a

polymorphous category with inexhaustible application as far as what constitutes a
terrorist act or thought, is the standard for global security. US interests and priorities set
the parameters for global security policy, and by default the agenda for the international
community. Since US policy stipulates that, "globalization requires that partner nations
work together closely to prevent, detect, and disrupt linkages that may develop between

terrorists and [any type of] facilitators," states that cannot counter US power are pushed
into accommodating its ASA.

50

To ascertain the operative premises and consequences of

the US ASA and its relationship to the event of 9/11 the following general questions will
be addressed: How does US domestic security, in light of unipolarity, affect/effect global

US Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 28 April
2006, Chapter 7 The Global Challenge of WMD Terrorism, 21 May 2007 <www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64660.h
tm>.
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security? How has global securitization changed in a post-9/1 1 world? What role does
US power assume? How is US power resisted, and what does resistance signify?
While a "politics of resistance" versus a "politics of supremacy" was an explicit

theme in the previous bipolar paradigm, in a post-9/11 unipolar world the US has
attempted to restructure notions of resistance and supremacy along very distinct yet broad

cultural, ideological, social, moral, and political lines. 5'

The US ASA actively and

forcibly proffers the politics, culture, and morality of a single state to objectively
represent the will and wellbeing of every state, in spite of the Westphalia principle of
diverse sovereign states. The Westphalia system has (traditionally) been viewed as

providing the following key principles/cornerstones of modern international relations:
sovereignty of states, elementary right of political self-determination, functional equality
between states, and non-intervention in the internal affairs of states.52

US Imperialism & Hegemony

The post-9/11 ASA, though distinct from the Cold War and pre-9/11 security
contexts, is part of a historical trajectory of the external projection of US power that has
selectively jettisoned Westphalia principles. Generally speaking, US foreign and security
policy have been informed by what Georges Debord describes as an aspiration to
"refashion the totality of [international] space into its own peculiar decor."5 3 Indeed, an
embryonic form of imperialistic/hegemonic security was put into practice by the US as
s1 Gill 68-73; Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs 72.3 (Summer 1993).
52 Treaty of Westphalia, October 24, 1648: Peace Treaty Between the Holy Roman Emperor, the King of France
&

Their Respective Allies, Avalon Project, Yale Law School 1996, 12 July 2007 <www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/westphal
.htm>.
s3 Debord 121.
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early as 1898, when it involved itself in the Spanish-Cuban war of independence. Over a
century later, the US has steadily pursued the hegemonic project it embarked on after

WWII when it established the global rules of engagement with the USSR, militarizing the
US economy to counter the ominous "Soviet threat" to US and global security. 54 In the
21st century, the US faces no overwhelming opposition to its unilateralist security

policies, and has premised its security on a war response to the 9/11 attacks on the US
Homeland. 9/11 has enabled the US to assume its paladin role with verve, determination,

and indubitable legitimacy. This, supposedly, is a good thing, a positive product of the
"end of history."5 5 As US President G.H. Bush declared in the aftermath of the collapse
of communism, a "world once divided into two armed camps now recognizes one sole
and preeminent power, the USA. And they regard this with no dread.

For the world

trusts us with power, and the world is right."56 The US international agenda, inextricably
linked with its domestic interests, has and continues to be held out as the basis for

defining the will and interests of the international community.
The "will of the international community," however, in security policy/discourse

explicitly refers to the will of the US. The vague notion of the "will of the international
community" functions in much the same manner as "the People" in US domestic political
discourse.

Multifarious warfare is waged by the US in the name and interests of "the

People" and the "will of the international community."

Yet "the People," like the "will

s4 See The Harry S. Truman Presidential Museum and Library, 5 June 2007 <www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/

studycollectionsdoctrine/large/index. php>.
ss See Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" The NationalInterest 16 (Summer 1989); Robert J. Lieber, "Foreign

Policy and American Primacy," Eagle Rules? Foreign Policy and American Primacy in the 21" Century, ed. Robert J.
Lieber (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2002) 1-15.
56 George H. Bush, New York Times, 29 Jan.

1992, A-16; William Blum, Rogue State: A Guide to the World's Only
Superpower (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2000).
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of the international community," is a functional sociopolitical construct, contingent upon
subjective and relative values and interests. As Barbara Herrnstein Smith observes, "All
value is radically contingent, being neither a fixed attribute, an inherent quality, or an
objective property of things but, rather, an effect of multiple, continuously changing, and
continuously interacting variables."5

7

A war on terror, waged in the interests of the "international community," consists

of the following components:

1., making the world open and hospitable for-in current
terminology-globalization, particularly US-based transnational
corporations, 2., preventing the rise of any society that might
serve as an alternative to the US moral, political, social,
ideological, and economic model, and 3., extending political,
economic, and military hegemony over as much of the globe as
possible to prevent the rise of any regional power that might
challenge US supremacy, creating a global order in the US
image, as befits the world's only superpower.58

To be hegemonic, US security must consist of ubiquitous, objective precepts as the only
legitimate, authoritative components that can constitute the fabric of global security and

society. 59

The moral justification to utilize an unfettered use of force to obtain US

security goals is therefore postulated as intrinsically correct under its ASA, in light of the
9/11 attacks.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, however, has observed the negative

s7 Barbara Herrnstein Smith, "Contingencies of Value," The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, eds. Vincent B.
Leitch, William E. Cain, Laurie A. Fink, Barbara E. Johnson, John McGowan, and Jeffery J. Williams (New York:

W.W. Norton, 2001) 1913.
58 Blum, Rogue

13-14.

59 See Fukuyama, "History" for an example of liberal-democracy touted as the final stage of political evolution for
humankind. For a discussion of grand strategies in securitization measures see B. R. Posen The Sources of Military
Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984).
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effects of this premise, pointing out that US security policy is directly contributing to
fueling a global arms race and proliferation. The world is

witnessing an almost unconstrained hyper use of force in
international relations. One state, the US, has overstepped its
national borders in every way ... This is very dangerous.
Nobody feels secure anymore because nobody can rely upon
mechanisms of order such as international law ... A unipolar
system is nourishing an arms race with the desire of countries to
get nuclear weapons ... Until we dispense with unilateralism in
international affairs, until we exclude the possibility of
unfettered imposition of one country's views on others, we will
not have stability. 60

When considering the US ASA, it is important to keep in mind Arnold Wolfers'
observation that "political formulas such as 'national interest' or 'national security' ...

need to be scrutinized with particular care ... While appearing to offer guidance and a
basis for broad consensus they may be permitting [one state] to label whatever policy [it]
favors" as universal. 6 1

The US ASA promises fortification, management, order, peace,

and security through totalizing control of world affairs based on US moral prerogatives.
This state of affairs produces a rubric of security that, based on moralistic and ethical
justifications imbued in a hostile war response, creates a precarious state of affairs for the
conduct of international relations.

Indeed, 9/11 has become an objective "fact" that

provides blanket authority and immunity for implementing an absolutist security agenda.
Under the US ASA, the "borderline between culture, [ideology,] and empirical reality

Vladimir Putin, speech, "4 3 'd Munich Security Conference," 10 Feb. 2007, BBC News Online,
1 June 2007 <http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6349287.stm>.
60

61 Arnold Wolfers, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol," Political Science Quarterly 67 (Dec. 1952) 481-502.
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becomes more and more indistinct."6 2 According to Wolfers' notion of a "normative
proposition," nations "are called upon to give priority to national security and thus to
consent to any sacrifice of value which will provide an additional increment of security
... Pushed to its logical conclusion ... spatial extension of the range of values does not
stop short of world domination." 63

Security is defined by complex systemic order-combines that manufacture,
deploy, reproduce, reify, and create "a continuous call for authority" 64 against internal
and external threats. 6 5 Security, as with any other expression of power, is a discursive as
well as material form of truth, given that individuals and collectivities are products of
power, of specific configurations of order that utilize security to maintain modalities of

control.

US innocence (no-ill will toward other states), benevolence (the desire to do

good for other states), and exceptionalism (the superiority of the US to establish global
order) justify the globalization of US values and security interests, especially in a post-

9/11 context.66 Yet, a unipolar and absolutist security system is destabilizing vis-a-vis a
system of states. In light of security, state policy, and the relationship each has with
imperialism, Arnold Wolfers notes that,

every increment of security must be paid by additional sacrifices
of other values usually of a kind more exacting than the mere
62 Theodore W. Adorno, The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture, ed. and intro. J.M. Bernstein (New

York: Routledge, 1991) 61.
63 Wolfers, "National" 119.
64 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2000) 14.
65 Howard K. Bloom, The Lucifer Principle(New York: Atlantic Monthly
Press, 1995) 1-25.

66 Jerel A. Rosati, The Politics of US Foreign Policy nd ed. (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace, 1999)
400-410: Jerel A.
2
Rosati, ed., Readings in the Politics of US Foreign Policy 2 nd ed. (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace, 1998) 376-386.
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expenditure of precious time on the part of policy makers. At a
certain point, then, by something like the economic

law of

diminishing returns, the gain-if any-in security no longer
compensates for the added costs of attaining it. Absolute security
is out of the question unless a country is capable of world

domination, in which case, however, the insecurities and fears
would be internalized and probably magnified. 6 7

The US, in assuming an absolutist security posture, stands above and is outside of
contending forces.

It comprises an authority that is neutral between the conflict that

permeates state relations and the international system.

The righteousness of the US

enables it in "every case to decide which party to the dispute has justice on its side."6 8 As
Special Assistant for US National Security, Condoleezza Rice unequivocally declared:
"American values are universal ... the triumph of these values is most assuredly easier

when the international balance of power favors those who believe in them." 69

Global Enemies, Militarization & Ideology
The US ASA embodies "supreme ideological representation." That is, the US is
tendered as a means of universal unification, a unity that is "real" in a material, political,
cultural, moral, and psychological sense in light of the ominous threat posed by terror to
all actors in the international

system after 9/11.

The "International

Communist

Conspiracy" that justified and legitimated US security during the Cold War has been
replaced by a polymorphous war on terror waged against any idea, practice, state, regime,

67 Wolfers, "National" 120.
68 Michel Foucault, Power: Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Vol. III, trans. Robert Hurley, intro. Colin
Gordon, ed. James D. Faubion (New York: New Press, 1994) 27.
69 Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," Foreign Affairs 79.1
(Jan/Feb 2000) 49.
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person, and/or group that proactively and aggressiN ely oppose US power. When material
and intangible power are concentrated, however, destabilization and insecurity become
pronounced. "The more concentrated the system becomes globally, ultimately forming
one single network, the more it becomes vulnerable... [In the case of 9/11] it was

eighteen suicide attackers who ... unleashed a global catastrophic process." 70
The form and substance of post-9/11 US security are beyond critique, or can only
be critiqued, analyzed, expounded upon, etc., on their own terms.

Hence, the US can

discuss the "proper" parameters of international security via its ordering constructs such

as ideology, political philosophy and system, and economic policy. The exercise of US
power on the world stage contributes to the creation and propagation of new objects of
"knowledge and accumulates new bodies of information.

Knowledge and power are

integrated with one another ... It is not possible for power to be exercised without
knowledge, and it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power." 7'

The

institutionalization of knowledge/power, in the guise of authoritative, objective security

discourse, systemically and systematically privileges a particular system of truth over
others.

Institutionalized US power in the form of global governmental and non-

governmental

actors

reflects

a

rationalized

administration

of

knowledge-an

"administration of knowledge, a politics of knowledge, relations of power which pass via
knowledge." 72 In the manufacture of power-precepts, it is important to keep in mind
what type(s) of knowledge does an actor that wields supreme authority seek to
70 Jean Baudrillard, The Spirit of Terrorism & Requiem for the Twin Towers, trans. Chris Turner (London/New York:

Verso, 2002) 8.
71 Foucault, Power 51-52.
72 Foucault, Power 69.
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disqualify?

"Which speaking, discoursing subjects-which subjects of experience and

knowledge-do you then want to diminish?" 73 Who has "justice" on their side and why?
Military objectives such as destroying the al Qaida network have been combined
with "globalist objectives, such as making the war [on terror] an ideological crusade 'for
a just peace-a peace that favors human liberty' [via] rebuilding Afghanistan with pro-

US leaders, and securing access to oil ... winning the war on terrorism is a uniquely
America's 'responsibility' equally for idealistic and power-political reasons."7 4 Indeed, it
is the case that

only the US can rally the world in a task of this complexity ...
against an enemy so elusive and so resourceful. [Only] the US
can see this effort through to victory. This responsibility did not
come to us by chance. We are in a unique position because of
our unique assets ... the character of our people, the strength of
75
our ideals, the might of our military.

The production of knowledge and truth is, therefore, essential to the manufacture and

deployment of US security.
spectacle,

Hence, 9/11 the event has been converted to 9/11-as-

9/11-as-legitimizer, 9/11-as-the-moral-and-ethical, 9/11-as-the-reference-

point for US security policy.

Truth, an elusive and malleable state of affairs, is not

independent of power and control.

Indeed, truth's effect on the unthinking, uncritical

subject leads to what Nietzsche refers to as humankind's most false illusion, that is, "a
thing exists therefore it is legitimate. Here one is concluding functionality from viability,

7 Foucault, Power 85.
74 Gurtov, Confronting 1-20.
7 Dick Cheney, speech before the Council on Foreign Relations, 15 Feb. 2002, New York Times, 16 Feb. 2002, A-6.
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and legitimacy from functionality."'

6

The manufacture of knowledge and truth "is a

political production as for political power; it is the object, under diverse forms, of
immense diffusion and consumption ... it is produced and transmitted under the control,
dominant if not exclusive, of a few great political and economic apparatuses." 77

The language and content of absolutist security, which expresses the "total
practice of one particular economic and [sociopolitical] formation," cannot be challenged
because it is based on the event of 9/11; 9/11 is, so to speak, the formation's agenda. 78
Yet, at the root of unipolar security lies the specialization and specification of US power.
US power is so pronounced that it asserts the right to change the meaning of a
cornerstone of international relations under the aegis of security.

concept that has been attenuated by the US ASA.

Sovereignty is key

According to the US State

Department's Director of Policy Planning, Richard Haass,

Sovereignty entails obligations.
terrorism in any way.

One is ... not to support

If a government fails to meet these

obligations, then it forfeits some of the normal advantages of
sovereignty, including the right to be left alone in your own
territory. Other governments, including the US, gain the right to
intervene. In the case of terrorism, this can even lead to a right
of preventive, or preemptory, self-defense. 79

76 Friedrich Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense," The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism,
eds. Vincent B. Leitch, William E. Cain, Laurie A. Fink, Barbara E. Johnson, John McGowan, and Jeffery J. Williams
(New York: W.W. Norton, 2001) 878.
77 Foucault, Power 132.
7 Debord 15.
7 Richard Haass quoted in Mel Gurtov, "American Crusades: Unilateralism, Past & Present," Confronting the Bush
Doctrine: Critical Views From the Asia-Pacific, eds., Mel Gurtov and Peter Van Ness (London: Routledge-Curzon,
2005) 11.
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By attenuating sovereignty, the US arrogates to itself the right to intervene, to strike at
any threat it feels may be the case.

"The specialized role played by the [US and its

security] is that of spokesman for all other activities, a sort of diplomatic representative
of hierarchical society at its own court, and the source of the only discourse which
[global] society [is] allow[ed] to hear."8 0 To define the problem of security for the entire

globe as being rooted in amorphous terror is to reduce the complexity of a system of
states and its attributes (for example, sovereignty, cooperation, diplomacy, economy,
balance of power, interest, interdependence) to a "simplistic" formula based on a single
state's policy, interests, morals, and values.8 '

Morality, ideology, and militarization go hand in hand under the US ASA.

For

example, from 1995-2000 the US share of world military expenditures was 37% more
than the combination of military spending by the other nine countries in the top ten of

states who spent the most on militarization: US arms sales amounted to over $18 billion
in 2000, and by 2003 the US spent over $400 billion.82

An exceptional and

unprecedented military build-up, in conjunction with the mass dissemination of ideology
and morality, has been initiated since the 9/11 attacks in order to secure the US's
preeminent and unipolar position in the global order.

The claims of ideology now take on a sort of flat, positivistic
exactness: ideology is no longer a historical choice, but simply
an assertion of the obvious. Names of particular ideologies have
vanished. The portion of properly ideological labor serving the
system may no longer be conceived of other than in terms of an
80 Debord 18-19.
81 Suzanne Daley, "French Minister Calls US Policy Simplistic," New York Times, 7 Feb. 2002, A-10.
82 See SIPRI, 5 May 2007 <http://projects.sipri.se/milex/mexmajorspend
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ers.html>.

'epistemological
ideological

base'

supposedly transcending all specific

phenomena. Ideology

without a name ... 'Total

in material form

ideology'-the

is itself

despotism of a

fragment imposing itself as the pseudo-knowledge of a ... whole,
as a [totalizing] worldview-forms the basis of post-9/11

security.83

Morality & Global Governance
There is then a battle for truth, around the circumference of truth, where war is
waged not on behalf of the truth, but over the power and "status of truth and the

economic and political role it plays." 84 The war on terror, the progeny of 9/11, as a
security rubric creates a binary framework of US/international society versus enemies of
peace and freedom. A state can find itself locked into a specified category, limiting or
expanding its potential and possibilities within the global context. Pakistan, for example,
is an example of a state that fell into favor with US security policy despite its domestic
politics, acquirement of WMD, sale of WMD technologies to official enemies of the US
(North Korea), and a history of providing support for terrorist groups.

Requiring

Pakistan's cooperation in the war on terror, the US provided material incentives to a state

that had been classified as a viable threat.

Sanctions on Pakistan for its nuclear-weapons tests in 1998 were
removed; its government, well known for cooperation, received
$600 million in aid, an open door to IMF assistance ($135
million), and access to the F-16 jet fighters that it had bought
from the US but had been denied the right to possess.
Musharraf, while cracking down on allegedly radical Islamic

83 Debord 212-213.
84 Foucault, Power

132.

34

schools and groups in his country, used the opportunity afford by
85
the war [on terror] to cement his [authoritarian] rule.

Consistency in global security policy is tied to the moral and political dimensions
of US security. These dimensions, in turn, "are determined by the [US] political and
cultural environment. Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the
control of man over man."8 6 Politics, morality, and security are explicitly moral in their
enunciations and manifestations. By postulating a universal moral enemy, one is able to

establish cognitive consistency and premise action on the defeat of an objectively true
"clear and present danger" that is truly beyond question.

Indeed, by "abolishing the

dictators, ... militarists, manufacturers of armaments or one of the other villains, peace
[will] be preserved ... it is often the passion for the antidote-whether [eliminating terror,
establishing] democracy,

... or [pushing] free trade-rather than an analysis of the

illness" that motivates the moral and military impetus behind waging war.87 Universal
moral principles, however, cannot be wholly applied to the actions of every state since

morality is "filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place."8 8 Security is
not an objective category of truth.
dominance, and subordination.

Rather, it is indicative of relations of power,

Morality is relative, non-objective in character and

content. While a clash of aims, interests, moralities, or civilizations may be intrinsically

85 Gurtov

16-17.

86 Hans J. Morgenthau. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power & Peace th ed.
(New York: Alfred Knopf,
4

1966) 11.
87 Geoffrey Blainey, "Power, Culprits, and Arms," Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War & Peace
2"d ed., ed. Richard K. Betts (New York: Pearson-Longman, 2005) 112-113.
88

Morgenthau 12.
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satisfying, "aims are simply varieties of power. The vanity of nationalism, the will to
spread an ideology ... the desire for more territory or commerce, the avenging of defeat
or insult, the craving for greater national strength or independence, the wish to impress or
cement alliances-all these represent power in different wrappings."8 9 The war on terror

is interesting because it is a "war in which the enemy is criminalized if he simply defends
himself' or seeks the means to effectively defend against perceived US aggression. 90
Hence, North Korea's defensive posture can be readily construed as belligerent, even
though each state has a supposed right to self-determination and self-defense.
9/11 is indicative of the fact that terror is mutually exclusive from the target of
terrorism, that is, the US and its allies.

Under a terror-rubric, there exists the vanguard

and paladin of justice, peace, and freedom (the US), and those "unlawful combatants
criminally resisting the forces of universal order." 9 1 Terror and warfare, however, do not

occur in a vacuum; "War is never an isolated act; War does not spring up suddenly, it
does not spread to the full in a moment." 92 Terror therefore provides a malleable security

template that establishes a "domain of free syntheses" where everything and anything can
be securitized. 93 The parameters of terror are only limited by the hegemonic imagination.
The "positive" programmatic of patriotism, loyalty, and fidelity, and the
opprobrium attached to contradiction, critical appraisal, and divergent views from the

89

Blainey, "Power" 114.

90

Zizek 93.

91 Zizek 93.
92 Carl M. Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and intro. Anatol Rapoport (New
York: Penguin, 1982) 106.

93 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalismand Schizophrenia, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem,
and Helen R. Lane, preface Michel Foucault (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003) 54.
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official line of the unipolar state, embody the present US security agenda.

Ideological

warfare is rooted in the political-and politics is a fluid and inclusive categorization of
action that operates within and gives rise to other concomitant and competing states of

affairs (for example, the economic, cultural, and psychological).

94

Despite the political

being the object of war, "it must accommodate itself to the nature of the means, and

though changes in these means may involve modification in the political objective, the
latter always retains a prior right of consideration." 95 Politics, therefore, is interwoven
within war, and exercises a continuous influence upon war and security. "War is not

merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political
commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means ... for the political view is the
object, War is the means, and the means must always include the object in our
conception." 96
Rogue states, therefore, serve to legitimate the expansiveness,

intrusiveness,

essentialness, inexorableness, immanence, and ideological-moral correctness of post-9/11
US security. 9 7 As empirical case studies, rogue states reveal that the designation and
signifier of "rogue state" has explanatory power in understanding the post-9/11 security
context, and how the event of 9/11 has provided fodder for an absolutist security posture.

94 See Adorno 61-97.

95 Clausewitz 119.
96

Clausewitz 119.

97 See William Blum, Freeing the World to Death: Essays on the American Empire (Monroe: Common Courage
Press, 2005); Nicholas Berry, "The Self-Serving 'Rogue State' Doctrine," Center for Defense Information
(Washington, D.C., 2000), 14 Jan. 2007 <www.cdi.org/asia/ fa061600.html>; Mary Caprioli and Peter F. Trumbore,
"Identifying 'Rogue' States and Testing their Interstate Conflict Behavior," European Journal of International
Relations 9.3 (2003) 377-406, and "Rhetoric Versus Reality: Rogue States in Interstate Conflict," Journal of Conflict
Resolution 49.5 (2005) 770-791; Noam Chomsky, Ramsey Clark, and Edward W. Said, Acts ofAggression: Policing
Rogue States (New York/London: Seven Stories Press, 1999); Salim Lamrani, ed., Superpower Principles: US
Terrorism Against Cuba (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2005).
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US policy toward North Korea in particular is "of a piece with the more profound
doctrine shift in US foreign policy that the administration was able to implement with
greater ease after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001:

a move away from

traditional containment, a preference for unilateralism over multilateralism, and a
scorning of diplomacy in favor of preventive war." 98

Rogue states can, therefore, be

analyzed on two levels, that is, on a surface level, and on a deeper, substantive level that
goes beyond proffered terms. 99 US policy on its own terms comprises the surface level,
which posits objective, apolitical criteria for rogue state status, such as large conventional
military

forces,

state-sponsor-of-terrorism

status,

illegitimate

inclusion on the US Country Reports on Terrorism.

WMD

capacity, and

The Reports articulate US

values/interests as the basis for genuine global peace and security;

"foremost among

criteria for incorporation into the [rogue category is] violation of American ideals."1 00

For example, although Cuba fails to meet any of the main criteria, it appears in the
Reports due to US domestic ideological and political factors.
If one goes beyond the terms of US power, "rogue" states function as any other

state would within a states-system context.101

Rogue states engage in propaganda,

information control, moral, political, and ideological socialization, and seek to acquire
resources, armaments, and obtain security.

Also, as is the case with other states,

98 John Feffer, North Korea/South Korea: US Policy at a Time of Crisis (New York: Seven Stories, 2003) 14.
99 See John Feffer, ed., Power Trip (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2003); David Hendrickson, "Toward Universal
Empire," World Policy Journal 19.3 (Fall 2002) 1-3.

100 Raymond Tanter, Rogue Regimes: Terrorism & Proliferation(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998) 40-42; William
Jefferson Clinton, "Strengthening American Security"; Warren Christopher, "America's Strategy for a Peaceful and
Prosperous Asia-Pacific," US Departmentof State Dispatch v.6, 591-544, 31 July 1995.
'01 See Bruce Cummings, Ervand Abrahamian, and Moshe Ma'oz, eds., Inventing the Axis of Evil: The Truth About
North Korea, Iran, and Syria (New York: New Press, 2004).
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preservation and projection of power are at the top of rogue state priorities; they seek
weapons, funds, resources, and security for the same reason(s) that other states seek
them, for example, to protect the integrity of geopolitical borders, preserve political
regimes, and project power. 0 2 The "rogue" signifier, when viewed outside of US terms,
is in actuality part of a more general phenomenon of hyper-nationalism.

Rogue status

can be viewed as referring to ultra-nationalist states whose socio-political and economic
agendas reject the premise of global US power. Indeed, if the US is viewed as a state as
opposed to a hegemonic entity, it is as "nationalist" as any other, the difference being that
it has the wherewithal to forcibly impose its agenda on a global scale. US Senator Albert
Beveridge, at the turn of the century, ardently declared that:

Providence had made [the US] the master organizers of the

world to establish system where chaos reigns ... made [the US]
adept in government [to] administer government among savage

and senile peoples ... has marked the American people as [the]
chosen Nation to finally lead in the regeneration of the world.
This is the divine mission of America ... We are trustees of the

world's progress, guardians of its righteous peace.103

The notion that the US has a categorical and legitimate "right" to define the parameters of
global affairs has remained a viable component of US foreign policy/discourse since it

involved itself in the Spanish-Cuban War for independence in 1898. The US hegemonic
impulse has found extensive expression over the last 110 years.

02 See Jack S. Levy, "The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology," Conflict After the Cold War:
Arguments on Causes of War & Peace 2 nd ed., ed. Richard K. Betts (New York: Longman. 2002); Scott D. Sagan and
Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread ofNuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: Norton, 2003).
103 Albert Beveridge quoted in William L. Shirer,
2 0 'h Century Journey: A Memoir of a Life and the Times-The Start,

1904-1930, Vol.

I (New

York: Simon and Shuster, 1976) 68.
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Organization of Study
This study will proceed by posing questions and hypotheses, and then discussing
conceptual and methodological issues regarding the US ASA.

Then, the USA Patriot Act

2001 and WMD proliferation vis-a-vis North Korea will be analyzed to expound upon the
implementation of the US ASA in a post-9/11 security context. This study will conclude
by offering insights and conclusions about the US ASA and its impact on configuring
global security.
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CHAPTER 2.

QUESTIONS

& HYPOTHESES

This chapter will clarify the general research questions and hypotheses that
ground this study, and will analyze some of the main operative philosophic and theoretic
components and assumptions that under-gird the US ASA as template for global security.

This will be accomplished

by examining in-depth

the role, implications,

and

consequences that epistemology, language, discourse, symbol, morality, and rules of

formation play in the articulation and dissemination of global security in a post-9/11
security context. In particular, the US ASA will be analyzed vis-a-vis the event of 9/11,
the US war-response to the terrorist attacks, power, force, the war on terror, terrorism,

enemies, and select US government statements and policies pertaining to security and
terror.

Subsequent chapters will then provide empirical exemplars of the US ASA as

manifested in the realms of criminalization of terror via the USA Patriot Act 2001, and
WMD proliferation by North Korea.

This study will focus upon two specific questions and hypotheses:

Question 1. How is post-9/11 US and global security defined,
and has it eclipsed previous notions of security based upon a
system of states?
Hypothesis 1. If it is the case that the US is pursuing an ASA,
then the present global security agenda challenges security
notions based on a system of states because an ASA reflects a
unipolar world, wherein the values and interests embodied in US
security are the basis for global security.
Question 2. Has 9/11 provided an opportunity for the US to
implement an absolutist security agenda?
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Hypothesis 2. If the US is pursuing an absolutist security agenda,
then 9/11 has served to legitimate and justify its implementation.

By

promulgating an absolutist

security

discourse, the

US has sought to

monopolize the conceptual and dialogical capacity of international actors, "capturing"
other states in a unipolar security discourse. 10 4 This is possible because the event of 9/11
provided the US with an imprimatur of propriety and authority to put forth an absolutist

agenda. Clothed in the garb of morality, justice, security, and "unprovoked" attacks on
the Homeland, the US has been able to articulate and disseminate an ASA that is premised
on a totalizing war-response to 9/11.

According to the US National Strategy for

Homeland Security 2007, the "terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, were acts of war
against the United States and the principles of freedom, opportunity, and openness that
define the American way of life. The severity and magnitude of the attacks were
unprecedented, and that dark day became a watershed event in the Nation's approach to

protecting and defending the lives and livelihoods of the American people (emphasis
added)."' 0 5 As the subsequent discussion will demonstrate, "defending" the lives and
livelihoods of the American people involves a moral and ethical notion of security that
spills over into every aspect of domestic and international affairs.
The US ASA utilizes techniques of power and control rooted in political realism
and in a singular epistemology of security. Four general realist assumptions under-gird

the US ASA:

unity of action and purpose; facts are objective, value-free concepts;

104 See Jean Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge,
trans. Geoff Bennington and
Brian Massumi, forward Fredric Jameson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984); Lyotard, Gaming 1-12.
105 The White House, National Strategy for Homeland Security October 2007,

gov/in focus/homeland/nshs/2007/index.html>.
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19 Aug. 2008 <http://www.whitehouse.

objective laws and regularities exist in the social world; and epistemology produces
objective truth. 106 The US ASA blends these assumptions with raw military power and a
knowledge system of security that utilizes epistemic categories to form a seamless,
holistic system.

So-called "critical" thought is, therefore, useful for gaining further

insight into the US ASA.10'

This is the case because there are "no brute facts, no facts

without interpretation, and interpretation always involves theory" that is saturated with
inter-subjective values and norms.'

are in actuality context-dependent.

08

Because human cognition is interpretive, "facts"

There is a general tendency in positivism to regard

language as a naming process, a sequence of symbols or words that intrinsically
corresponds to that which is named. The US ASA perpetuates itself by emphasizing the
axiomatic nature of its ordering principles and categories-for example, terror, peace,
freedom, and justice are "organic" signifiers. Such a conceptualization of language

106

See John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," InternationalSecurity 15:1
(Summer 1996) 5-56; Quincy Wright, A Study of War 2 nd ed. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1965); Geoffrey
Blainey, The Causes of War 3 rd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1988); Jack S. Levy, "The Causes of War: A Review of
Theories and Evidence," Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War: Vol. 1, eds. Philip E. Tetlock, et al., (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1989) 209-333; Michael E. Brown, Sean Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Perils of
Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and InternationalSecurity (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press,
1995); UnitedStates National Strategyfor Combating Terrorism, September 2006, 30 May 2007
<www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/>; The NationalSecurity Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006,
30 May 2007 <www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/>; Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds., The Use of Force:
Military Power & InternationalPolitics 6 th ed. (Rowman: Lanham, 2004); John J. Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon
Miss the Cold War," The Atlantic 266.2 (Nov. 1990) 35-50; Richard K. Betts, ed., Conflict After the Cold War:
Arguments on Causes of War and Peace 2 "d ed. (Pearson: New York, 2005); Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of
InternationalPolitics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979); Hans J. Morgenthau, PoliticsAmong Nations: The Struggle
For Power and Peace, 6 th ed., ed. Kenneth W. Thompson (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993); George F. Kennan,
"Diplomacy in the Modern World," Classics of InternationalRelations, ed. John A. Vazquez (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice Hall, 1986).
See John G. Ruggie, Constructingthe World Polity: Essays on InternationalInstitutionalization(New York:
Routledge, 1998); Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," InternationalSecurity 20.1 (Summer, 1995)
71-81; Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,
InternationalOrganization46.2 (Spring 1992) 391-425; David Dessler, "What is at Stake in the Agent-Structure
Debate?" International Organization43.3 (1989) 441-474; Michael Nicholson, "The Continued Significance of
Positivism?" International Theory: Positivism & Beyond, eds. Steve Smith, Ken Booth, Martha Zalewski (Cambridge:
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"assumes that ready-made ideas exist before words ... [and] lets us assume that the
linking of a name and a thing is a very simple operation."10 9 This is how 9/11 has been
construed and interpreted, and why it forms an irrefutable basis for pursuing the US ASA.

According to V.W. Quine, it is quite misleading to speak of the objective content of a
statement; any statement can be held true based on shifting standards of correctness,
truth. No statement is "immune" to revision."

0

"If a thought were correct a priori, it

would be a thought whose possibility ensured its truth. A priori knowledge that thought
was true would be possible only if its truth were recognizable from the thought itself.""'
The simulation of a priori truth generates loci of enunciation-that is, points where
interactive, complex knowledge systems intersect-that create the bases for legitimate
2

and authoritative categories to define and implement security."

Signifiers such as US-Global-Justice, US-Global-Freedom, US-Global-Security,
US-Global-Democracy,

and US-Global-Development

are arbitrary prescriptions as

opposed to fixed, stable, and definite states of affairs based on universal norms. "The

bond between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary.""

3

Objectivity is, as Pierre

Bourdieu notes, a product of a field of perceptual and conceptual effects "which depends
on the presuppositions accepted in the field, particularly as regards the legitimate way of

109 Ferdinand de Saussure, "Course in General Linguistics," trans. Wade Baskin, The Norton Anthology of Theory and
Criticism, eds. Vincent B. Leitch, William E. Cain, Laurie A. Fink, Barbara E. Johnson, John McGowan, and Jeffery J.
Williams (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001) 963.
110 See V. W. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," Challenges to Empiricism, ed. Harold Link-Morick (Belmont:

Wadsworth Publishing, 1972).
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Routledge, 2004).
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settling conflicts.""

4

Prescriptive language has the "extraordinary effect of making us

change worlds or of changing the world. To change the world in which we live and make

us change language ... as well. An effect not to be found anywhere else.""'

The US

ASA collapses distinctions between signs and signifiers, establishing a dissertation of
knowledge and power that, in turn, is used to manufacture first principles that are

bestowed and/or discovered, such as the utility of US power providing the basis for the
global system.
The US ASA is brazenly antithetical to the founding principles of the modern
international system. Hans Morgenthau observes that, "political realism, [the basis of

modern international relations,] refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular
nation with the moral laws that govern the universe.""16 The US ASA, however, seeks to
universalize one state's aspirations, casting an illimitable "net" as far as what qualifies as
a "threat." It leaves open the possibility of securitizing any activities and actors as

possible fodder for global security measures, generating a totalizing epistemology of how
and why to securitize. The US categorically asserts that, "We are a Nation blessed with
unprecedented liberty, opportunity, and openness-foundations of the American way of
life.

Our principal terrorist enemies-al-Qaida, its affiliates, and those inspired by

7
them-seek to destroy this way of life."" 1

114

Pierre Bourdieu, Science of Science & Reflexitivity, trans. Richard Nice (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press,

2004) 71.
15

Lyotard, Gaming 51.

116 Hans J. Morgenthau. PoliticsAmong Nations: The Strugglefor Power & Peace th ed. (New York:
Alfred
4

Knopf,

1966) 30.
The White House, NationalStrategyfor Homeland Security October 2007, 19 Aug. 2008 <http://www.whitehouse.
gov/in focus/homeland/nshs/2007/index.html>.
117

45

Under the US ASA, the states system is reduced to being an extension of the US.
In particular, the US reserves the categorical and unilateral right to decree final
pronouncement on the legitimacy of an international actor and its security policies, and to
act as an objective, referential authority of how world affairs are to be defined and

implemented.

International actors are, therefore, accorded degrees of legitimacy and

functionality based upon a set of subjective criteria that are ubiquitous yet singular,
domestic yet international, and state-centric yet selective as to what qualifies as a
legitimate international actor. The US is able to justifiably pursue such courses of action
based on the fact that anyone can be a terrorist, anything can be used to perpetuate terror,
and (in particular) those who perpetuate terror use their own deaths to further their cause.
"Terrorists, while they have at their disposal weapons that are the system's own, possess
a further lethal weapon:

their own deaths." "8

During the 43rd Munich Security

Conference, Russian President Vladimir Putin's critiques of US security policy touched
upon the modus operandiof the US ASA:

What is a uni-polar world? No matter how we beautify this
term, it means one single center of power, one single center of
force and one single master ... The US has overstepped its
borders in all spheres-economic, political and humanitarian,
and has imposed itself on other states.' 19 [US security policy] is
a formula that ... has led to disaster: Local and regional wars
did not get fewer ... We see no kind of restraint-a hyper0
inflated use of force.12
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Power, Morality & Terror
Regarding the role of material power in international relations, Hans Morgenthau
observes that, "international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever
the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim," and

involves control "over the minds and actions of' international actors.' 2' Power is,
therefore,

complex,

relations.

Utilizing an ASA, the US seeks control over information and knowledge in

multidimensional,

and permeates

all aspects

of international

"constant interplay with other media" to enhance US power. 22 Hence, 9/11 functions as
the objective and shared reference point for all international actors for the establishment
of an absolutist security agenda. After all, if terror is not destroyed where it grows, that
is, anywhere and everywhere, then the entire global community is in ominous mortal
danger.

The knowledge that emanates from knowledge systems therefore plays a

fundamental role in the message-articulation and manifestation of power, and the event of
9/11 forms the moral, conceptual, and security superstructure for pursuing a full-fledged

ASA.

As Kenneth Boulding notes, the "meaning of a message is the change which it

produces in the image. Concern with effect rather than meaning is a basic [dynamic] of
power-in-practice, for effect involves the total situation, and not a single level of
information."

23

The effect of 9/11 is to provide an objective, in-frangible basis for the

unilateral exercise of US power on the world stage.
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Perceptions of power run the gamut of possibility.

Graham Evans and Jeffrey

Newnham find power to be a "portmanteau concept," virtually impossible to define with
any degree of precision, and Robert Gilpin describes "the concept of power as one of the

most troublesome in the field of international politics." 2 4

For Robert Keohane and

Joseph Nye, power is an "elusive concept for statesmen and analysts of international
politics." 25

Susan Strange contends that the systemic structure of power consists of

specific micro-power structures of security, knowledge, production, and finance, each
component being of equal weight and interacting amongst each other.126 Michel Foucault
views power as relational:

"There are power relations.

They are multiple; they have

different forms, they can be in play in family relations, or within an institution, or an

administration-or between a dominating and a dominated class, power relations having
specific forms of rationality, forms which are common to them. It is a field of analysis
and not at all a reference to any unique instance." 2 7

military,

ideas,

discourse,

epistemology,

Economy, cooperation, regimes, the

material

resources,

states,

geopolitics,

propaganda, culture, politics-indeed, there is a superabundance of perspectives and
definitions of power that abound in the literature. The US ASA augments US power to
define global security by having a preponderance of tangible (military) and intangible
(social, symbolic, cultural) power that "characterizes the existence, circulation, and

124 Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, The Dictionaryof World Politics(London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992)
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operation of [security] discourses within a society." 2 8 With the moral and ethical might

to ground US security policy and action, the US ASA enables the US to exercise social
and material power in tandem in order to produce truth via knowledge, since "the subject
is constituted through practices of subjection, or, in a more autonomous way, through

practices of liberation, of liberty, ... on the basis, of course, of a number of rules, styles,
inventions

to be found

in [a social,

political, economic,

moral, and]

cultural

environment."1 2 9
Although there is a voluminous literature on power in international relations, four

distinct yet inter-relational spheres of power can be clearly identified in the US ASA:
Political, Cultural/Symbolic, Economic, and Military/Coercive power. Political power

involves

the

capacity

of

an

actor

to

authoritatively

define,

organize,

and

manage/implement individual and group life within a larger configuration of order.
Political power forms control and command rubrics, for example, procedural democracy,
that establish legitimate knowledge systems.

Cultural/Symbolic power involves and

refers to nonmaterial means, for example, ideas, language, and master symbols of

legitimation (see below), to disseminate ordering-principles. Economic power is rooted
in the ownership/control of private property in the form of tangible resources such as
fossil fuels and land. "This power sphere enables the power-bearer to possess the ability
to transform human, material, and financial resources into goods and services, for sale or

exchange in a market, in order to generate a means of subsistence" and wield power

128 Michel Foucault, "What is an Author?" The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, eds..
Vincent B. Leitch.
William E. Cain, Laurie A. Fink, Barbara E. Johnson, John McGowan, and Jeffery J. Williams (New York: W.W.
Norton, 2001) 1628.
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through profit.

30

Lastly, military power involves the material capacity of an actor to

exercise police powers as well as wage or threaten offensive and defensive physical

warfare against foes. In an ASA rubric, power is a combination of material (force) and
non-material (ideas) components, with ideas such as morality being as paramount as
crude military might. As E.H. Carr observes, "theories of social morality are always the
product of a dominant group which identifies itself with the community as a whole, and
which possesses facilities designed to subordinate groups or individuals [to impose] its
view of life on the community.

Theories of international morality are, for the same

reason and in virtue of the same process, the product of dominant nations." 3 ' In the case
of the US international theory of morality embodied in the US ASA, the NationalStrategy

for Homeland Security 2007 issues sweeping pronouncements that advocate a unitary
executive state via homogenization of security interests via immanent terror:

To best protect the American people, homeland security must be
a responsibility shared across our entire Nation. As we further
develop a national culture of preparedness, our local, Tribal,
State, and Federal governments, faith-based and community
organizations, and businesses must be partners in securing the
Homeland ... This Strategy also calls on each of you ... As we
secure the Homeland, however, we cannot simply rely on
defensive approaches and well-planned response and recovery
measures. We recognize that our efforts also must involve
offense at home and abroad. We will disrupt the enemy's plans
and diminish the impact of future disasters through measures that
enhance the resilience of our economy and critical infrastructure
before an incident occurs.1
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This sweeping pronouncement effectively blurs the lines between traditionally distinct
categories, creating a homogenized, centralized, law-enforcement-based and militarized
panoptic surveillance apparatus premised on patriotism, loyalty, fidelity, and duty to the
elimination of terror in any and all of its manifestations.

Morality & Symbol
Morality assumes a pivotal and singular role, both in interpreting 9/11 and in
framing the post-9/11 security context. The moral, however, can be adjusted to proffer
the intrinsic superiority/correctness of any particular moral posture; indeed, morality

encompasses a relative, subjective state of affairs. A moral prerogative enables one to
declare that a particular political, social, and economic modality must necessarily be the

case. Yet morality as a form of knowledge must be strictly scrutinized, since "knowledge
leads to control, and control is possible because institutions, and thus men ... are
infinitely manipulable."

13 3

A "correct" or superior morality is effectuated via knowledge.

"The insidious thing about the [moral] point of view is that it leads us to say: 'Of course
it [has to be] like that.'

Whereas we ought to think: it may [be like] that-and also in

many other ways." 134 An examination of the war on terror and rogue states reveals that
the privileging of a moral perception occurs in the framing and definition of security, and
that the privileging of one reality and actor occurs at the expense of another. 35

33 Waltz, Man 75.
"4 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture & Value, trans. Peter Winch (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980) 37.
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In a unipolar world, "terror" (as extrapolated from the event of 9/11 by the US)
and the notion

of "Homeland"

have become

the operative

Master Symbols of

Legitimation (hereinafter, MSL) that inform the postulation of global security.136 MSL,
in general, are part of a nomenclature that have the effect of generating and reifying selfcontained knowledge systems of a particular modality of order through the use and

examination of MSL. Particular constellations of order deploy a specific epistemologyone that embodies distinct ordering assumptions and principles-that utilize MSL to

manufacture and deploy categories and information. The power of MSLs reside in the
ability of actors to authoritatively designate and fix signification; MSL justify, explain,
and reify subject matter without having to rely upon external sources of justification. In
the case of the US ASA, terror and Homeland have come to absorb and/or displace

traditional MSL such sovereignty and the states system.

The US defines Homeland

Security as "a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the US, reduce
America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks

that do occur." 37 This definition explicitly encompasses multifarious levels of thought
and action:

all levels of government, the private sector (including religious and other

non-profit single-issue groups), foreign and domestic policy in a host of different sectors,
various communities, and most especially the individual. The US will stop at nothing to
securitize anything and everything, placing the polity and all other states on a militarized
war-response track.
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In order to realize this vision, the US will use all instruments of
national power and influence-diplomatic, information, military,

economic,

financial, intelligence, and law enforcement-to

achieve our goals to prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks; protect

the American people, critical infrastructure, and key resources;
and respond to and recover from incidents that do occur.

We

also will continue to create, strengthen, and transform the
principles, systems, structures, and institutions we need to secure
our Nation over the long term. 138

Within an ASA rubric, the categories "enemy combatant," "terrorist," "rogue
state," "freedom" and "peace," amongst others, fall under the MSL of terror. The "new"
enemy of the US, terror, legitimates unilateral security policies.

Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every
government that supports them. Our war on terror begins with al
Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every
terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and
defeated ... [Terrorists] hate ... a democratically elected
government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our
freedoms-our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our
39
freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.1

Yet, who is a terrorist and what constitutes (objective) terror fluctuates; as uncomfortable
as the fact may be, terrorist "hate" and "evil" are un-falsifiable states of affairs that lie in
the eye of the beholder. US support of Contra "freedom fighters" in Nicaragua during
the 1980s under the Reagan administration, or the more recent case of the US preventing
suspected terrorist Luis Posada Carriles to be tried by Cuba and Venezuela for an

138 The White House, National Strategy for Homeland Security October 2007, 19 Aug. 2008 <http://www.whitehouse.
gov/infoc us/homeland/nshs/2007/index.html>.
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assassination attempt against Fidel Castro in 2002 and the terrorist bombing of a Cuban

airliner in 1976, highlight the bias and relativity of definitions of terror.' 40 9/11 and the
security framework crafted on its occurrence construes terror as noun (thing), verb

(action), and adjective (descriptive category). It is perpetuated and perpetuates. In the
US ASA, terror is accorded agency, meaning, and significance independent of specific

actors.14 ' "All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of [the US definition] takes
place already within an [ASA] system."

42

The moral meta-language employed in the

ASA is a basis for legitimating the unilateral exercise of US power. In all configurations
of order, however, there is "no meta-language ... that [can] ground political and ethical
decisions that [can] be taken as the basis of its statements.

There is no moral meta-

language; there are only genres of language, genres of discourse."'

43

What qualifies as

good, right, proper, and/or a just means of resistance to "authoritative" power has no
objective definition.

Terrorism is a means as opposed to an end in itself, and can be

viewed as an asymmetric "strategy of coercion" in the service of some "higher"

substantive aim, as opposed to a pure machination of "evil."1 44 The US ASA, premised
on terror and defense of the US Homeland, seeks to globally disseminate a security
framework that is binary yet open-ended, illimitable and absolute.
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The US ASA is therefore effectuated via a discrete set of ideas concerning the

form and substance of international order.145
conceptualization

The values embodied in a US-based

of US-Domestic-Security-Equals-Global-Security have become the

referents for global security vis-a-vis international affairs.146

Because of its claims to

universality, the US ASA dispenses with the notion that security "is a social construct
with different meanings in different societies," and adheres to a framework that
propagates the objective status and moral superiority of a US-based, organized, and

managed world order.14 7 Overall, this conception negatively effects global security in
practice.1 48 Viable and violent centers of resistance in the form of militarization and
proliferation have developed in response to US security policy.

Terrorists and state-

sponsors of terror are frequently accused of seeking to forcibly impose a particular

modality of being on an unwilling recipient through violent means; this is one of the
premises of US security that has devolved from 9/11.149 Ironically, this modus operandi
and end-goal are exactly what the US seeks to effectuate via an ASA.

Indeed, terrorist

violence and ideology can be traced to the absolutist security policies of the US.

By
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defining the "new" threat to US-global security as consisting of malevolent, terroristic
violence

sponsored by rogue states, for instance, the US effectively neutralizes the

legitimacy

of any form of violent resistance to unipolar control.

For instance, if

"terrorism" is indeed the only or most viable means by which weaker states and non-state

actors can (violently) resist US unipolarity-because the rules of global security
formation classifies any form of violent resistance as criminal, terroristic-then there can
be no legitimate resistance to US power. The use of force may be considered the only
option available to those who resist a singular unipolar power in an anarchic world. Yet,
force, violence, and resistance carried out by any other actor but the US and its allies are
considered improper and summarily criminalized.
Beneath a veneer of peace, the US ASA is premised and thrives on force and
panoptic surveillance. "Force" is applied in all sectors and levels of international affairs,
for example, in the realms of global trade, allocation of financial resources, control of
states

through

development

governmental

and non-governmental

organizations,

military aid,

aid, international embargos, and diplomatic and economic

isolation,

amongst several other means. Only the US has the authority to wage war, or rather wage

peace through war; war not only becomes the continuation of politics, but politics
becomes the extension of war by other means. 5 0 The US ASA assumes that "to introduce
into the philosophy of War itself a principle of moderation would be an absurdity."' 5'
Hence, the "new" rules of formation pertaining to global security involve:

ISO Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed., and intro. Anatol Rapoport (New York: Penguin Books, 1982) 119: Foucault,
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a movement from a policy of contention, dissuasion, and limited
use of military force to a policy of decisive unilateral prevention,
where reprisals are based on massive military force and an

increase of covert actions whose emphasis is on action, not
restraint; the use and/or threat of force is the focus of foreign
policy, and the use of moral values to legitimize US decisions in
international organizations, such as the UN, when interpreting
international treaties, such as the NPT, and conducting relations
with allies and designated enemies of global peace and security;
the definition of terrorism is understood not in terms of motives
and causes but in the nature of the act itself, which expands the
criteria beyond what was traditionally accepted to include
physical, psychological, economic damage and destruction, and
fear among civilians.' 5 2

In the realm of surveillance, the US has proclaimed that:

The unimpeded exchange of information should be the rule, not
the exception, in our efforts to combat the terrorist threat ...
Improving information sharing in the post-September 11 world
requires an environment that supports the sharing of information
across all levels of government, disciplines, and security
domains. As with our achievements to date, an improved
information-sharing environment will not be constructed
overnight, [and] will be constructed upon a foundation of trusted
partnerships among all levels of government, the private sector,
and our foreign allies-partnerships based on a shared
commitment to detect, prevent, disrupt, preempt, and mitigate
the effects of terrorism.'"3

Intemperate aggression, illimitable surveillance, and the use of military force with
virtually no apparent limits contribute to an unstable and enervated international

framework for ensuring the security of the US and all states.

James Madison's
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observations in 1795 concerning war and its effects retain validity in a post-9/11 security
context:

"Of all the enemies of true liberty, war is, perhaps, the most to be dreaded,

because it comprises and develops the germ of every other. War is the parent of armies;
from these proceed debts and taxes; and armies, and debts, and taxes are the known

instruments for bringing the many under the domination of the few ... No nation can
preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare." 54 No borders, no clear rules, no
identifiable enemy-all describe current US security policy.

The attempt to inaugurate

an US-National-Security-Equals-Global-Securityframework renders threat and enemies
ubiquitous, protean, fomenting uncertainty by imposing homogeneity on a world system
that is immanently heterogeneous in character and content. According to S. C. Marino,

the new national-security doctrine establishes the right of the US,
in an aggressive and expansionist manner and without proof of
the threat or type of threats, to initiate defensive intervention ...
the US ... reserves for itself the right to use a broad range of
public resources and instruments to undertake military
intervention ... This allows little space for positive dialogue,
including on subjects of vital interest between [all states].155

The US has established some of the following institutions, policies, agencies, and
other apparatuses on the basis of the 9/11 war-response: The US has

a Department of Homeland Security ... created a Director of
National Intelligence; shifted the FBI's focus from investigating
terrorist attacks to preventing them; created a new National
Counterterrorism Center; created Treasury's Office of Terrorism
154
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and Financial Intelligence; enacted the Patriot Act and tore down
the 'wall' that once prevented law enforcement and intelligence
officers from sharing vital information; worked ... to pass the

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendments Act, which
allows our intelligence professionals to quickly and effectively
monitor terrorist communications [without undue obstacles].

156

Such apparatuses and the operative principles that underlie the US ASA undermine global

security by undermining the states system. This is the case because the tools that the US
has given itself to perpetuate absolute security are myopically focused on the absolute
weal of one state, to the detriment of all others when it comes to state sovereignty and
respect for diversity amongst states.

Unfettered panoptic surveillance in the form of

information "fusion centers," extraordinary rendition, militarization of law enforcement,
and the legal, economic, and military means to forcibly impose US mandates on other
states via the war on terror all attenuate sovereignty, diversity of state interests, and
states'

right to political self-determination.

157

The US Homeland, under an ASA,

becomes the singular reference point for adjudging the efficacy, correctness of any
security measure,

summarily dismissing out of hand any other conceptualization,

rationalization, interest, etc., that is at odds with US security.

Security & Rules of Formation
Establishing an enemy involves rules of formation.
acknowledge that the "truth of certain ...

The US ASA does not

propositions belongs to our frame of
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reference."

9/11 is touted by the US as the basis of a universal moral, ethical, and

total-war response disseminated throughout

the globe; all

states must recognize,

empathize, and interpret 9/11 as the US posits. To refuse the US interpretation is to be
marginalized, possibly provoking the ire of the world's hyper-power. Terror and rogue
states, after 9/11, are presented as universal threats as opposed to state-specific, context-

based threats. The US ASA disseminates particular modalities of knowledge and truth,
and examination of the rules pertaining to security and how they are made,
communicated, administered, interpreted, enforced, legitimized, and disseminated sheds
light on how the US manufactures and disseminates knowledge. 159

The articulation and

implementation of rules of formation have the consequence of being "directed towards
the preservation of order, not [only] by directly upholding or implementing the rules, but
by shaping, molding or managing the social environment in which the rules operate."1 60

The ASA posited by the US presents the US as the "organic bond uniting hierarchized
individuals" on a global level. 161 In the case of securing the blessings of liberty for all
states, a positive effect of the US ASA-even those that do not solicit US intervention or
desire the US governance template-the US categorically asserts that,

in Afghanistan, we removed a dangerous regime that harbored
the terrorists who plotted the attacks of 9/11. Because we acted,
the Afghan people have been liberated, and a nation that was
once a training ground for terrorists has become an ally in the
war on terror. We built a strong coalition of nations, including
158 Wittgenstein, Certainty 12.
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every member of the NATO Alliance, to help the Afghan people

defend their young democracy. We will ensure Afghanistan
never again becomes a safe haven for terrorists seeking to launch
attacks on America or our allies. In Iraq, an international
coalition removed a brutal dictator who murdered his own
people, paid the families of suicide bombers, invaded his
neighbors, and repeatedly defied UN resolutions. In 2006, the
situation in Iraq was deteriorating, so the President ordered a
surge of forces into Iraq. Since the surge began violence in Iraq
has dropped, civilian deaths and sectarian killings are down, and
political and economic progress is taking place. Iraq is a rising
democracy.162

To reject or challenge US power is "rogue" in nature, meriting considerable, aggressive
retaliation,

whether

in

the

form

of

rhetoric

and/or

economic

sanctions,

preemptive/preventive warfare, political and diplomatic isolation, severe economic
sanctions, military invasion/occupation, denial of global development aid via the IMF or
World Bank, massive military aid to perceived enemies of rogue states (such as military
aid to South Korea), and selective overt/covert attempts to topple and replace various
(rogue) regimes.163

The objective veracity of the US ASA, however, is tenuous at best. As Jean
Frangois Lyotard observes, "no maker of statements, no utterer, is ever autonomous. On
the contrary an utterer is always someone who is first of all an addressee ... he is

someone who, before he is the utterer of a prescription, has been the recipient of a
prescription, and that he is merely a relay; he has also been the object of a

prescription."164 When analyzing rules of formation, Ludwig Wittgenstein is correct to
162
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note that, "Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of the

clothing it is impossible to infer the form of thought beneath it, because the outward form
of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body, but for entirely different
purposes."165 The actual content of the US ASA is hidden behind a veneer of language
that is familiar, accepted, and grounds international relations. After all, are not peace,
freedom, stability, and development "good" things?

In the case of globalization, the US

is adamant that it has brought prosperity to the world community.

Much of the world's prosperity and improved living standards in
recent years derive from the expansion of global trade,
investment, information, and technology. The United States has
been a leader in promoting these developments, and we believe
they have improved significantly the quality of life of the
American people and people the world over. Other nations have
embraced these opportunities and have likewise benefited.
Globalization has also helped the advance of democracy by
extending the marketplace of ideas and the ideals of liberty.
These new flows of trade, investment, information, and
technology are transforming national security. Globalization has
exposed us to new challenges and changed the way old
challenges touch our interests and values, while also greatly
enhancing our capacity to respond.166

Yet, the traditional "facts," the basic realities of sovereignty, self-determination,
and the states system, are colored and have meaning imputed to them that is not in accord
with the actual initial and basic meaning/significance of these "facts." To produce
freedom by overwhelming military force, embargos, and other coercive measures, as in

the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan vis-a-vis invasion and occupation and Cuba via a
165 Wittgenstein,

Tractatus 22.
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permanent US embargo, is a self-contradictory premise (one must be forced to be free?).
To discard or marginalize the civil rights/liberties of a "free" populace in the name of
security is hardly in line with the tenets of genuine freedom.

Language therefore

provides protective and obfuscating screens, fixing attention on the term (freedom) while
simultaneously reconfiguring it.

Equating justice, peace, and freedom with US

modalities of global governance is the means by which this exchange occurs.

For

example, in globally institutionalizing the war on terror, premised on the organic
propriety of US socioeconomic and political precepts, the US has established the
Partnershipfor Progress and a Common Future to support political, economic, and

social reform in the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA), launched by the
G-8 in 2004. This region of the world has its own history, culture, priorities, religious
postures, and the like, and has been historically anti-colonialist and anti-Western because
of its tumultuous and exploitative relations it has had with the West, the US in particular.

Indeed, the Iranian (1979) and Libyan (1969) revolutions were direct results of US and
Western interference that sought to mold these countries in a Western/ US image for the
sake of material and political benefits. Theocracy and self-determination, among other
variables, simply do not comport to the US template.

Yet, because the US desires

security from terror in the present age, the region is now viewed as having no choice but
to adapt the sociopolitical and economic premises of US global governance.

The US and the G-8, together with regional partners in the
Middle East, developed the Forum for the Future to advance
freedom, prosperity, and opportunity. Bringing together leaders
in government and civil society, the Forum is an opportunity to

anchor reform in the region. Through the BMENA initiative and
the Forum, foreign, finance, and educational ministerial meetings

63

are taking place. In addition, the Forum brings together civil
society and business in dialogues to energize and focus reform

and connect these vital actors with government participants.1 67

It is important to note that, "any discourse meant to account for prescriptions, transforms
them into conclusions of reasoning, into propositions derived from other propositions, in

which the latter are metaphysical propositions on being and history, or on ... society. In
such a derivation ... what is derived or deduced is not the prescriptive itself but the
citation of the prescriptive, that is, the image, the representation ... of the prescriptive."1 68
The imprimatur of the unipolar state as legitimating a system of security relies
upon the power to circumscribe reality via rulemaking. Rulemaking is part of the process
whereby signification occurs within a system of object-signifieds. Signifieds rely upon
imagery to retain signification.

In any security system, an authority "depends upon a

fundamental or constitutional principle, stated or implied, which singles out certain
[actors] as the sole bodies competent to discharge ... political functions."169 In the "new"
security context, the US is the singular actor that is competent to discharge security

functions. Security is conditioned on the knowledge and ideas that a subject/actor draws
upon to form ideas of what constitutes security. Knowledge is the basis for prescription.
Perceptions and prescriptions of security will therefore vary according to the world-view
of a subject. If that worldview is based on the US ASA, then the US assumes a "natural"
position at the apex of power in the states system, because the ASA template articulates

167 The White House, 9/1I Five Years Later: Successes and ChallengesSeptember 2006, 21 Aug. 2008 <http://www.
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and presupposes knowledge of security "upon which it is to intervene and/or which it is

calculated to bring into being. The common axiom of [the US ASA] is that an effective
power is and must be a power which knows the objects upon which it is exercised ... The
condition that [security] must satisfy is that it render reality" amenable to such power.'7 0
The US is constantly making statements as to the content and character of international

security in a post-9/11 world. Is the US correct in its assertions of the indispensability of
US morality, ideology, politics, economy, ideals, and power in the new global context
that has emerged?

The US ASA treats such statements as unconditionally true. Yet, a

statement is not a structure, but rather "a function of existence that properly belongs to

the signs and on the basis of which one may decide ... whether or not they 'make sense,'
according to what rule they follow one another or are juxtaposed, of what they are the

sign, and what sort of act is carried out by their formulation."' 7 '

Terror & Global Security
In a post-Cold War world, the global war on terror has effectively replaced the

war against communism and the Evil Empire, and retains the hegemonic and expansionist
impulse that permeates US policy since at least 1898, when the US entered the SpanishCuban War. Presently,

the US conveys hegemony with new characteristics. These
characteristics are described by various authors [as] unilateral
hegemony of a new type-one that presupposes interaction with
170 Colin Gordon, afterword, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews &

Other Writings 1972-1977, by Michel

Foucault, ed. and trans. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon, 1980) 245-248.
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certain allies before acting on its determined imperatives and
defines unilateral actions according to its interests ... the US sees

itself the unipolar hegemonic power, internationally as well as
regionally in the 'new' post-9/1

I security

context. 172

Under an absolutist security program, the US forms an entelechy of global security, that
is, a complex state of affairs where a large number of objects (states) reside within the
confines of defined space (states-system framework). The single object, when combined
with other objects, produces an entelechy of order. This is significant because the US
ASA is an absolutist, totalizing system, in that security under a terror rubric has an ad
infinitum capacity to be expanded and replicated, embodying the directives and interests
of the US.

Whereas other states may have very different priorities, the US has

proclaimed that the "War on Terror remains a generational struggle," and that all nations

must be entirely engaged and prepared to participate in this effort.'

73

Security is,

therefore, disseminated via self-replicating clusters of ideas, precepts, and first principles

backed by overwhelming military power and the specter of the event of 9/11.

This

manner of positing security for the entire system of states creates tension and conflict
rather than security because absolutist security is antithetical to a states system's ordering
principles. Recently, US President George W. Bush chastised Russia for failing to meet
US standards of proper and necessary social and political development:

In a speech celebrating democracy's progress around the
globe-and calling out places where its reach is either
incomplete or lacking-Bush said that free societies emerge 'at
172
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different speeds in different places' and have to reflect local
customs.

But he

said certain

values

are

universal

to all

democracies, and rapped several countries for not embracing
them. 'In Russia, reforms that once promised to empower
citizens have been derailed, with troubling implications for
democratic development,' Bush said, speaking at a democracy
conference in the Czech Republic-a state that was once part of
the former USSR's sphere of influence. 174

In response, Russia has threatened to militarize at an exponential rate in order to counter

what it views as "benevolent" US aggression and encroachment.

Under the banner of

universal values, states become firmly emplaced within stratified, layered rungs of
priority, necessity, as apperceived by the US.
Under the US ASA, notions of terror and a US war on terror are implicitly as well
as explicitly premised on notions of the "just" that conform to a definition of justice as an
axiomatic thing-in-itself. "The distribution of all that circulates in a given society is just
if it conforms to something defined ... as justice itself, that is, as the essence, or the idea,
of

justice." 75

significations.

Justice will therefore manifest itself in conformity with specific
Symbolic signification, however, possesses a protean capacity; symbols

can have different meanings for different actors under different circumstances.176 This
state of affairs complicates the enterprise of establishing a universal framework of
security that is unitary, stable, legitimate, objective, and authoritative.
difficulty, the US relies upon the "transubstantiation"

To bypass this

of US national security and

universal justice based on denotative statements. "A just practice will have to conform to
174 "Bush: Putin has 'Derailed' Democratic Reforms: President's Comments Risk Stoking Dispute with Russia Over
Missile Shield," Associated Press, MSNBC News Online, 5 June 2007 <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19040836/>.
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denotative statements (statements that denote justice) that are themselves true. This is
where the pathos of the conviction is involved: it admits that the statement" of the just
embodied in security is objectively "true" in and of itself.17 7

Terror as signified and

signifier is articulated and implemented via denotative statements. "The vast machine of

political thought that justifies itself, or believes itself to be justified, by what it wants to
decree in the realm of practice so that a society be just ... all this thought is actually
futile, inasmuch as a command cannot find its justification in a denotative statement."' 7 8
The success of the US ASA is therefore measured in its inherent truth-value and how
effective it is in binding "legitimate" power and control to the order that propagates it. 179
US statements pertaining to global security policy and the war on terror reveal the
operative and ubiquitous structural rules of formation that inform the post-9/11 security
context. Conceptual "representation posits the self-identity of the thinking subject. The
subject, the concepts, and the objects in the world are thus presumed to share a self-

resemblance essential for maintaining their identity. Representational thought establishes
a correspondence between two symmetrical domains" that is, US security and global
security.

180

Wittgenstein is correct in noting that the limits of one's language constitute

the limits of one's world.181
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security apparatuses as well as the powers of the US to actively counter terror in any and
all of its manifestations at any cost, financially, politically, legally, and in sacrificing
traditional ordering principles.

US President G.W. Bush's articulation of the "Bush

Doctrine" in his speech at West Point Military Academy (2002) and the New National

Security Strategy 2002 are exemplary of this. According to S.C. Marino, "This doctrine
is at the margin of both international law and the rules and practices of recognized

international norms. It legalizes the hegemonic power's preventive attacks, couched in
hypothetical moralizing rhetoric about the necessity of regime change and has, at its core,
geo-economic and geopolitical considerations."18 2
The modus operandi of post-9/11

global security policy is its unilateral,

militaristic, legal, and preemptive character.

The US unilaterally marshals material and

intangible resources for the defense of "universal" global values and interests. There is
no question of legitimacy or authority; there is only the "fact" that there is a distinct,
correct way to combat the threat that looms over every state actor (terror), that is, by all
states contributing to the security of the US Homeland.

Various policies have been put

into effect on the international level to make this a reality-policies which arrogate the
power to inform if not define all states' security interests, such as:

-The US has used the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to
promote international standards and is helping develop FATFstyle regional bodies to support implementation of these
standards, including most recently the Middle East/North Africa
Financial Action Task Force and the Eurasian Group to Combat
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing.

182
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-The US, in partnership with the International Maritime
Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organization,

has developed and promoted standards for international transport
security, including travel document security and biometric
identification.
-In June 2004, the G-8 adopted, and implemented, the Secure
and Facilitated International Travel Initiative (SAFTI), which
focused on developing practices and mechanisms to increase
impediments to terrorists' travel.

-The US has worked with the UN Terrorist Prevention Branch
(TPB), European Union (EU), and OSCE to encourage
enactment of strong counterterrorism laws and to develop
common standards and procedures to reduce terrorist
exploitation of international travel.
-Through centers like the Southeast Asia Regional Center for
Counterterrorism
in
Malaysia
and
the
US-sponsored
International Law Enforcement Academies in Thailand,
Botswana, Hungary, El Salvador, and the US the US is providing
counterterrorism training to law enforcement officers.
-Since FY 2005, the Department of Defense has exercised new
authority to build the capacity of our foreign partners to conduct
internal security counterterrorist operations.
-The US has launched an African Maritime Governance
Initiative (AMGI) to work in partnership with African countries
to improve governance of their maritime space through programs
that promote coastal and maritime security awareness and
capability.
-Through the provision of training, equipment, and other
assistance, the US is building the capacity of foreign partners to
attack and defeat terrorists, by strengthening their ability to
conduct law enforcement, financial, regulatory, intelligence, and
military activities.183

An imperative issued from an authority "requires that anyone who [follows] the
proposition it is contained in, can make it his or her own ... it must be thought that it is

"8 The White House, 9/11 Five Years Later: Successes and Challenges September 2006, 21 Aug. 2008 <http://www.
whitehouse.gov/nsc/waronterror/2006/sectionVII.html>.
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universalizable for any and every pragmatic context, that is, for any and every move."184
The US ASA produces a discourse that is "accepted on [its] own merits and positioned
within an anonymous and coherent conceptual system of established truths and methods
of verification." 18

Since 9/11, the US has defined illimitable terrorism-a terrorism that

is as all encompassing, shapeless, potent, and miasmic-as the enemy of global order.

In addition to al-Qaida, a host of other groups and individuals
also use terror and violence against the innocent in pursuit of
their objectives and pose potential threats to the security of the
US. These include Lebanese Hizballah, which has conducted
anti-US attacks outside the US ... Hizballah may increasingly
consider attacking the Homeland if it perceives the US as posing
a direct threat to the group or Iran, its principal sponsor. The US
also is not immune to the emergence of homegrown
radicalization and violent Islamic extremism within its borders.
The terrorist threat to the Homeland is not restricted to violent
Islamic extremist groups. We also confront an ongoing threat
posed by domestic terrorists based and operating strictly within
the US. Often referred to as 'single-issue' groups, they include
white supremacist groups, animal rights extremists, and ecoterrorist groups, among others.186

Terrorism constitutes the nucleus of an absolutist US security agenda.
epistemic

category

is so malleable

under the

US ASA

that animal

Terror as an
rights

and

environmental groups can be logically and justifiably placed in the same category or level
as suicide bombers.

This can transpire licitly, so to speak, because the US ASA is

intimately "tied to the legal and institutional systems that circumscribe, determine, and
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articulate the realm of discourses; it does not operate in a uniform manner in all
discourses, at all times[;] it is not defined by the spontaneous attribution of a text to its
creator, but through a series of precise and complex procedures" that revolve around
illimitable, polymorphous terror and global security.187

The war on terror is

general enough to support more than one meaning. It can be
interpreted precisely, in terms of destroying the organizations
and instruments of terror, and protecting the homeland against
[WMD] theft efforts. But it can also be defined much more
broadly to encompass changing the conditions that gave rise to
terrorism, and creating an international order that would be
inimical to its existence ... [establishing] conceptual boldness
and an ambitious, assertive use of American power.188

Yet, as Robert Kagan notes, "America did not change on 9/11.
more itself." 8 9

It only became

While the event of 9/11, terror, and the 9/11 war-response are indeed

new policies/ frameworks, US aspirations for world dominance and the "blowback" that

the US experienced on 9/11 as a direct consequence of pursuing global dominance is
nothing novel, surprising, or unforeseeable.

For the US, "by its unbearable power, has

fomented [terrorist] violence which is endemic throughout the world," fueling the
"terroristic" imagination.19 0

Indeed, from the founding until the present, the US has

always envisioned itself playing a profound role in the history of all nations: there is a
messianic, hegemonic, and imperialist continuity between the Monroe Doctrine (1823),
187 Foucault, "Author" 1631.
188 Owen Harries, "Australia & the Bush Doctrine: Punching Above Our Weight?" Confronting
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Wilsonian International Liberalism (1 900s), the Truman Doctrine (1947), the Regan

Doctrine (1980s), G.H. Bush's New World Order (1990s), and the G.W. Bush Doctrine
( 2 001-present), to name a few significant exemplars.

"The US's conviction that its

interests and the world's interests are one ... may be welcomed, ridiculed, or lamented.
But it should not [and cannot] be doubted."1 9 1 In light of the historical record, 9/11 runs

along the same track as the previous doctrines/frameworks listed; the difference lies in
9/11's significance, scope, interpretation, unilateral implementation, and there being lack
of any power to effectively counter or ballast US power.

Hence, the US can

authoritatively, legitimately, and categorically establish, in the name of 9/11 and its
security interests, the following advances in "combating" the terrorist threat to global
security:

The US has advanced efforts in the international community to
deny safe haven and material support to terrorists. The US will
continue to insist that all state sponsors end support and
sanctuary to terrorists [and will] implement sanctions against,
and promote international isolation of, state sponsors ... At the
same time, we will continue to work with allies in the War on
Terror to strengthen their ability to destroy safe havens [For
example,] the US has:
-Helped create the Yemeni Coast Guard, bolstered Yemen's
counterterrorism forces, worked to reduce the illicit flow of
small arms and light weapons, and strengthened Yemeni border
security and export control measures.
-Cooperated closely with regional partners to interdict arms
flows and monitor terrorist activities through the East Africa
Counterterrorism
Initiative
(EACTI).
EACTI
provides
assistance, including border security and police training, to
Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar,
Tanzania, and Uganda.

191 Kagan 88.
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-Through the Trans-Sahel Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI),

provided military support and other assistance to Chad, Mali,
Niger, Mauritania, Algeria, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, and
Tunisia to enhance cooperation among the region's security
forces.

-In Indonesia, provided capacity-building training to the national
police and law enforcement counterterrorism personnel to
reinforce efforts to
networks.

detect, disrupt, and

dismantle terrorist

-In FY 2005, the Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance
(ATA) Program provided training and technical assistance to 78
countries. Seventy-five countries were scheduled to receive ATA
training through the end of FY 2006.
-Implemented the Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI), to develop
flexible regional networks in key terrorist theaters of operation to
assess the threat and devise collaborative strategies, actionable
initiatives, and policy recommendations.
-With UNSCR 1267, and
UNSCR 1617, the UN has
travel restrictions and arms
the Taliban, al-Qaida, and
freeze their financial assets.

its successor resolutions including
required Member States to impose
embargo against Osama bin Laden,
those associated with them and to

-Drafted and co-sponsored UNSCR 1373, which requires all
States to deny safe haven and prevent the movement of terrorists
across borders. The Resolution also mandates all States to
prevent and suppress terrorist financing by requiring states to
criminalize terrorist financing, planning, preparing, or
perpetrating terrorist acts. 192

Rules
foundations

of conduct
for

exclusion,

and

reality-formation

inclusion,

and

create

epistemic

circumscription

when

and
it

conceptual
comes

to

comprehending global order.193 Indeed, rules of formation are a primary means by which
the US seeks to make "true" the interests, values, morality, and priorities of its order-
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combine.

While the US practices forms of

"multi-layered geo-governance,"

the

cynosure of security, that is, terror and rules of formation that articulate terror, seek to
establish the conditions of existence, coexistence,

maintenance, and modification in

defining the content of global security and society. 194 Arrangements of order prescribe

rules of reality-comprehension, modalities of existence.

Within such a milieu, security

finds expression in governance. The US ASA, the war on terror, and the Bush Doctrine
ignore the states system and international society, and concomitantly create a this/that

universe while also retaining a nebulous quality as far as defining what is a security
threat. There are no clear rules of formation; what the US deems threatening and terrorist
in nature is targeted for elimination. Notions of terror are "constituted by differences and

by differences from differences, it is by its nature absolutely heterogeneous and is
constantly composing with the forces that tend to annihilate it," that is, the enemies of

global peace, security, and freedom.195

In waging an aggressive militaristic, absolutist

war against terror, the imperial hegemon's system

of security and peace,

a pax

imperium/hegemonia, after 9/11 reflects the tremendous power to articulate and execute

the rules of formation as far as what and what does not qualify as a legitimate state actor
and threat to global peace.

Peace, however, should not be confused with

justice.196

"Peace and justice are not natural allies, unless right happens to coincide with might."1 97
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Based on the 9/11 attacks, a global war of unprecedented scope was officially

declared and initiated by the US on a material as well as an ideational level. After the
attacks, US President G.W. Bush emphatically declared, "They have declared war on us
... we are going to war," one in which the US "will make no distinction between the

terrorist who committed [the] acts and those who harbor them." 198 Given that the world
is divided into nation-states, the logical derivative of a key principle under-girding the
war on terror is that the war has no boundaries, and neither does the application of US

power in attempts to eradicate anything and everything that falls under the rubric of a
polymorphous enemy. "Terror" is, therefore, signifier and signified, and can be "found"
in any form of (violent) resistance.
Terrorism has historically been and continues to be a viable form of resistance by
actors that are too weak to challenge a perceived threat/enemy. With 9/11, terrorism has
"changed," in that the terrorists that committed the 9/11 attacks

brought their own deaths to bear in an effective, offensive
manner, in the service of an intuitive strategic insight which is
quite simply a sense of the immense fragility of the opponent-a
sense that a [unipolar] system which has arrived at its quasiperfection can, by that very token, be ignited by the slightest
spark. They have succeeded in turning their own deaths into an
absolute weapon against a system that operates on the basis of
exclusion of death, a system whose ideal is an ideal of zero
deaths ... And all the means of deterrence and destruction can do
nothing against an enem who has already turned his death into a
counterstrike weapon.19

198 George W. Bush quoted in Bob Woodward, Bush At War (New York: Simon & Shuster, 2002) 15; George W.
Bush, "Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation," The White House, Washington, D.C., 11 Sept. 2001,
14 June 2007 <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html>. See Russell D. Howard, Reid L.
Sawyer, and Natasha E. Bajema, Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understandingthe New Security Environment,
Readings and Interpretations3 ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2008).
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The US interpretation of 9/11 dispenses with external motives and justifications.
sundry motives for terror are peripheral, marginalized.

The

Terror is a MSL that follows a

self-contained and autonomous logic, involving a category of knowledge that is the

"expression and communication of ... social experience, culturally determined in space
and time."200
defined.

The terrorist act itself, which is categorically criminalized, is culturally

Criminalization of the act, with no or nominal weight accorded to motives,

preempts any "legitimate" analysis, critique, and/or understanding of the "why" of terror,
of the political, ideological, social, cultural, historical, and economic motives for terrorist
acts.

After 9/11, terror laid the groundwork for an objective, absolutist, aggressive,

preemptive, and preventive security policy. 20 1 9/11 and the specter of terror it ushered in
was viewed as part of malevolent trend as opposed to an isolated or explainable act.
After the 9/11 attacks, US President George Bush declared, "this crusade, this war

on terrorism, is going to take awhile," and that while some may not find it "diplomatic to
speak of 'good and evil' ... I feel like I represent how the American people feel." 20 2 That
bin Laden, the visage of terrorist evil, specifically stated that "to kill Americans and their
allies, both civil and military, is an individual duty of every Muslim who is able, in any
country where this is possible," seems to provide prima facie evidence for the utility of
an absolutist security policy. 2 03 Yet, morality aside, the rhetoric and actual waging of

200 Bertalanffy, Systems View 51.

201 See John W. Dietrich, ed., The George W. Bush Foreign Policy Reader: PresidentialSpeeches With Commentary
(New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005) 39.
202 George W. Bush quoted in Todd S. Purdum "Bush Warns of Wrathful, Shadowy and Inventive War," New York
Times, 17 Sept. 2001; George W. Bush quoted in Bill Scammon, FightingBack: The War on TerrorFrom Inside the
White House (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Press, 2002) 335.
203 "Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and the Crusaders," quoted in
Bernard Lewis,
"License to Kill: Usama bin Ladin's Declaration of Jihad," Foreign Affairs 77 (Nov/Dec 1998) 14-15.
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asymmetrical warfare by weaker powers/ actors have been manifested in international
order since its inception.

Furthermore, it can be argued that absolutism has produced

conditions that have, in turn, presented a profound challenge to US power. For instance,
the following rational exemplars can be interpreted as fueling "senseless" terrorist evil: a

massive military presence/occupying force in the Middle East; levying sanctions against
"undesirable" regimes; marginalizing, dismissing, and/or criminalizing other forms of
governance not in line with US prerogatives; unilateral invasion of sovereign states;

impinging upon states' sovereignty by exerting unabashed influence/control over Middle
East political and economic policies; and categorical ideological, political, military,
financial, and unqualified economic support of Israel by the US for geo-political and
strategic purposes.
The 9/11 attacks are presented as ubiquitous, as threatening the very fabric of
international society.

Terrorism is the embodiment of universal evil, and is given

universal symbolic and material content by the US ASA.

All states and peoples are

affected by the terrorism experienced by the US on 9/11.

[President] Bush compared the terrorists directly to the previous
era's totalitarians, arguing that they seek to control every aspect
of life and impose their views through violence ... Bush argued
that no country could be neutral in this conflict: all had to
choose between radicalism and freedom, between support for
terrorism and support for civilization, between evil and good. 204

The "Bush Doctrine" and its emphasis on waging an absolutist war on terror presents a
variety of problems, both conceptual and pragmatic, such as the following.
204

Dietrich 42.
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1., sweeping rhetoric that defines the world in black and white
terms limits options; 2., linking efforts to a grand cause can lead
to public disillusionment in the overall cause when setbacks

occur; 3., an activist US may be perceived by other countries as
an international bully; 4., declaring terrorism to be the number
one problem could shift attention away from other issues or skew
debates on other important policy goals; 5., the policy-making
system may become too driven by the executive branch, which
205
tends to assert power in times of national crises.

The war on terror, terror, and the Homeland are systemic categories that, in rhetoric and

application, are US-defined, US-driven, and US-managed/organized.

"Symbolic forms

or categories are neither a passive framework of innate a prioris as Kant assumed, nor are
they acquired by simple repetition as Hume ... contended; [rather,] they are creative
functions of the individual mind and culture concerned."206 Nation-states that are normal,
rational,civilized, and/or suitable for the US-managed international system of states are
permitted and encouraged to join the US in its crusade, in planning what international

society will look like. According to US President George W. Bush, "Every nation has a
stake in this cause," and even though "at some point, [the US] may be the only [state]

left[, that is] okay ... We are America." 207 Under a war-on-terror rubric, war is premised
on a conflict between values, morality, civilization, and the proper universal paradigm for
international affairs.

The 9/11 attacks have been invested with more than mere

repugnance of violence. Violence in and of itself, outside of US rules of formation, has
been construed as maniacal, nefarious, an unpardonable assault on the global polity

205

Dietrich 42.

206

Bertalanffy, Systems View 60.

207 George W. Bush, speech, UN General Assembly, New York, NY, 10 Nov. 2001, The George W Bush Foreign
Policy Reader: PresidentialSpeeches With Commentary, ed. John W. Dietrich (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005) 5051;Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002) 81.
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(which is a direct extension of the US). The use of violence by enemies of global peace
and freedom is construed as a clear struggle between the forces of good and evil, as
freedom versus slavery, as compulsory ethical resistance against tyranny, totalitarianism,
fear, authoritarianism, and the like.

Yet violence is an immanent and constituent

component of human affairs. How to draw clear, objective lines between destruction and
construction, unwarranted and necessary aggression, justified and unjustified violence?
In light of 9/11,

any form of violent resistance that violates US morality,

sensibilities, or interests is inherently "evil." According to the US, "On September the
11th enemies of freedom committed an act of war against the [US] ... in a single day ...
night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack." 2 08 Freedom,
like power, is a complex and problematic state of affairs.

There is no self-evident,

objectively correct notion of "true" freedom. What qualifies as a "free" state of affairs?
Does freedom

involve

the obligation

to consume,

a commitment

to profit and

materialism, an obligation to obey and stalwartly uphold the political, social, and

economic imperatives of the US state? In what manner is it proper to construe and define
a universal notion of freedom? Under whose auspices is freedom legitimately articulated
and implemented?

Is there no other (legitimate) framework whereby to conceptualize

security besides a uni-dimensional, binary Freedom versus Terror framework?

Internationalizing the War on Terror
To emplace war within such a rubric is to wage unlimited war on anything that

does not comport with relativistic notions of a "freedom" that has a singular definition. It
208 George W. Bush, speech, US Capitol, Washington, D.C., 20 Sept. 2001, The George W. Bush Foreign Policy

Reader: PresidentialSpeeches With Commentary, ed. John W. Dietrich (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005) 50-51.
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is not possible to conceive that forcibly imposing "freedom" is perhaps analogous to the
stated goal of terror, that is, to remake the world by imposing "beliefs on people
everywhere." 209 To combat ubiquitous terror, the US has internationalized its war.

the US will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to
terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to
make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists ...
the only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is
to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows ... This is
not ... just America's fight. And what is at stake is not just
21 0
America's freedom. This is the world's fight.

To destroy terror "where it grows" lends itself to a destabilizing "clash of civilizations"
framework. 21' The clash of civilizations, in thought and practice, supports an "objective"
Us versus Them framework for comprehending terror and violent opposition to US
power. According to the US, "civilization, itself, the civilization we share, is threatened.

History will record our response, and judge or justify every nation. We ... choose the
dignity of life over a culture of death ... every nation in our coalition has duties" to carry
out the mandates of US security policy. 2 12 Yet, the US characterization of 9/11 initiating
a world war to preserve the existence and survival of Western is dubious at best.2

209 George W. Bush, speech, US Capitol, Washington, D.C., 20 Sept. 2001, The George W. Bush ForeignPolicy

Reader: PresidentialSpeeches With Commentary, ed. John W. Dietrich (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005) 51.
210 George W. Bush, speech, US Capitol, Washington, D.C., 20 Sept. 2001, The George W. Bush Foreign Policy
Reader: PresidentialSpeeches With Commentary ed. John W. Dietrich (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005) 53.
211 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations& the Remaking of World Order (New York: Touchstone, 1996).
212 George W. Bush, speech, United Nations General Assembly, New York, NY, 10 Nov. 2001, The George W.
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Foreign Policy Reader: PresidentialSpeeches With Commentary ed. John W. Dietrich (New York: M.E. Sharpe,
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An example of 9/11 finding international expression can be observed in the role
the UN has played in internationalizing the war or terror. In 2005, the UN Security
Council adopted two resolutions to support the war on terror.

Resolution

1617

strengthened extant sanctions against the Taliban and al-Qaida, and endorsed the
establishment of the Financial Action Task Force standards for combating international

money laundering and terrorist financing.

Resolution 1624, adopted at a Security

Council summit, specifically addressed the issues of incitement to terrorism and terrorist
safe havens. Also, the Counterterrorism Committee (hereinafter, CTC) was established
by National Security Council Resolution 1373 after the 9/11 attacks, with the aim of
"raising the performance level of the governments of all 191 member states in the fight
against terrorism."2 14 The CTC's Executive Directorate (hereinafter, CTED), established
in 2004, enhances the Committee's ability to monitor the implementation of Resolution
1373 and to "continue its capacity-building work by facilitating technical assistance to
member states and promoting closer cooperation and coordination with international,
regional, and sub-regional organizations. It is also undertaking visits to certain nations to

assess their implementation of obligations under Resolution 1373."215

The Security

Council also "maintains a list of individuals and entities associated with al-Qaida, the
Taliban, and/or [Osama] bin Ladin that are subject to international sanctions-assets
freeze, travel ban, and arms embargo-that member states are obligated to implement." 2 16

214 US Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 28 April

2006, 23 June 2007 <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/66236.

htm>.

215 US Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 28 April
2006, 24 June 2007 <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/66236.htm>.
216 US Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 28
April
2006, 24 June 2007 <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/66236.htm>.
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The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (hereinafter, FATF),
established in 1989, is an inter-governmental body charged with developing global
standards and policies aimed at combating money laundering and, following the 9/11
attacks, financing terrorism.

FATF's recommendations

are acknowledged

as the

international standards of the US-managed global system in both these areas, and serve as
the basis of regular evaluations of its members' financial sectors as well as evaluations by

the IMF and World Bank.

"In 2002, the FATF adopted eight (later nine) special

recommendations on terrorist financing. While focused principally on safeguarding the
integrity of the international financial systems, these recommendations also provide
governments with guidance on combating terrorist misuse of cash couriers, wire
transfers, and non-profit organizations." 217

In addition, the UN's Outcome Document

issued "a clear and unqualified condemnation of terrorism 'in all its forms and
manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever, and for whatever purposes,' and sets
objectives

for UN

actions

to counter terrorism," and

seeks

"the adoption and

implementation of a comprehensive strategy to promote comprehensive, coordinated, and
consistent responses at the national, regional, and international level." 218 The UN has
also adopted antiterrorism resolutions, established the Comprehensive Convention on
International Terrorism, and concluded the International Convention for the Suppression
of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. 2 19

US Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 28 April
2006, 24 June 2007 <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/66236.htm>.
217
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The international nature of the war on terror has produced an international
hegemonic security agenda. Terror, in the abstract as well as empirically, becomes the
all-encompassing enemy, creating centers of terror whose reach and significance are only
limited by the inventive imagination of the imperial hegemon.

The following chapters

will, therefore, explore select case studies, that is, the USA Patriot Act, WMD
proliferation, and the rogue state of North Korea, as empirical manifestations of an ASA
rubric in post 9/11 global security context.

84

CHAPTER 3. THE USA PATRIOT ACT 2001

The USA PATRIOT Act 2001, that is, the Uniting and Strengthening America by
ProvidingAppropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001

(hereinafter, PA), is an example of how 9/11 has been utilized to push for an ASA that
legally posits US national security as the controlling standard for international security. 220
An examination of the linkage between legality, criminality, terror, and security within a

domestic juridical framework illuminates the post-9/11

security context.

Law is

particularly relevant when one considers that US power is premised upon the notion that
international society should be subject to an objective rule of law. Law is a means by

which US domestic security can be invested with a truth-value beyond (legitimate)
question.

When considering law and power, it must be kept in mind that power "is

exercised through networks, and [actors] do not simply circulate in those networks; they
are in a position to both submit and exercise this power.

They are never the inert or

consenting targets of power ... power passes through [actors].

It is not [necessarily]

applied to them."2 2 ' Knowledge and truth are produced and reified by security measures

and the order-combine they devolve from. Legality therefore functions as a means of
producing and reflecting US security priorities at the expense of competing priorities,
such as civil liberties and state sovereignty. The US articulates a specific set of values,
prerogatives, principles, and morals when it utilizes law to enhance its power. Since the
UNITING AND STRENGTHENING AMERICA BY PROVIDING APPROPRIATE TOOLS REQUIRED TO
INTERCEPTAND OBSTRUCT TERRORISM ACT OF 2001, PUBLIC LAW 107-56 [H.R.3 162] 26 OCT 2001, 107 P.
220
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post-WWII period, the US holds itself out as the "unitary power that maintains the social
peace and produces ... ethical truths" for the international community.2 22
In light of the war on terror, the PA exemplifies a security system's capacity to
become an overtly boundless security measure, uniting "juridical categories and universal

ethical values, making them work together as an organic whole."2 23

The PA posits a

framework of security that, at a most basic level, should prompt us to examine the

essence of post-9/11 global security. As Geoffrey Blainey observes,

For any explanation the framework [utilized] is crucial. In every
field of knowledge the accepted explanations depend on the
marshalling of evidence than on preconceptions of what serves
as a logical framework for the evidence.
The framework
dominates the evidence, because it dictates what evidence should
be sought or ignored. Our idea of a logical framework is often
unconscious, and this elusiveness enhances its grip.224

Security as articulated in the PA explicitly privileges, prioritizes, US security as the basis
for global security; the PA blurs the demarcation between domestic and international
categories of security. According to the US, the system of states must embrace its ASA as

the only logical means to combat "terror."

In the face of this ruthless threat [of terrorism], our nation has
made a clear choice: We will confront this mortal danger, we
will stay on the offensive, and we're not going to wait to be
attacked again. Since September the 11th, 2001, we have taken
the fight to the enemy. We've hunted terrorists in the mountains
222 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge:
223 Hardt, Empire

Harvard University Press, 2000) 10.

10.

224 Blainey, "Power"

114.
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of Afghanistan, cities of Iraq, the islands of Southeast Asia, and
everywhere else they plot, plan, and train. Our men and women

in uniform have brought down two regimes that supported
terrorism. We liberated 50 million people. We've gained new
allies in the war on terror. As we wage the war on terror
overseas, we're also going after the terrorists here at home, and
one of the most important tools we have used to protect the

American people is the Patriot Act. The Patriot Act closed
dangerous gaps in America's law enforcement and intelligence
capabilities, gaps the terrorists exploited when they attacked us
on September the 11th.2 25

The establishment of "legally definable enemies"-which one is obligated to
consider "legitimate"-is a security strategy that enables the projection of US security
policy and interests to form the singular and ubiquitous legal basis for global security. 226

While the US has a long tradition of projecting its security interests and policy across the
globe, the PA indicates a change in policy in that US domestic security is now explicitly
postulated as being synonymous with world security, and is disseminated via a domestic
legal instrument.

Distinctions between "sovereign" states-a conceptual cornerstone of

international relations-become subsumed under a totalizing rubric of security that is
premised upon a universal (yet domestic/national) definition of justice. The PA reflects

the US "empire of thought" regarding US control of setting the global security agenda.
In 1943, Winston Churchill made a very insightful observation regarding the future of
imperial power: "The empires of the future ... are the empires of the mind ... [Empire]

George W. Bush, speech, "President Signs USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act," The White
9 4
House, East Room, 9 March 2006, 29 June 2007 <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/2006030 - .html>.
225

Also, see Patrick Leahy, THE UNITING AND STRENGTHENING AMERICA BY PROVIDING APPROPRIATE
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SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS, 29 June 2007 <http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200110/102401a.html>.
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does not covet territory or resources. It covets ideas." 22 7 By imposing its idea of global
security via an "objective" medium (law), the US augments its global power.

Enemies of Freedom

The PA wages war on a variety of levels against global enemies of freedom by
blurring "the boundary between internal and external security concerns." 228 At root, the

PA is part of a grand war on the level of ideas. "The war on terrorism is at root a war of
ideas. As Secretary [of Defense,] Donald Rumsfeld explained in 2003, 'all elements of
national power: military, financial, diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence and public

diplomacy,' are necessary to win the war on terror. But, he added, 'to win the war on
terror, we must win the war of ideas."'

229

The PA, therefore, wages a legalistic war

against terror, combining ideas and force into a comprehensive strategy of perpetuating
US power. The US, for example, in the name of security has given itself the power to

maintain records of any "information used to verify a person's identity, including name,
address, and other identifying information."2 3 0 Privacy, as idea and in practice, succumbs

to the US interest of protecting and perpetuating the inviolability of the state. The PA is
revealing of the tension, dissonance that exists between PA security and individualism (a
core component of American political philosophy), and the state's interest in effacing the
priority of individual freedom as well as the diversity of states' security interests that
227 Bradley A. Thayer, "The Case for the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Bradley A. Thayer and

Christopher Layne (New York: Routledge, 2007) 7.
228 David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity

(Minneapolis:

University of Minnesota Press, 1998) 27.
229 Donald Rumsfeld, "Take the Fight to the Terrorists," Washington Post, 26
October 2003, B-7.
230 PatriotAct 39.
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exist on the world stage. To attain security, the US must subordinate the very basis of its
power, that is, the individual subject, as well as the states system within which it
functions. The security measures enunciated in the PA have the effect of perpetuating an
order-combine that infiltrates and functions via enhanced state surveillance, arrest,

detention, spying, defining threat and security, and intelligence gathering measures free
from extensive oversight and accountability.
The US preoccupation with control, with ordering the world in its image and
according to its particular security interests, has the effect of fueling its unipolar security

impulse, equipping it (the state and its security discourse) with a "licit" means of
counteracting any "threat" (real or imagined) that may present itself.

Via a legal

dissertation of knowledge the US juxtaposes itself against and infiltrates/assimilates the
individual state actors of the world system. By engaging in such practices, the US ASA
seeks to circumvent the notion that there may be a limit to the virtuosity of security
measures. PA security measures are devised to act upon any event, information, practice,

actor, etc., deemed to constitute or imply any "actual or potential attack or other grave
hostile acts of [any] foreign power or an agent of a foreign power" against the US.2 3'
Section 501 of the PA, for example, authorizes the FBI to "make an application for an
order requiring the production of any tangible things (including books, records, papers,
documents, and other items)" for investigation to protect against international terrorism
or clandestine

intelligence activities, with the express

surreptitious investigations.

231

PatriotAct 9.

232

PatriotAct 15.

legal authority to conduct

An order so obtained "shall not disclose that it is issued
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for purposes of investigation," and "no person shall disclose to any other person ... that
the FBI has sought or obtained tangible things."2 33 The PA can therefore be viewed as an
attempt to establish a "network of permanent, [unfettered] observation."2 3 4
The power of the US to engage in legal and unfettered clandestine surveillance of
its populace and of publics abroad in the pursuit of its security interests has been

bolstered, further legitimized, via a legal instrument. Under color of law, the unipolar
state expands its power by explicitly grafting its politico-legal and ideological agenda
onto global society.2 3 5 The PA gives a suitable, legitimate legal framework to buttress
the US political agenda that under-girds domestic/international security.
measures

of summate

securitization

(surveillance

The US, via

and the authoritative power to

discipline and punish), premises its efforts on its providing a ballast, a point of
convergence, a means by which the component elements of security and control become
a single, unified Security=Control/Control=Securityequation.

Security, therefore,

concomitantly becomes an end in itself and a means to "not only manage [a] territory and
a population but also create ... the very world it inhabits." 236
The PA is premised upon the following assertion:

it is a juridical "Act to deter

and punish terrorist acts in the US and around the world, to enhance law enforcement
investigatory tools, and for other purposes" (emphasis added).237

2 33

The PA establishes
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inextricable ties between universal justice and US security. The legitimacy of waging
what in essence can be envisioned as an all-encompassing declaration of war is premised

upon the equation of: If (ifP, then

Q),

therefore R: that is, if (if a given distribution of

security obtains, then justice obtains), therefore justice obtains. 238

This tautological

formulation is at the heart of security as enunciated in the PA. The means, the standards,

by which to adjudge the viability, propriety, of a "threat," proceed from the illusion of an
elective sensus communis embodied in US security discourse; yet, in actuality, judgments
are tinctured with distinct political values and norms. Dissertations of security are "not

regulated by categories.

History itself provides no help in their formulation." 239 US

categories of security are part of a system of knowledge

that is ubiquitous and

amorphous. Criteria of judgment are, as Immanuel Kant posits, "invented." This state of
affairs enables the PA to substantiate unilateral warfare against uncongenial international
enemies under color of law.

The ambiguous phrase in the PA, "and for other purposes," imbues US security
with surfeit degrees of freedom to define and legislate the meaning of global threats. The
expansive pronouncements of the PA can be likened to Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon;
consummate security measures infuse security with a super-ordinate legitimacy and

justification to observe, record, and sanction. The PA is, therefore, a politico-legal
instrument that is part of a general war against terror, premised against any form of
resistance to the prerogatives of US security. The PA entitles the state (that is, the state
authorizes itself) to pursue security at any and all costs. Financially, for instance, the PA

238 Lyotard, Gaming 21.
239 Lyotard, Gaming 14.
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institutes an inexhaustible Counter-Terrorism Fund for the purpose of combating "terror"
(decreeing that any costs incurred by officials "paying rewards in connection with" 240
identifying terrorist activities have no limit and shall be reimbursed from the Fund).

The didactic imperative of the PA is decreed applicable to the world at-large. The
US's

unconditional

expenditure

of resources

in support

of both

domestic and

international anti-terrorist activity is something that all states are expected to emulate.

The US and all states should spare no expense and incur "any costs in connection with
detaining in foreign countries individuals accused of acts of terrorism that violate the
laws of the US." 24 1

Indeed, the US has declared that, "a regime that has lost its

legitimacy [in view of the US] will also lose its power." 242

US law has assumed an

officious position vis-a-vis international security. States' sovereignty falls to the wayside

and US precepts and premises of security reign supreme in the conduct of international
relations.

The PA universalizes US moral rectitude, declaring that, "the concept of

individual responsibilityfor wrongdoing is sacrosanct in American society, and applies
equally to all (emphasis added)."24 3

A relentless, ubiquitous, and immoral foe provides grist for the mills of PA
securitization, creating a perpetual "urgent and unparalleled need to protect the physical
integrity of the nation from any future attacks." 244 In defining the PA war-response to
"terror," the US has erected a continuing-threat matrix upon a trans-mutative terrafirma
240
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of signification, which has enabled a "network of laws and policies of expansive scope
and uncertain duration" to be established. 245 Security premised on an infrangible "threat"
enables an Orwellian "war-is-peace" mentality to anchor and legitimate US power to

define global security. US President George W. Bush reminds the US and the global
polity that the US is engaged in "a different kind of war. It's a war that is not measured
by the destruction of tanks, or ships, or aircraft, because we're fighting a different kind of

enemy." 24 6 The "different kind of enemy," that is, terror, has significant implications for
how security will be defined and operationalized, for example, war can be waged under
the aegis of traditional, power-politics state-to-state combat and/or expansive moral and
legal violations of universal norms.

"The Bush administration has pursued both in its

efforts to uproot and eradicate 'terrorism,' and has fused the two into what might be
termed the 'militarization of law enforcement,' with the 'war' on terrorism furnishing the
predicate" for unhampered action at the domestic as well as the international level. 247

Militarization of law enforcement is part of a public-safety security rubric in which the
US seeks to procure a zero-risk security environment wholly amenable to US interests.

The PA establishes a system of security that engenders unconstrained boundaries.
Take, for instance, section 203(a)(lc), which holds that (foreign) intelligence is:

(I) Information, whether or not concerning a US person, that
relates to the ability of the US to protect against--(aa.) actual or
potential attack or grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power; (bb.) sabotage or international
terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; or
245
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(cc.) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service

or network of a foreign power or by an agent of foreign power;
or (II) Information, whether or not concerning a US person, with
respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to(aa.) the national defense or security of the US; or (bb) the
conduct of foreign affairs of the US. 24

Such measures give rise to a security "discourse that systematically reifies a ... specific
spatial ontology, a sharp delineation of here and there, a discourse that both expresses and
constantly affirms the presence and absence of political life inside and outside the
[unipolar] state as the only ground on which structural necessities can be understood and
... realms of freedom ... revealed." 249 PA security has the attribute of engaging in the

"spatial capture" of any potential and actual threat.

PA Section 802 establishes an

expansive, protean definition of "domestic terrorism."

Qualitative differences between

foreign and domestic terrorism are blurred under the PA, encompassing activities that:

(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of
the criminal laws of the US or of any State; (B) appear to be
intended (1) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, or (2)
to influence the policy of a government by mass destruction,
assassination, or kidnapping, or (3) to effect the conduct of a
government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.

Also, Section 808 implies any "such acts that result in virtually any federal crime of
violence"

as being construed as threats to national

security; "conceivably,

these
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extensions of the definition of terrorism could bring within their sweep diverse domestic
political groups, which have been accused of acts of intimidation or property damage." 2 5'
25 2
Security can be "characterized fundamentally by a lack of boundaries [with] no limits."

Under PA security, global society becomes a product of and beholden to US
ideology. As Fredric Jameson notes, this is significant because ideology manifests itself
by ordering the totality of thought and action; ideology is "that grillwork of form,
convention, and belief which orders our actions."2 5 3 Security assumes the validity of a
dichotomous "inside/outside" equation of international actuality:

it revolves around

preventing the "transgression of borders between established forms of order and
community

inside

and the realm

of either danger (insecurity,

war) or a more

universalistically conceived humanity (peace) outside."2 5 4 Absolutist, militaristic security
is, therefore, the mechanism that informs the primary modus operandi of US security, and

the means to comprehend any threat (real or imagined) that confronts the US
domestically as an international threat. The term "any" bestows vast degrees of freedom

to the author defining terror. Any person within and without the jurisdiction of the US
that engages in any act that, "if committed within the jurisdiction of the US, would
constitute an offense under [the PA] shall be subject to the fines, penalties, imprisonment,
and forfeiture."
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PA security delineates

and interprets percept

apparatuses

and prescriptive

statements, resulting in a self-referential system that possesses "sole un-reviewable
discretion" of its methods and enforcement mechanisms. 25 6

If the PA is construed as a

specific act of political warfare, centers of resistance constitute "threats" that legitimate

the US as vanguard of global peace, freedom, and justice. The PA lexicon of warfare,
which posits a "war with no easily identifiable foe nor any agreed understanding of what
would constitute decisive defeat of the enemy and termination of the threat," fuels a
perpetual absolutist security discourse. 25 7 The PA, as an instrument of "counterterrorism," collapses foreign and domestic policy into a unified and seamless whole on an

absolute scale. US national security policy, at home and abroad, is the means by which
the lines are blurred between foreign and domestic, US and global security.
It is interesting to note that PA security measures are part of a historical continuity

of US hegemonic aspirations. Under the aegis of security, the US has historically utilized
legal instruments to define the parameters of political reality. One can recall the Sedition

Act of 1798, which made it a crime to criticize the policies/practices of the US, or the
Espionage Act of 1917, which made it felonious to "willfully utter, print, write, or
publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language" pertaining to the US
government.25

The US has consistently utilized law to legislate state-protective acts.

The US Supreme Court's "clear and present danger" standard (which held that the US
256
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could legitimately suspend its self-imposed

circumscriptions on the exercise of its

power), for example, is exemplary of the state's capacity to privilege its security interests
over all others. Any act can be "rationally" construed as constituting a "clear and present

danger." The Smith Act of 1940 made it a crime to "knowingly or willfully advocate,
abet, advise, or teach the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or
destroying any government in the US by force or violence." 25 9 The US's highest selfappointed juridical apparatus (the US Supreme Court) then articulated "the gravity of
evil" standard to legitimize security measures controlling public speech acts of citizen-

subjects. A more recent campaign of unfettered security involved the FBI engaging in
surreptitious police activity in the COINTELPRO program (1956-1971).

The FBI, under

color of law and in the interest of national security, engaged in spying and interference so
as to "'expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize activities of
individuals and organizations perceived by the government to pose a threat" to national
security. 260

Under the PA, US domestic imperatives embodied in COINTELPRO have

been internationalized in legal instruments.
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The above observations of the plasticity of security can be observed in the
domestic/global financial dimensions of the PA as well.

Under the PA, the US now

requires the US Secretary of the Treasury to "encourage further cooperation among
financial institutions, their regulatory authorities, and law enforcement authorities, with
the specific purpose of encouraging

[such authorities] to share information regarding

individuals, entities, and organizations.'" 26 1 The PA has also amended the Bank Secrecy
Act, noting that:

Congress finds (A) adequate records maintained by insured
depository institutions have a high degree of usefulness in
criminal, tax, and regulatory investigations or proceedings, and
that, given the threat posed to the security of the Nation ... such
records may also have a high degree of usefulness in the conduct
of intelligence or counterintelligence activities ... and (B)
microfilm or other reproductions and other records made by
insured depository institutions of checks, as well as records kept
by such institutions, of the identity of persons maintaining or
authorized to act with respect to accounts therein, have been of
particular value as well. 26

The PA works in tandem with other international institutions, such as the UN, to
aggressively perpetuate US power and security interests; this has the effect of tincturing

security with international political economy.

The internationalization of US global

economic and security interests is evident in the rapid passage of UN Security Council
Resolution 1373 (28 September 2001), which complements the PA. US President George

261

Patriot Act 30.

262 Patriot Act 46. Also, see Larry Abramson, "The Patriot Act: Alleged Abuses of the Law," National Public Radio,
28 July 2005, 2 August 2007 <www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=4756403>; Nancy Chang, Silencing
Political Dissent, forward Howard Zinn (New York: Seven Stories, 2002); Nancy Kassop, "The War Power & its
Limits," Presidential Studies Quarterly 33.3 (2003) 509-529, 10 Jan. 2007 <http://proquest.umi.com>.

98

W. Bush emphatically stated, "Every UN member has a responsibility to crack down on
terrorist financing.

We must pass all necessary laws in our own countries to allow the

confiscation of terroristassets. We must apply those laws to every financial institution in
every nation" (emphasis added).2 63

Money laundering "and the defects in financial

transparency on which money launderers rely, are critical to the financing of global
terrorism and the provision of funds for terrorist attacks," 264 menaces "the safety of US
citizens and undermines the integrity of US financial institutions and [the] global
financial and trading systems upon which prosperity and growth depend." 265
The PA broadly premises US security policy/interests as a global duty and
imperative.

A political

economy of terror has assumed

a global functionality,

interpenetrating the various nation-states that comprise international order. To infiltrate

every possible dimension of state security (economic, military, political, social, cultural)
is how the US seeks to attain absolute security from terror. A comprehensive regime of
truth, perpetuated by an ASA discourse via the PA, postulates the US directive to "provide
a clear national mandate for subjecting to special scrutiny those foreign jurisdictions,
financial institutions operating outside of the US, and classes of international transactions
or types of accounts that pose particular, identifiable opportunities for criminal abuse." 266
The US has ex-officio decreed itself adept to sequester any assets, foreign or domestic,
used in the perpetuation of any type of crime against the US in any way that threatens US
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security. Furthermore, any assets used by an individual or organization that is engaged
in/planning any act of domestic or international terrorism (as defined by the US) will be

forthwith appropriated by the US.267 Under an absolutist security framework, the US is
the sole competent power to dictate and enforce standards that define terror.

The

significance of such pronouncements is that the federal definition of terrorism is so
expansive that virtually any "reasonable" or "unreasonable" hostile act can be construed
as in some way contributing to a terrorist threat: racketeering, cyber-terrorism, maritime

affairs, nuclear and other hazardous materials, biological agents, aviation, railways,
religion, shipping, the food industry, civil and political liberties, domestic dissent,
consumer products, and utilities, amongst many things, have the potential to fuel a
totalizing concept of security that permeates, penetrates, and transcends US national
borders.

A unipolar, militarized, police-power notion of security trivializes all other state
(as well as non-state) actors and interests in the international system.

Global public

safety and a zero-risk security environment reign supreme under the US ASA.

Jose

Alvarez contends that the PA constitutes an expression of hegemonic international law

(hereinafter, HIL) on the world, and erodes the spirit and fabric of a pluralistic and
diverse system of states. According to Alvarez, this occurs because law is divested of its
ability to transcend the purely ideological and political aims of the hegemon.

HIL jettisons or severely undervalues the formal and de facto
equality of states, replacing pacts between equals grounded in
reciprocity, with patron-client relationships in which clients
pledge loyalty to the hegemon in exchange for security or
267
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economic sustenance. The hegemon promotes, by word and
deed, new rules of law ... and disregards, when inconvenient ...
international law, confident that its breach will be hailed as a
new rule. 268

In line with the domestic function of security, HIL depreciates cosmopolitan security and
postulates US security injunctions as the appropriate basis for global security measures in

place

of legal principles

and statutes. "Substantively,

HIL is characterized

by

indeterminate rules-whose vagueness benefits primarily (if not solely) the hegemon." 2 69
The PA, then, can be viewed as an institutionalized, hegemonic security percept-system,
a legal asseveration that the US can and will intervene in the affairs of any state, with
unbounded issue-linkage between security and terror enabling this to transpire "licitly."
Threat is therefore construed as any attempt by enemies of global peace and freedom to
dismantle the US-managed and defined international order. Law is a means by which US
security = global security transpires.

For example, the PA grants the US president the

power to adjudge if

a foreign country has taken or has committed to take actions that
contribute to efforts of the US to respond to, deter, or prevent
acts of ... terrorism, [and to authorize] the [Treasury] Secretary
... to instruct the US Executive Director of each international
financial institution to use [their] voice and vote ... to support
any loan or other utilization of the funds of the respective
institutions for such country, or any public or private entity
within such country. 270
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In effect, the PA can be construed as a manifesto of US power to unilaterally

define and implement global security. The UN Security Council's Counter-Terrorism
Committee (CTC) is exemplary of an articulation of the US "public right" to articulate
and implement global security. The CTC's

legally binding orders regarding counter-terrorism-imposing
financial sanctions on designated individuals and organizations
and a welter of other obligations on states-are that rare
phenomenon in international law: legally binding regulation,
backed by the possibility of real enforcement action, imposed on
all states by a global international organ engaged in a continuous
legislative enterprise by virtue of delegated power and subject to
no geographic or temporal limitation.271

The continual dislocation, reprocessing, and modification of categorical elements of the
initial "basic reality" of the international states-system framework involves processes that
substitute simulacra in place of those "basic realities" that initially informed international
order (IO).

For instance, PA securitization measures have infiltrated and enervated

cardinal IO constructs such as sovereignty and law, rendering them weak, utilizing them
as a means of furthering the unipolar security enterprise. The CTC is led by experts

not evidently chosen on the basis of representing the diverse
legal cultures of the world or their qualifications in international
law. The CTC model for counter-terrorism legislation has been

guided by the US. The CTC is aimed at globally exporting US
counter-terrorism legislation, particularly the US PATRIOT Act.
The CTC reflects the priorities of the hegemon and elevates
security over other concerns.272
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The US ASA has, therefore, become the general matrix for "relations of power and
techniques of domination ... a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the [domestic]
but producing and reproducing all aspects of [international] life." 7

All juridical acts involve the establishment of matrices of subject/object
signification. To have a subject utilize controlled significations, as if they existed within
the nous of the subject itself, is a hallmark of the ASA. "The role of [hegemonic] political
power is perpetually to use a sort of silent war to re-inscribe" the relationship of unipolar
security, force, inducement, and obedience, "and to re-inscribe it in institutions, economic
inequalities, language, and even the bodies of individuals." 274

State actors thus find

themselves inscribed within a unipolar system of absolute security, the targets of global

offensives rooted in a "domination-repression" matrix of struggle/submission via force
and inducement. 275

Security, then, assumes a biaxial manifestation of truth, of objective

control over global security conceptualization.

Waging War to Wage Peace

"Power constantly asks questions and questions us; it constantly investigates and
records; it institutionalizes the search for truth." 276 The PA must therefore be viewed
within a complex of techniques, media, and technologies that have the effect of
establishing an authoritative structuration of systemic international order. If viewed in
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such a manner, the PA, as an act of political warfare, constitutes an act of political
invasion.

"Invasion, with its forms, motifs, and effects, becomes a ... problem to the

extent that it ... defines the very principles of [international] public right."2 77

The PA,

therefore, reflects and constitutes an economy of power, whose currency translates into

global panoptic surveillance, transcription, inscription, detention, and legal recrimination
of the highest order/degree. "A right of sovereignty and a mechanics" of securitization
work in tandem to legitimate an expansive, discursive edifice of global order. 278 The PA,
in addition to being a juridical creation, is also a normative, moralistic, ideological
apparatus of knowledge that presents the US ASA as an objective, systemic compos
mentis. Politics and legality are, in light of the PA, a continuation of war. Beneath the

concept and practice of law, the universal, objective means of stabilizing the human
condition, "war continues to rage in all the mechanisms of power, even in the most

regular. War is the motor behind institutions and order ... [and] we have to interpret the
war that is going on beneath peace; peace itself is coded war.279 All subjects reside on
the "battlefront" of security and securitization measures; there is no detachment, no
placid repose or independent space that emerges from frameworks of security.

Although the PA is held out as being grounded in a security = liberty equation,
this equation metamorphoses into a circuitous security = liberty = security, ad infinitum
equation; rather than each term possessing an independent status or devolving from the
other, the PA obliterates any demarcation, privileging security sui generis as the singular
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means to procure universal freedom, liberty, and justice.28 0

Under the PA, liberty loses

its independent efficacy, and is rendered a subset of security. Liberty assumes the status

of a simulacrum, utilized by the unipolar state to promote its security agenda.

The

preventive and preemptive dimension of the PA, based on the singular and ubiquitous
nature of terror, leaves "open-ended any determination of the point at which hostilities
have ended." 28 1 The US categorically asserts that:

the war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must
take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the
worst threats before they emerge ... And our security will
require all Americans ... to be ready for preemptive action when
necessary to defend our liberty and defend our lives ... We must
be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before
they are able to threaten ... the US. 282

Furthermore, it is contended that "the inability to deter a potential attacker, the
immediacy of today's threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused
by our adversaries' choice of weapons, do not permit a reactive posture. We cannot let
our enemies strike first." 2 83 The US ASA provides an immense amount of discretion to

define and perpetuate unilateral war and global security.
By perpetuating a barrage of securitization efforts premised on a peace-inducing
war-mentality against an intangible adversary, the US ASA is able to assert the primacy
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of a US agenda, that is, preservation of the security of the US Homeland at any and all
costs via law and militarized law enforcement.284 Preserving the Homeland embodies a

"virtual abandonment of ... barriers between foreign intelligence and domestic law
enforcement."285

The PA's reach projects outward as well as inward; homogenization

and coordination of security apparatuses have been effectuated, resulting in a more
undifferentiated system of state surveillance and control. Previous distinctions, which
had had the effect of constraining intelligence gathering, data sharing, and un-moderated
law enforcement conduct, have been dismantled or seriously weakened. Before the PA,
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (hereinafter, FISA) served as a "firewall
between foreign and domestic intelligence gathering."286 A clearer distinction existed
between "investigative conduct in domestic criminal investigations and in foreign
intelligence investigations. By creating this distinction, FISA served to protect the Fourth
Amendment rights of US citizens in criminal investigations, requiring probable cause
before a search warrant is issued and preserving freedom from unreasonable search and
seizure." 28 7 The PA has diluted such protections; any and all activities directed against
the US (foreign and domestic) are now presumed to be criminal in nature, subject to the
jurisdiction of the US. The US is now less encumbered in its quest to bolster security via
prevention of ubiquitous terror. Scrutiny standards for intrusive conduct permitted by the

US, after passage of the PA, are now held at a much more permissive standard. "Instead
284
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of requiring that gathering information about foreign intelligence activities be the purpose

of a FISA investigation, it now needs to be a significant purpose-only one of a number
of purposes." 288 This has the effect of dismantling distinctions that previously prevented
the state from meta-expansive surveillance and transcription.

Before the Patriot Act, the records that law enforcement agencies
could collect and analyze under FISA were limited to specific
pieces of information, such as hotel registrations, car rentals, and
storage unit rentals. Under the Patriot Act, investigators can
collect and analyze a wide range of records that include 'any
tangible thing (including books, records, papers, documents, and
other items).' This difference is enormous, allowing for an
investigation to tap into virtually any form of information.289

Preserving the Homeland has, therefore, resulted in a "militarization" of law
enforcement, at home and abroad; this state of affairs, combined with a virtually
unlimited space of definition regarding threat, safety, and "clear and present" dangers,

has serious consequences for global security policy.

The Bush Administration, for

instance, has "crafted and imposed policies that put a premium on secrecy, and has left
little doubt that it operates under the assumption that no tactic by the US in the war
against terrorism, including torture and preemptive military action, is too excessive." 290
Such a policy is at odds with an open, democratic society that is the beacon of global
peace and freedom, and a system of sovereign states.

The PA has transformed law

enforcement, producing a distinct modality of law-securitization, resulting in a pliable,
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orderly, subservient political context that encourages and effectuates convergence
international society's well-being with the unipolar state's security mandates.

of

Via the

PA, the US as a unipolar state is systemically reified and re-inscribed into the domestic
and international political discourse.

Hence, the US president has been empowered to

use "all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons
he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred

on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons" (emphasis added).2 9 1

Conclusion
"The triumph of some means the submission of others."2 92

Via militarized

juridical and political warfare, the US unipolar state has assumed the part of global
systems-manager, planner, and guardian, concerned solely with the maximization of all
that is universally "good" in the structure and conduct of international affairs. Acting in
the name of universal ideals (Law, Justice, Morality), the US ASA has been clothed in
the garb of an ineluctable, pragmatic, proper, organic "good," articulated in the name of

all peace-loving peoples who desire nothing but harmony, stability, order, and most
importantly freedom. The US combats unpropitious appraisals of its security policy by
restating critiques within its ASA terms, effectively emptying critiques of any type of
discerning, viable content. Former US Attorney General John Ashcroft has emphatically
declared that the US polity requires nothing less than fealty to the following decree:

US Congress, "Authorization for Use of Military Force (Enrolled Bill), S.J.Res.23,
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we need honest, reasoned debate; not fear-mongering ... To
those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost
liberty, my message is this. Your tactics only aid terrorists-for
they erode our national unity and diminish our resolve. They
give ammunition to America's enemies, and pause to America's
friends. They encourage people of good will to remain silent in
the face of evil. 293

Unity, resolve, trust, war, patriotism, obedience-all of these states of affairs are
presented from a discrete unipolar security discourse manifested in US security policy.
Hence, the need to examine the ASA because "ideas, cultures, and histories cannot
seriously

be understood

or studied without their force,

or more precisely their

configurations of power, also being studied." 294 Under the ASA, the political and social
ramifications of absolutist security policy are summarily dismissed, relegated to the
margins, declared un-essential, unpatriotic, pernicious, or even deleterious.

Hence, the

US President can articulate the following retort to those who object to the PA, as well as

to those who object to the exercise of US global power via a US domestic legal
instrument:

Our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series
of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts ... thousands of lives were
suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror ... A great
people have been moved to defend a great nation ... America
was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for
freedom and opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that
light from shining. 295

293 John Ashcroft, US Attorney General's Office, quoted in Whitehead, "Forfeiting."
294 Edward W. Said, "Orientalism," The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, eds. Vincent B. Leitch, William
E.

Cain, Laurie A. Fink, Barbara E. Johnson, John McGowan, and Jeffery J. Williams (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001)
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In order to ensure that the joie de vivre that US "freedom" provides remains ever present,

guiding international society onto a righteous path, the US has directed the following:

that the full resources of ... intelligence and law enforcement
communities [be used] to find those responsible and bring them
to [the US government's fair justice].
We will make no
distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and
those who harbor them ... America and our friends and allies
join with all those who want peace and security in the world, and
we stand together to win the war against terrorism ... [Pray] for
all whose sense of security and safety has been threatened ... We
go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in the

world. 296

In light of this, Jean Baudrillard asks, when considering the fact that a single global
power monopolizes global security perception and conceptualization,

when no alternative form of thinking is allowed, what other way
is there but a terroristic situational transfer? ... To a system

whose very excess of power poses an insoluble challenge, [terror
responds] with a definitive act which is also not susceptible of
[symmetric] exchange. Terrorism is the act that restores an
irreducible singularity to the heart of a [unipolar] system of
generalized exchange. 29 7

The doctrine of "extraordinary rendition" instituted by the US further exemplifies
how the US ASA has found expression on the world stage.

In particular, the case of

Khaled el-Masri is exemplary of the logic the under-girds the PA. El-Masri, a German
citizen who alleged he was kidnapped by the CIA and tortured in a prison in Afghanistan,

296 George W. Bush quoted in Howard 621-622.
297

Baudrillard, Spirit 9.
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was denied the opportunity to seek redress in US courts on the 9 October 2007 when the

US Supreme Court declined to consider his case. The Court's refusal to hear el-Masri's
case let stand a ruling by the US Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit upheld a 2006
decision to dismiss

Mr. Masri's lawsuit on the grounds that trying the case could
expose state secrets ... Nevertheless ... the 4 th Circuit
acknowledged the seriousness of the issues when it dismissed
Mr. Masri's suit. 'We recognize the gravity of our conclusions
that el-Masri must be denied a judicial forum for his complaint'
... for it pits the judiciary's search for truth against the
298
executive's duty to maintain the nation's security.'

US security is, therefore, paramount and trumps all other competing values. The case of
Mr. el-Masri, "who is of Lebanese descent and was apparently the victim of mistaken
identity, was the most extensively documented case of the CIA's controversial practice of

'extraordinary

rendition,'

in which terrorism suspects are abducted and sent for

interrogation to other countries, including some in which torture is practiced." 299 The US
has invoked the state's secret privilege 39 times since 9/11 to withhold information from

the courts; "at the height of Cold-War tensions ... US presidents used the state secrets
privilege

six times

from

1953

to

1976."300

An ultra-secretive

modus operandi

complements, reinforces, and augments the US ASA.

298 David Stout, "Supreme Court Won't Hear Torture Appeal," New York Times Online, 9 Oct. 2007, 10 Oct. 2007
<http://www. nytimes.com/2007/10/09/washington/09cnd-scotus.html?_r=l&hp&oref-slogin>.
299 David Stout, "Supreme Court Won't Hear Torture Appeal," New York Times Online, 9 Oct. 2007, 10 Oct. 2007
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/09/washington/09cnd-scotus.html?_r=1 &hp&oref=slogin>.
300 Associated Press, "Court Nixes Man's Suit Claiming Torture by CIA; Justices Throw Out German's
Challenge to

Alleged Abduction by U.S. Agents," MSNBC News Online, 9 Oct. 2007, 10 Oct. 2007 <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id
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International society's obedience and fidelity to the security mandates/dictates of
the US is the overarching priority in global security measures.

Fidelity to US power

informs the rules of securitization which the US tacitly claims exemption from, and

which the US rewards in a militarized, unipolar world.

This is evident in US policy

toward WMD proliferation in a post-Cold War, post-9/11 world.

The issue of WMD

proliferation and its role in perpetuating the US ASA will be the focus of the following
chapter. As is the case with criminalization and the PA, the US ASA sets the purlieus as
to what constitutes a legitimate and viable threat vis-a-vis WMD and global security,
particularly by designating which states are permitted to justifiably and legitimately

possess WMD technology.
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CHAPTER 4. WMD & PROLIFERATION

Proliferation

in a

post-Cold

War, post-9/11

world

has

had significant

consequences for the structure and management of global security policy. 30'

The

introduction of nuclear weapons (hereinafter, NW) initially confounded and distorted
conventional

formulae of war and peace, such as limited warfare, armies, arms,

munitions, strategy, and distinctions of non/combatants. NW, generally speaking, have
been accommodated and rationalized, rendering them strategically functional within the
discourse of global security. 30 2 Since 9/11, NW have assumed an important role in the

justification of the US ASA, for example, North Korea's testing of a nuclear device and
Iran's determination to acquire nuclear capability have had serious consequences on US
and, by default, global security policy. Keeping NW within the purview of select states
while concomitantly excluding those states the US designates enemies of global freedom,
that is, rogue states, is considered a major component of the war on terror.

Theoretically, a nuclear power cannot logically engage a non-nuclear state in
actual combat; indeed, there is no functional, complementary relationship between the

two-total-death neutralizes the playing field. This also holds for engagement between
nuclear powers-where the obliteration of all states will result from the mass use of
nuclear weapons.

Yet, the US has forcefully asserted its right to use NW against any

301 See Michael Hamel-Green, Regional Initiatives on Nuclear and WMD-Free Zones: Cooperative Approaches
to
Arms Control and Non-Proliferation,forward Patricia Lewis (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament
Research, 2005); James A. Russell, ed., Proliferationof Weapons of Mass Destructionin the Middle East: Directions
and Policy Options in the New Century (New York: Palgrave, 2006).

302 For examples see Peter Katona, John P. Sullivan, and Michael D. Intriligator, eds., Countering Terrorism and
WMD: Creatinga Global Counter-TerrorismNetwork (New York: Routledge, 2006); Stephen J. Cimbala, ed.,
Deterrenceand Nuclear Proliferationin the Twenty-First Century (Westport: Praeger, 2001).
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state deemed a threat, despite the "first pillar" of the NPT. 303

The five nuclear states

identified in the NPT, that is, the US (1968), UK (1968), USSR (1968, now Russia),
France (1992), and China (1992) have stated that NW will not be used against states that
do not possess NW except in response to a nuclear attack, or a conventional attack in
alliance with a NW state. However, this policy has not been incorporated formally into

the NPT, and practice has deviated from policy. The US has indicated that it may use
NW in response to a non-conventional attack by rogue states, and that it had NW targeted
at North Korea while it was non-nuclear from 1959-1991.304
The "strategy of preemption" is one of the more recent hegemonic acts of
controlling NW. The Gulf War II is reflective of a US policy to "'forestall or prevent ...
hostile acts" of aggressors-with US disapproval of possession of nuclear technology
being considered a "hostile act"-via preemptive military action.305 Klare argues that the
US approach is reflective of an effort of trying to preserve a "world that no longer
exists-a world in which WMD remain the exclusive prerogative of the [US and its
allies.]" 306 Initially, the USSR, by assuming the role of an ominous and mortal enemy,

303 See "THIRD SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE 2005 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF

THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS," Opening
Statement, Chairman of the Third Session, Ambassador Sudjadnan Parnohadiningrat, 26 April 2004, United Nations,
New York, NY, 16 July 2007 <http://www.indonesiamission-y.org/i ssuebaru/Events/opening_npt.htm>; Alexander T.
J. Lennon, ed., ContemporaryNuclear Debates: Missile Defenses, Arms Control, and Arms Races in the Twenty-First
Century (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2002) 3-11; "NPT Documents, Facts, and Figures,"
InternationalAtomic Energy Agency, 5 March 2007 <http://www.iaea.or g/Publ ications/Documents/Treat
ies/npt.html>; Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy 3 ed. (New York: Palgrave, 2003) xiii.
304 "Analysis on Military, Security, Arms Control, and Non-proliferation Issues," Berlin Information Center (BITS) for

Transatlantic Security, 4 March 2007 <http://www.bits.de/index.html>.
305

Freedman 453.

306 Klare, "Ambivalent" 203. See Wendy Frieman, China, InternationalArms Control and Non-Proliferation(New
York: Routledge-Curzon, 2004); Evan S. Medeiros, Chasing the Dragon: Assessing China's System of Export
Controls for WMD-Related Goods and Technologies (Santa Monica: RAND Corp., 2005); Derek D. Smith, Deterring
America: Rogue States and the Proliferationof Weapons ofMass Destruction (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2006).
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provided fodder for channeling and giving shape to NW strategy.307

The loss of the

bipolar ballast and the advent of ubiquitous terror after 9/11 have redirected US efforts
regarding containment and control of NW via preventing "undesirables" (rogue states and
their "terrorist clients") from attaining nuclear technologies. 308

The Post-9/11 Nuclear Threat
According to the US, when "it comes to nuclear weapons, the world has changed
faster than US policy. The emerging security threats to the US, its friends and allies and
even Russia now come from rogue states, terrorist groups and other adversaries seeking

weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. Threats also come from
insecure nuclear stockpiles and the proliferation of dangerous technologies." 309

US

security in a post-911 world indicates a sharp break from the Cold War rubric, even
though US imperial aspirations remain a salient and constant theme of its security policy.
It "is time to leave the Cold War behind and defend against new threats of the 21St
century."3 10 Curbing the proliferation of NW and other WMD in a post-Cold War, post9/11 world involves an approach to global security that retains the lexis of a states-system
paradigm while basing action on unipolar security mandates. This is part of a general
security strategy implemented after 9/11, which has provided the US with a basis for
justifiably pursuing an ASA.

It is by the "simulation of a conventional, restricted

307
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308

Freedman 130.

309 George W. Bush, speech, The National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 23 May 2000, The George W. Bush Foreign
Policy Reader: PresidentialSpeeches With Commentary, ed. John W. Dietrich (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005) 25.
310 George W. Bush, speech, The National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 23 May 2000, The George
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perceptive field, where the premises and consequences of any act or event are calculable,
that a political credibility can be maintained ... But if the entire cycle of any act or event
is envisaged in a system where linear continuity and dialectical polarity no longer exist,

in a field unhinged by simulation, then all determination evaporates."3 1'
According to the US National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction

(2002), US policy regarding WMD, US national security, and global security involves the
following:

the US can no longer be sure that its enemies will lack WMD;
the US must focus on defense of its territory through NMD and
enhanced homeland security; the US should make plans to
manage the consequences of attacks at home and abroad; and the
US should continue nonproliferation programs and a proactive
counter-proliferation strategy. 3 12

Proactive US security policy includes unilateral decision-making, legislation, military
incursions/

campaigns,

and dissemination

of US

political,

moral,

and economic

prerogatives as the basis for global peace and freedom. Preemptive and preventive US
military strikes provide new ground rules for the implementation of a blanket security
policy in order to "forestall or prevent ... hostile acts by our adversaries."3 1 3 Also, the
US has announced its unqualified right to act unilaterally, to confiscate, interrogate, and
target suspected states and individuals (foreign and domestic) without any or little
accountability to the US polity or world community via global extraordinary rendition,

3"

Jean Baudrillard, Simulations, trans. Paul Foss, Paul Patton and Philip Beitchman (New York: Semiotext, 1983) 31.
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being held as an enemy combatant, and/or interdiction of exported weapons and

materials.

In May of 2003, US President George W. Bush announced a new

ProliferationSecurity Initiative (hereinafter, PSI), which exemplifies how the 9/11 war-

response has invested security with a capacity to encompass and develop a very broad
range of security measures:

Some challenges of terrorism [such as NW/WMD proliferation]
cannot be met with law enforcement alone. They must be met
with direct military action ... The greatest threat to world peace
is the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. And
we must work together to stop proliferation ... When [WMD] or
their components are in transit, we niust have the means and
authority to seize them. So today I announce a new effort to
fight proliferation called the Proliferation Security Initiative
[(PSI)]. The US and a number of our close allies ... have begun
working on new agreements to search planes and ships carrying
suspect cargo and to seize illegal weapons or missile
technologies ... [and to] extend this partnership as broadly as
possible to keep the world's most destructive weapons away
from or shores and out of the hands of our common enemies. 3 14

The US and its "allies," however, are not subject to any search and seizure, given that
such practices would infringe upon the sovereignty of the US and it allies.

This

consequence of adhering to the PSI, that is, infringement on the integrity and sovereignty
of nation-states, is only directed toward undesirable states that defy US mandates.
The offensive, absolute security embodied in the US ASA authorizes the US to
ignore the rules it sets for others in the global order. The spectacle of 9/11 has provided

314 George W. Bush, speech, Warsaw Royal Castle, Krakow, Poland, 31 May 2003, The George
W. Bush Foreign

Policy Reader: PresidentialSpeeches With Commentary ed. John W. Dietrich (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005) 207.
Also, see Mark J. Valencia, The ProliferationSecurity Initiative: Making Waves in Asia (New York: Routledge, 2006)
25-56; George Bunn and Christopher F. Chyba, eds., U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: Confronting Today's Threats,
forward William J. Perry (Harrisonburg: R.R. Donnelley, 2006).
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the US with an empirical as well as moral and ethical basis for claiming exemption from
the rules it demands all other states be bound by to combat terror. The use of tactical
nuclear weapons in taking preemptive action in waging war against terror, for instance,
has been presented as feasible in the Nuclear Posture Review 2002 (hereinafter NPR).

The NPR points out the

value of missile defense and use of tactical nuclear weapons in
coping with the new security environment of global terrorism
and proliferation ... [and] suggest[s] adoption of a triad of
offensive strike systems (both nuclear and non-nuclear), defenses
(both active and passive), and a revitalized infrastructure.
Central to this new strategic concept [is] offensive deterrence,
namely preemption, and tactical use of nuclear weapons
Terrorists or rogue states armed with [WMD] will likely test
America's security commitments to its allies and friends. In
response ... A broader array of capability is needed to dissuade
states from undertaking political, military, or technical courses of
action that would threaten US and allied security. US forces
must pose a credible deterrent to potential adversaries who have
access to modern military technology, including [WMD] ... US
nuclear forces will continue to provide assurance to security
partners ... This assurance can serve to reduce the incentives for
friendly countries to acquire nuclear weapons of their own to
deter such threats and circumstances. Nuclear capabilities also
assure the ... that the US will not be subject to coercion based on
a false perception of US weakness.3 15

Since 9/11, US global supremacy has sought to implement an ASA that establishes
the "facts" of global order and international society.

Yet, under a unipolar framework,

"facts all contribute only to setting the problem, not to its solution ... doubt can exist only
where a question exists, a question only where an answer exists, and an answer only

Chung-in Moon and Jong-Yun Bae, "The Bush Doctrine and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis," Confronting
the
Bush Doctrine: Critical Views From the Asia-Pacific, eds., Mel Gurtov and Peter Van Ness (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005) 5l; US Department of Defense, Nuclear PostureReview Report, Submitted to Congress, 31 December
2001, Released 8 January 2002, 16 May 2007 <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm>.
315
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where something can be said."3 16

As with the war on terror, US policy regarding

proliferation clearly identifies the "facts" of good and bad, the right and the wrong, the
peace-lovers and the warmongers, US allies and enemies. The use of nuclear technology

by select undesirable states for any purpose, peaceful or otherwise, such as Iran and
North Korea, has been construed as utterly incompatible with the "facts" that inform US
security interests. Previous frameworks that sought a more balanced solution to the issue

of WMD and proliferation have been "re-defined."

The NPT in particular has been re-

conceptualized. Rather than eventual global de-nuclearization of the world, the US has
divided the world into acceptable (the US and its allies) and unacceptable (rogue states)
nuclear actors.

North Korea and Iran, amongst other (rogue) states, are viewed as unacceptable
nuclear actors.

The US unilaterally declared, for instance, that the "international

community" would "not tolerate construction of a nuclear weapon [by Iran].

Iran would

be dangerous if it had a nuclear weapon." 317 Libya, on the other hand, has been held out
as an example of how an absolutist US policy can successfully force states to conform to
"proper" rules of global society. Libya's declaration that it sought to de-nuclearize and
renounce WMD programs, even though some observers pointed out that Libya had
simply taken the obvious final step in its plans to join the (US-managed) society of states,
was touted as a major victory by the US. It is certainly the case however, that the US
ASA, backed by profound military power, has been effective in shaping the world in the

316 Wittgenstein, Tractatus 88.
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image of the US.

For instance, eventually "over sixty countries, including a hesitant

Russia, joined PSI[, and] the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1540, which called
on [all] states to refrain from aiding efforts by non-state actors to acquire WMD and take
cooperative action to prevent illegal trafficking in WMD materials."3 18
Terror and rogue states are, therefore, the "new" organizing principles of the post-

9/11 ASA. When the Cold War ended, the Director of the Institute for US and Canadian
Studies (ISKRAN) of the Russian Academy of Science in Moscow, Georgi Arbatov, put
forth the following question to the US: "now that you have lost your enemy, what will
you do? The end of the Cold War [has] deprived the US not only of an enemy but also its
core organizing principles on which it had based its foreign policy for four decades." 319
As Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf note, "fear of alien ideas-once communism,
now Islamic fundamentalism [and terror] permeates official thinking.

The perceived

need to combat threatening forces, once the Soviet Union, now Iran [and other rogue

states] remains pervasive. And a preference for military intervention to achieve policy
objectives continues."3 2 0 The explicit as well as subtle ties that bind all nations' security
with US security, and that bind rogue states with US notions of terror, are salient and
powerful factors in the articulation of post-9/11 security.

To maintain a semblance of a states system, the concept of rogue states has been
utilized in order to establish "clear" enemies of peace and freedom.

318
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Rogue states are clearly the most likely sources of chemical and
biological and nuclear weapons for terrorists. Every nation now
knows that we cannot accept-and we will not accept-states
that harbor, finance, train, or equip the agents of terror. Those

nations that violate this principle will be regarded as hostile
regimes. They have been warned, they are being watched, and
321
they will be held to account.

US President George W. Bush has forcefully and unequivocally decreed that, "for states
that support terror, it's not enough that the consequences be costly-they must be

devastating. The more credible this realty, the more likely that regimes will change their
behavior-making it less likely that America and our friends will need to use
overwhelming force against them." 322

To militarize the US polity, to create a

sociopolitical context where threat is limitless, security policy moves from defined
topical matters/categories to a constant state of fear and alert that justifies a militarized

security policy wherein everything is fair game for securitization, that is, suppression,
surveillance,

preemption,

militarization,

criminalization,

and

prevention

become

universal values, norms, and practices to ensure global peace and freedom. The post-9/11
US ASA is grounded in a militaristic mentality. Militarized security, a security-as-war
modality, enables the US to "justifiably" issue sweeping condemnations and unilateral,
militarized responses to apperceived threats. It also enables the US to legitimately ignore
any role the US may play in bringing about the circumstances fomenting warfare, while
concomitantly making the US the sole competent power to deal with global threats.
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The

modality

of war-is-peace,

war-is-freedom,

war-is-righteous-one

that

excludes any possibility for US responsibility/complicity in bringing about violence,
conflict, and acrimony-provides

fodder for absolutist rhetoric, policy, action, and

condemnation of rogue states for doing what states do, such as seek offensive and
defensive capabilities against their enemies.

Every state that actively sponsors terror is known to be seeking
[NW] and the missiles to deliver them ... Their hope is to
blackmail the US into abandoning our war on terror, and
forsaking our friends and allies and security commitments
around the world ... America will never be blackmailed, and we
will never forsake our commitment to liberty ... If America
wavers, the world will lose heart. If America leads, the world
will show its courage. America will never waver. America will
lead the world to peace. Our cause is necessary. Our cause is
just. And no matter how long it takes, we will defeat the
enemies of freedom.32 3

The "just" cause legitimates the US categorically rationalizing and upholding its "right"
to use force indiscriminately to promote peace.

In actuality, this absolutist, militaristic

modality-despite a perpetual and monotonous rhetoric of peace-becomes an end in
and of itself.

The US ASA "leads, by necessity, to preventive war.

The general

insecurity that goes hand and hand with this results in the sacrifice" of ordering concepts
embodied in a society/system of states. 325 The US has unilaterally outlined seven points
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that now form the basis of global security policy vis-a-vis NW, attempting to reshape
various treaties such as the ABM Treaty of 1972 and the NPT. In short, "no treaty that
prevents [the US] from addressing today's threats, that prohibits [the US] from pursuing

promising technology [such as NMD] to defend ourselves, our friends and our allies is in
our interests or in the interests of world peace." 326 There must be no hindrance-legal,
diplomatic, military, technological, moral, political-to unipolar management of world
affairs via global security policy, since "the greatest threats... [come] from terrorists who
strike without warning, or rogue states who seek weapons of mass destruction." 327 The
US has outlined the following seven components for dealing with proliferation:

1., expand the PSI; 2., criminalize proliferation; 3., contain
WMD; 4., close 'loophole'

in the NPT that allows non-nuclear

states access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes; 5.,
expand IAEA surveillance by implementing the Additional
Protocol, which requires states to publicly declare if they are
engaged in a broad variety of nuclear activities; 6., create IAEA
special committee to focus intensively on verification of nuclear

activities; and 7., no state being investigated for violations can
serve on the IAEA Board of Governors or special committee. 32 8

The seven-point agenda creates an intrinsically correct US modality of international
relations/society.329

326 George W. Bush, speech, Whitehall Palace, London, England, 19 Nov. 2003, The George W. Bush Foreign Policy
Reader: PresidentialSpeeches With Commentary, ed. John W. Dietrich (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005) 134.
George W. Bush, speech, The White House, Washington, DC, 13 Dec. 2001, The George W. Bush Foreign Policy
Reader: PresidentialSpeeches With Commentary, ed. John W. Dietrich (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005) 136.
327

George W. Bush, speech, The National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 11 Feb. 2004, The George W. Bush
Foreign Policy Reader: PresidentialSpeeches With Commentary ed. John W. Dietrich (New York: M.E. Sharpe,
328

2005) 138-142.
329 Lyotard, Postmodern 35.

123

Rogue States & WMD
The politics of proliferation and militarization stem in part from the worldview,
the politico-ideological perspective employed when adjudging security vis-a-vis an ideal

state of affairs.
reference

In the case of US and its view of global security, 9/11 provides the

point for such a worldview.

A

perceptual/conceptual

conjunction with "naked power," informs and shapes eventuation.

framework,

in

This is significant

because "our idea of what belongs to the realm of reality is given for us in the concepts
which we use."3 30 The rogue state concept is part of a larger program of articulating and

implementing an objective US system of security. In a post-9/11 world, a US unilateral,
militaristic posture presents and constitutes a perpetual and ever-present threat that
actually fuels and possibly legitimizes militarization by rogue states, sustaining fervent
resistance to US power.
Every political configuration of order augments its power by manufacturing
knowledge to establish a regime(s) of truth:

that is, discursive as well as material

"mechanisms and instances which enable a subject to distinguish true/false statements;

the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in
the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as

true." 33 1 Truth, in its purest sense, is actually repressive in that it delimits permissible
thought and possibility via exclusion. Order appropriates truth so as to accord itself the
privilege of inclusion and exclusion, of what is or is not (can or cannot be) the case. It is
"truth that makes the laws, that produces the ['true'] discourse which, at least partially,
330
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decides, transmits itself, extends upon the effects of power. In the end, we are judged,
condemned, classified, determined in our undertakings, destined to a certain mode of
living or dying, as a function of the true discourses which are the bearer of the specific
effects of power." 332
In light of US power, rogue states reason that they have little choice but to

aggressively resist and/or counterbalance US power-especially military power-with
proportional power to exist. Although bandwagoning, balancing, and the like provide
alternate options, viable military power is an indispensable and fundamental component
of state power in an anarchic, self-help world. From a rogue state perspective, the US
invasion/occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan are examples of what happens to a state that
is unable to effectively counter or deter US power. In the case of North Korea, "the war

in Iraq had led the leaders in Pyongyang to draw three conclusions:

a nonaggression

agreement [(without sufficient military power to back up the DPRK)] with the US was
pointless, no inspection regime would ever be good enough for Washington, and only a
nuclear weapon would deter a US [military] intervention."33 3

US policy based on hard-

line militarism, transcendental morality, and unilateral prerogatives did not avert but
rather seriously agitated an already volatile situation on the peninsula.

Indeed, North

Korea's eventual detonation of a nuclear weapon can be traced, in part, to a protracted
history of US aggression.

The belligerent posture regarding North Korea's nuclear

disarmament in 2003 was, according to the DPRK:
332

Foucault, Power/Knowledge 94.

333 John Feffer, North Korea/South Korea: US Policy at a Time of Crisis (New York: Seven Stories, 2003) 12;
"Statement of Foreign Ministry Spokesman Blasts UNSC's Discussion of Korean Nuclear Issue," Korean Central
News Agency, Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 7 April 2003, 14 August 2007 <http://www.kcna.c
o.jp/index-e.htm>; Doug Struck, "Citing Iraq, North Korea Signals Hard Line on Weapons Issue," Washington Post, 31
March 2003.
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precisely a prelude to war ... The US intends to force the DPRK
to disarm itself. The Iraqi war shows that to allow disarming

through inspection does not help avert a war but rather sparks it.
Neither international public opinion nor the UN Charter could
prevent the US from mounting an attack on Iraq. This suggests
that even the signing of a non-aggression treaty with the US
would not help avert a war. Only the physical deterrent force,
tremendous

military

deterrent

force

powerful

enough

to

decisively beat back an attack supported by any ultra-modern
weapons, can avert a war and protect the security of the country
and the nation. This is a lesson drawn from the Iraqi war.334

In general, rogue states view militarization as a viable and necessary option, for

example, maintaining and augmenting conventional military resources as well as efforts
to develop offensive nuclear capacity, to persevere in light of US "aggression."
Historically as well as presently, unsolicited US interference in the affairs of rogue states,
for example, US military support of the Shah's regime in Iran, or attempts at outright
military incursion/invasion, for example, Cuba's repulsion of the Bay of Pigs invasion
force in 1962, makes militarization a priority-one that serves the defensive, ideological,

symbolic, cultural, and political needs of regimes in power. The US has framed postCold War proliferation in absolutist moral terms:

the US and its allies have an

unconditional right to nuclear technologies, and those deemed enemies of global peace

and freedom by the US are forbidden to develop/acquire nuclear technologies for any
reason or purpose. During the Cold War, the US was selective as to which actors were
permitted to have access to nuclear technologies; in a post-Cold War system, there is no
viable counter-power to ballast or contain US security objectives.

The rogue state

33 "Statement of Foreign Ministry Spokesman Blasts UNSC's Discussion of Korean Nuclear Issue,"
Korean Central
News Agency, Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 7 April 2003, 14 August 2007
<http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm>.
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concept is as subjective, selective, and morally based as the US campaign against the

USSR during the Cold War.33 5 The selective and inconsistent policy of US proliferation
policy (both past and present) has contributed to the desirability of acquiring NW
technologies by rogue states.

North Korea & WMD
In a post-9/11 world rogue states, especially North Korea, have turned inward to

resist and effectively combat the hegemonic social, political, economic, and military
warfare waged against them by the US. North Korea, historically an isolationist state,

has always turned inward-economically, politically, ideologically-to buttress itself
against foreign influence and interference, for example, against the US after WWII and
the waves of sociopolitical and economic destabilization/neutralization of the communist

bloc during and after the dissolution of the USSR. In light of the US "victory" over the
USSR, the DPRK did the following to not suffer the same fate as the defunct USSR:

The DPRK fell back on an extremely competent system of
indoctrination, intimidation, and incarceration to thwart any
possible infection from the Tiananmen or glasnost viruses. It
attempted to maintain an information blockade for all but the
most loyal of its citizens ... draw on Korean history to play up
nationalist fears of outside intervention ... As an added deterrent,
the government relied on a large and offensively structured
military to discourage external attempts to effect regime
3 36
change.

3 See US National Security Council, "NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, April
14, 1950: A Report to the President Pursuant to the President's Directive, January 31, 1950," Naval War College
Review, Vol. 27 (May-June 1975) 51-108, 12 June 2007 <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/nsc-68/nsc68-l.htm>.
336 Feffer, North Korea 59. Also, see Roy Richard Grinker, Korea and Its Futures (New York:
St. Martin's Press,

1998).
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The experience of the Korean War and the continual threat posed by the US to the
sovereignty of the DPRK since its founding have resulted in militarization being
accorded the highest priority by the North Korean leadership. 3 37

Indeed, the military

plays an indispensable role in social, political, economic, cultural, ideological, and
military functions; for example, it plays a key role in socializing, training, and educating
the young via fostering patriotism to the state, and inculcating loyalty to the Kim clan and
the military leadership. 33 8
Proliferation and militarization in general are roundly condemned by the US, even

though it has one of the largest standing armies and is one of the world's most prolific
manufacturers and suppliers of arms in the world. According to the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (hereinafter, SIPRI):

World military expenditure in 2005 is estimated to have reached
$1001 billion at constant (2003) prices and exchange rates, or
$1118 billion in current dollars. This corresponds to 2.5% of
world GDP or an average spending of $173 per capita. World
military expenditure in 2005 represents a real terms increase of
3.4% since 2004, and of 34% over the 10-year period 19962005. The USA, responsible for about 80% of the increase in
2005, is the principal determinant of the current world trend, and
its military expenditure now accounts for almost half of the
world total. The process of concentration of military expenditure
continued in 2005 with a decreasing number of countries
the 15
responsible for a growing proportion of spending:
countries with the highest spending now account for 84% of the

3

Bertil Lintner, Great Leader, Dear Leader: Demystifying North Korea Under The Kim Clan (Chiang Mai:

Silkworm Books, 2005) 93-94.
338 James E. Hoare and Susan Pares, North Korea in the 21' Century: An Interpretative Guide (Kent:
Global Oriental,
2005) 11. See CIA World Factbook Statistics: North Korea. Military branches: North Korean People's Army: Ground
Forces, Navy, Air Force; civil security forces (2005). Military service age and obligation: 17 years of age (2004).
Manpower available for military service: Males age 17-49: 5,851,801; Females age 17-49: 5,850,733 (2005 est.).
Manpower fit for military service: Males age 17-49: 4,810,831; Females age 17-49: 4,853,270 (2005 est.). Manpower
reaching military service age annually: Males age 18-49: 194,605; Females age 17-49: 187,846 (2005 est.). Military
expenditures - percent of GDP: Not Available, US Central Intelligence Agency, CIA World Factbook, 12 Feb. 2007
<www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ kn.html>.
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total. The USA is responsible for 48% of the world total,
distantly followed by the UK, France, Japan and China with 45% each. 339

For the US, militarization is considered a legitimate and absolutely necessary exercise.
For "undesirable" states, the very same phenomenon is viewed with disdain, as an

inherently dangerous enterprise. Yet, the history of rogue states, especially explicit US
interference in their domestic affairs, in conjunction with the US ASA, provides a
different explanation for militarization other than the "fact" that rogue states arm to

threaten global freedom and peace. Analysts such as Nicholas Eberstadt, for example,
perpetuate a particular interpretation of rogue states that militarize. In the case of North
Korea, he declares that the DPRK is "a state unlike any other-a political construct
especially and particularly built for three entwined purposes, [that is,] to conduct a war,
to settle historical grievances and to fulfill a grand ideological vision."3 4 0

Such

pronouncements emerge from an "objective" analysis based on military expenditures, the
number of people under arms, and length of compulsory military service the state

requires.

Yet, the description and the concerns of rogue states proffered by Eberstadt,

that is, to conduct war and fulfill a grand ideological vision, can be equally applied to any

339 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Recent Trends in Military Expenditure: World Military
Expenditure, 1988-2006 (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2006), 12 April 2007 <www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_trends.
html>. Also, see CIA World Factbook: United States. Military branches: Army, Navy and Marine Corps, Air Force,
and Coast Guard; note - Coast Guard administered in peacetime by the Department of Homeland Security, but in
wartime reports to the Department of the Navy. Military service age and obligation: 18 years of age; 17 years of age
with written parental consent (2006). Manpower available for military service: males age 18-49: 67,742,879; females
age 18-49: 67,070,144 (2005 est.). Manpower fit for military service: males age 18-49: 54,609,050; females age 18-49:
54,696,706 (2005 est.). Manpower reaching military service age annually: males age 18-49: 2,143,873; females age
18-49: 2,036,201 (2005 est.). Military expenditures - percent of GDP: 4.06% (2005 est.), US Central Intelligence
Agency, The World Factbook, 13 Feb. 2007 <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factboo k/geos/us.html>.
340

Nicholas Eberstadt, "What Surprise? The Nuclear Core of North Korea's Strategy," Washington Post, 1 March
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other state, including the US (which spent $417.4 billion on military expenditures
compared to $1.8 billion by North Korea in 2003).341

It certainly is the case that the

military plays an important part in North Korean affairs, but that role goes beyond merely

having an offensive capability. The military's pronounced role is also shaped by and is
part of the historical culture and identity of the North Korean state. North Korea is a
"garrison society," forged in the fires of military struggle-initially against the Japanese
imperialists and then against the US and its South Korean "ally."

These battles have required enormous sacrifices. However much
legitimacy the government could claim for its social programs
(the land reform after World War II, the economic rebound after
1953), the chief source of its pride has been the ability to prevent
the modern-day equivalent of the nineteenth-century imperialists
from once again seizing the country... [F]ew other countries in
the world [(with the exception of Cuba)] have weathered the full
bore of American power or continued to face the sheer amount

of military hardware that the US assembled for its posture of
containment in the Asia-Pacific region. What might seem like
paranoia [on behalf of North Korea] is common sense for a
country that suffered near total destruction in the Korean War. 34 2

Militarization is therefore less about "evil" and posing a threat to global peace and
freedom than it is about state survival, self-interest, self-preservation, security, and

rational development of effective military technologies to preserve the state against
internal and external threat-in short, those values and interests that are pursued by all
states in an anarchic world.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Military ExpenditureDatabase2004 (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2004),
15 April 2007 <http://web.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mexdata_ index.html>.
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An absolutist and aggressive US security policy as manifested in the Bush
Doctrine and the war on terror has the effect of aggravating tensions, fueling global
militarization and proliferation. The US ASA does not give credence to notions of state

sovereignty and a diversity of state interests. In North Korea, fear "of failure and loss of
nationhood-and the perceived importance of the military in preventing such scenariossurvived Kim I1 Sung's death in 1994."343 The military, premised on resistance against
US aggression, is therefore a key component of the North Korean regime, and exercises
tremendous power in the articulation of North Korean offensive/defensive policy. "North
Korea today simply pays lip service to the importance of the party, but the signs of the
rise of the military are everywhere, and the military presence can be felt in all aspects of
social and political life." 344 Indeed, the People's Army maintains a second economy
"devoted to its own welfare ... Overseas sales of arms, weapons and even missiles,
produced within the DPRK, which have been going on since the 1980s, are presumed to
pass through its hands and its own banking institutions. Its clients are said chiefly to be a
number of Middle Eastern and African states." 34 5

In light of the ASA pursued by the US after 9/11, in 2003 North Korea officially
emphasized the role of the military and militarization in maintaining the struggle against
the US by privileging a "military-first policy" over economic development.

"North

Korea switched from a policy of kangsong taeguk (strong military, strong economy) to a

343

John Feffer, North Korea 61.

344 Dae-Sook

Suh, "The Military-First Politics of Kim Jong I1," Asian Perspective 26.3 (2002) 146 (Masan, Kyungnam

University)..
34' Hoare, Century 58.
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military-first doctrine [(songun)]."3 4 6

Songun chongchi means to "give a priority to the

military in politics."34 7 Military-first signifies a politics, economy, cultural and political
structure, and a leadership that places primary emphasis on the military throughout
society in order to buttress and preserve society from foreign aggression.

In 2003, the

North Korean military absorbed 15.4% of the 2003 budget (25% of GDP), up from
14.9% in 2002.348 In 2005, the military was estimated to absorb between 20% and over
30% of the economy's Gross National Income (GNI). 349 North Korea has the

5 th

largest

standing army in the world. More than 1/ 2 0 th of the population serves in the armed forces
in some capacity, with 7.45 million (30% of the population between the ages of 15-60)
reserve soldiers available for active duty, and a recent estimate noted that North Korea
has approximately 4,000 tanks, 2,500 armored personnel carriers, nearly 1,000 naval
vessels, and 1,700 aircraft.3 50

Despite being a militarized state, North Korea is a very poor, developing country.
In order for it to invest in, develop, and maintain such a large military, North Korea has

engaged in a variety of activities, such as bringing in nearly $1 billion in the 1990s from
sales of arms to "undesirable" states such as Libya, Iran, the former Iraq, and Egypt,
346 Feffer, North Korea 151; Hoare, Century 12; Tim Beal, North Korea: The Struggle Against US Power (London:
Pluto Press, 2005) 92.

347

See Dae-Sook, "Military-First."

Jane 's Sentinel, 20 Feb. 2003, 39-79; "North Korea Boosts
Military Spending as Nuclear Crisis Persists," Agence France-Presse,27 March 2003, 15 Aug. 2007 <http://209.85.16
5.104/search?q=cache:TckWeMaHKMYJ:www.integrasyssa.com/Press/spacedaily2003Headlines.pdf+North+Korea+
Boosts+Military+Spending+As+Nuclear+Crisis+Persists&h=en&ct=clnk&cd=2&gl=us&client=firefox-a >.
348 See Alex Vatanka, "North Korea Special Report,"

349 Charles Wolf, Jr., and Kamil Akramov, North Korean Paradoxes: Circumstances, Costs, and Consequences of
Korean Unification (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2005) 5-6, 13-14; Eugene J. Palka and Francis A. Galgano,
North Korea: GeographicPerspectives (Guilford: McGraw Hill, 2004).
See Joseph Bermudez, The Armed Forces ofNorth Korea (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2001): "North Korea Boosts
Military Spending As Nuclear Crisis Persists," Agence France-Presse,27 March 2003; Nicholas Eberstadt and Judith
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while also developing offensive nuclear capabilities and stockpiling a significant amount

of biological and chemical WMD.3 5 ' US policy actively and aggressively isolates North
Korea (diplomatically and economically), fueling North Korea's most lucrative industry,
that is, trafficking in weapons, especially with Pakistan and countries in the Middle East
such as Iran and Egypt (Egypt being North Korea's oldest and closest partner).3 52 As
early as 1965, with the Korean War still fresh in his memory, Kim Il Sung inaugurated
the Hamhung Military Academy to conduct research into missile technology. In a speech
before the academy, he declared:

"If war breaks out, the US and Japan will also be

involved. In order to prevent their involvement, we have to be able to produce rockets

which fly as far as Japan. Therefore it is the mandate of the Military Academy to develop
mid and long range missiles."35 3 A militarized state engaging in illicit activities has,
therefore, arisen in direct response to US policy in the Asia-Pacific region, and toward
the DPRK in particular.

To assume that US policy is not constitutive of the tension,

conflict, acrimony, violence, and potential for war and destabilization of the Korean

peninsula is to be ensnared in the munificent assumptions, values, norms, morality, and
epistemology of the US ASA.
In her dealings with North Korea, former US Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright observed that brinksmanship is a North Korean specialty. 354

The nuclear

3' See Daniel Pinkston, "Domestic Politics and Stakeholders in the North Korean Missile Development Program,"
Non-ProliferationReview: Centerfor Non-Proliferation,Monterey Institutefor InternationalStudies (Summer 2003)

1-15, 16 Aug. 2007 <cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol10/10 2/102pink.pdf>.
Joseph Bermudez, Shield of the Great Leader: The Armed Forces of North Korea (Sydney: Allen and Urwin,
2001) 252-253.
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confrontation between North Korea and the US is not the result of an evil, irrational
North Korea. North Korean resistance to US unipolar management of global order is not
so much the result of an iniquitous, failing state that seeks nothing more than to threaten

civilized international order. Rather, the "confrontation takes place against a backdrop of
historical, cultural, ethical, and practical premises and realities that need to be taken into
account."3 5 5

The nuclear (as well as sociopolitical, ideological,

and economic)

confrontation between the US and North Korea can be better understood if viewed as a

manifestation of a conflict between two irreconcilable worldviews. One worldview is
represented by the DPRK. The DPRK tenaciously adheres to what has been a hallmark
of international relations, that is, a Westphalia system of sovereign states. It demands a
right to exist and pursue its self-interest free of US oversight, recrimination, threat, and
sanctions (as with other rogue states).

Perhaps, quite ironically, the longest running

enemy of the US-the North Korean state-is more of a "genuine" state vis-a-vis official
state-to-state interactions, policies, rationalizations, and justifications for its right to exist,

than the staunch defender of the new world order, that is, the US.
The DPRK's struggle to survive the onslaught of US power is based upon
principles, precepts, and a philosophy embedded in the Westphalia system, which, at its
most basic level, posits that international order is comprised of sovereign states "equal"
in their functional sovereignty. In theory and practice, sovereignty includes a state's right
to self-defense, self-determination, prohibits forcible external interference within a state's
domestic affairs, and postulates that war and violence is justified when a state is

a
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confronted with unwarranted aggression.3 5 6

The unipolar and absolutist posture of the

US views world society as a forum for the implementation of its singular agenda.

The

US ASA views international affairs as follows:

the world [is] centered on a [single] state representing
civilization and good governance, surrounded by subordinate
states. If the legitimacy of the rulers of these states is endorsed
by the [hegemonic] power then they are allowed arms ... and are
considered as 'members of the international community.' The
others, whose legitimacy is not recognized are called ... 'rogue

states.'3

The DPRK, a demonized rogue state, cannot legitimately pursue national survival and
engagement in the world economy.

DPRK efforts to negotiate with the US and shut

down its program to develop NW, according to the DPRK, have to encompass:

1.,

recognition of the DPRK's sovereignty, 2., assurance of nonaggression, and 3., the US
must cease its continuous ideological and economic warfare on the DPRK by allowing it
to participate in the states system, especially global trading in the world economy.

In light of US aggression and a sustained massive military presence on the Korean
peninsula, it should not come as a surprise that offensive NW have been sought by North
Korea.

After the fall of Baghdad, former US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld

warned North Korea to draw an "appropriate lesson" from the US invasion.358 A rational
state actor would realize that only something as profound as a nuclear deterrent could

356 See "Treaty of Westphalia, October 24, 1648," The Avalon Project at Yale Law School 1996, 12 July 2007 <www.
yale.edu/lawwe b/avalon/westphal.htm >.
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358 Randeep Ramesh, "The Two Faces of Rumsfeld," The Guardian,9 May 2003.
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prevent unilateral US military aggression in a unipolar world.

Also, the US Nuclear

Posture Review 2002 identified North Korea (in addition to other non-nuclear states) as
being first among countries that could be the target of an unprovoked nuclear strike:

"North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya are among the countries that could be involved
in immediate, potential, or unexpected contingencies." 359 In light of such policy, a

key factor driving [development of] WMD is the nationalist
backlash against economic, [social, political, and cultural]
globalization and its challenges to the state's primacy ... [NW]
are not simply a path to military parity or superiority. They are a
way for middle powers to emphasize their independence and
attain equal status in the international system ... WMD can
compensate for the lack of economic and cultural independence
... North [Korea], anxious about [its] deteriorating position ...
[is] eager to have boost to its] prestige and status in the world. 36 0

It must be kept in mind that North Korea's security is at the apex of its nuclear agenda.
"It was security from attack, normalization of relations with the US, the ending of US
economic warfare, and energy aid" that initially guided the development of WMD. 36 1
After the fall of the USSR and the subsequent terrorist attacks on the US on 9/11,
the US found itself in a position where it had

had fewer constraints on the use of military force, particularly
aerial bombing and missile attacks. It seemed to have no
problem attacking non-nuclear states that possessed large armies
and conventional forces (Iraq, Serbia) but generally fell back on
diplomacy to handle competitors with nuclear weapons such as

359 US Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review 2002, 2 Aug. 2007 <www.globalsecurity.org>.
360 Feffer, North Korea 135.
36! Beal 215.
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Russia and China. A nuclear weapon would make sense to
Pyongyang as a trump card to play if all else failed. 362

As John Feffer observes, North Korea had witnessed firsthand the US tendency of
"taking advantage of weak adversaries. And it had also seen in the developing world that

weak countries languish in poverty despite decades of 'development aid.'

Only

substantial deterrence-in the form of nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver
them-offered the ultimate promise of dissuading the US from using its stick on
Pyongyang and providing real development assistance." 3 63

North Korea's military

strategy, however, while incorporating NW for deterrent purposes, also seeks other goals
that are not "irrational." In particular, North Korea's international military and armament
strategies are derived from domestic strategies and concerns that are "intended to achieve
goals and conditions that satisfy national interests. Military strategies reflect capabilities

vis-a-vis potential opponents, resource constraints, and desired end states. North Korea is
no different [than other states]; its military strategy is a reflection of Pyongyang's
national goals." 3 64 Military strategies also reflect what Peter Katzenstein has termed
"cultural rules of engagement," that is, military strategies are based on socially

362 Feffer, North Korea 62. Also, see Wendy Sherman, "Sunshine Through Cloudy Skies," Asian Perspective26.3
(2002) 7; Bruce Cumings, Parallax Visions: Making Sense ofAmerican-EastAsian Relations at the End of the Century
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1999); Selig S. Harrison, "The Missiles of North Korea," World Policy Journal 17

(Fall 2000) 13-24.
363 Feffer, North Korea 65. Also, see Nicholas Eberstadt, "Tear Down This Tyranny," Weekly Standard, 29 Nov. 2004;
William Kristol, "Toward Regime Change in North Korea," ProjectFor the New American Century, 22 Nov. 2004, 16
Aug. 2007 <http://www.newamericancentury.org/eastasia2004.htm>.
364 Homer T. Hodge, "North Korea's Military Strategy," Parameters: US Army War College (Spring 2003) 68-81,
16
Feb. 2007 <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03spring/hodge.htm>.
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constructed cultural precepts unique to a particular nation.'

In the case of North Korea,

the regime has sought to reunify the Korean Peninsula on North Korean terms. Indeed,
the regime's constitution describes reunification as "the supreme national task," and
366
reunification remains the case under the present leadership.

In addition to protecting itself from US attack and the goal of reunifying Korea,
North Korea also seeks to complete its revolution. When North Korean leaders speak of
achieving "socialist revolution in our country," they are referring to the unification of the
entire peninsula on their terms.

North Korea considers the entire peninsula as constituting its
sovereign territory. It does not recognize South Korea as being a
separate nation, nor the government of South Korea as
legitimate. Therefore, when North Korea refers to 'our country'
or the 'fatherland,' they mean the entire Korean peninsula ...
[and the] southern half of their country as occupied by 'US
imperialists' and the government of South Korea as 'puppets
serving their imperialist masters.' 'Defense' does not refer to
defending North Korea, but to defending all of Korea.
Accordingly, 'defense of the fatherland' means (1) reclaiming
that portion of Korea [(the south)] that is currently occupied and
controlled by the 'imperialists,' and (2) defending against further
encroachment by 'US imperialists.' 3 67

The security context that has emerged in light of 9/11 premises US policy and action on
interference in the affairs of any state deemed a threat, paying no heed to the interests of
sovereign states (hostile and non-hostile), ignoring history, culture, the US role in
365 Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security," The Culture of National
Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press,
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366 Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People'sRepublic of Korea (Pyongyang: Foreign Language Publishing
House, 1998) cited in Hodge, "Strategy."
367

Hodge "Strategy."

138

producing conflict and destabilization, and disregarding the sundry states of affairs that
pre-exist unsolicited interference.

After denouncing Kim Jong I1 as a "pygmy" and

declaring, "I loathe Kim Jong II! I've got a visceral reaction to this guy ... Maybe its my
religion ... but I feel passionate about this," US President George W. Bush proceeded to
express his earnest desire for "toppling" Kim's regime. 368 The DPRK responded by
withdrawing from the NPT and announced in June of 2003 that it was officially pursuing
nuclear weapons capacity. North Korea went on to assert that it has "no option but to
have a nuclear deterrence if the US keeps its hostile policy and continues its nuclear
threat toward the DPRK." 369

Conclusion

An absolutist security policy has, therefore, explicitly contributed to NW
proliferation in the Asia-Pacific region, and overall instability on the Korean peninsula.
North Korea has therefore considered its nuclear and missile programs as bargaining
chips and/or deterrents to be used against its enemies; "on the evidence of the last decade,
the deterrent of a possible nuclear weapon has been demonstrably effective: no one has

invaded or bombed [a nuclear] country." 370

On March 29, 2003, Rodong Sinmun

reported that North Korea "would have already met the same miserable fate as Iraq's, had
it accepted the [unqualified and unilateral] demand raised by the imperialists for nuclear
inspection and disarmament ...

and that it would increase defense capacity as the

368 George W. Bush quoted in Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002) 340.
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country's number one lifeline." 37'

An absolutist US posture, with the ominous threat of

destabilizing and toppling the North Korean regime, has played a direct role in North

Korea's developing and obtaining offensive WMD (especially NW).

North Korea has the capability to produce medium-range
missiles, chemical weapons, and biological weapons, and tested
its first nuclear device on October 9, 2006. The test came less
than one week after the October 3, 2006 'clarification statement'
by the North Korean Foreign Ministry declaring Pyongyang's
intention to conduct a nuclear test. The Korean Central News
Agency announced that the October 9 test was conducted at a
'stirring time when all the people of the country are making a
great leap forward in the building of a great prosperous powerful
socialist nation.' 3 72

Seeking engagement with the US on its own terms, amongst other interests, motivates the
nuclear aspirations of North Korea as well as possessing a means to deter military attacks
by the US. "To pose a credible threat and deter US intervention or aerial assault, North

Korea is deeply invested in projecting [an] image of aggressive competence." 373 A
classic brinkmanship in-crisis-lies-opportunity framework seems to underlie the rationale
for engagement with and procuring economic aid/incentives from the US and its allies

while maintaining North Korean autonomy/identity via the development and testing of
functional and offensive nuclear weapons.374

371 Aidan Foster-Carter, "Analysis: North Korea's Move," BBC News Online, 16 April 2003, 15 Aug. 2007 <www.bb
c.com>.
372 Center For Non-Proliferation Studies, WMD Country Profiles Database, 17 Aug. 2007 <http://cns.miis.edu/dbinfo/
about.htm>.
373 Feffer North Korea 66.

374 Hoare 125-132.
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North Korea's development and testing of nuclear weapons is viewed with utter
disdain by the US. The US cannot and will not abide any rogue state obtaining the means
to effectively challenge its prerogatives.

Christopher R. Hill, Assistant US Secretary of

State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, has declared that, the US is "not going to live
with a nuclear North Korea, [the US] will not accept it."375 North Korea therefore has a

very clear choice, that is, conform or be explicitly and perpetually targeted for
destabilization. "North Korea can have a future or it can have these weapons. It cannot

have both." 376 Under incessant and hostile US pressure, it is assumed by the US that the
dismal state of North Korea's conventional armed forces (due to a languishing economy
for the last several decades and severe natural disasters such as the mass famine that
occurred in the 1990s) will supposedly result in destabilization and the eventual
obliteration of North Korea.

Yet, the struggle against an unyielding enemy (the US) has

defined North Korea (politically, militarily, socially, economically) since its inception;
the US has always been the DPRK's nemesis, looming over and threatening its very

existence. 7
North Korea has consistently utilized a variety of strategies to maintain its
sovereignty and security in addition to developing NW. During the Cold War, the North:

375

David E. Sanger and Jim Yardley, "US Sternly Warns North Korea Not To Conduct A Nuclear Test," New York
Times, 5 Oct. 2006.
Sanger, "Sternly." For a general discussion of global security vis-a-vis regions, see Barry Buzan and Ole
Wxver,
Regions and Powers: The Structure of InternationalSecurity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
376

377 For examples covering this topic, see "Rag-Tag Army Forced to Survive on Paltry Funds," South China Morning
Post, 10 April 1999; Jae-Jung Suh, "Blitzkrieg or Sitzkrieg? Assessing A Second Korean War," Pacifica Review 11.2
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juggled its relations with China, Russia, and the 3 d World to
achieve the greatest benefits from all three. After 1989, it tried
to adapt this ... strategizing to the democratic world. Central to
this new diplomatic approach was improved relations with the
US ... In the 1970's, it hoped for a breakthrough in relations

with the US as a kind of corollary to the Washington-Beijing
detente. More recently, North Korea has identified the US as the
chief power-broker in the Asia-pacific region and has
accordingly focused attention on concluding a bilateral deal. 37 8

The US, however, cannot and will not in good faith engage an "evil" state that by virtue

of its existence poses an inherent "threat" to global peace, order, and security. While
engagement in the form of diplomatic relations and recognition, trade, incorporation into
the world economy and the US-managed society of states, and the like, could be utilized

by the US to bring North Korea into mainstream world order, giving it a degree of
"agency," such a policy is anathema to US morality. "Staying the course" of perpetual
US aggression comprised of militarization, force, hostility, containment, propaganda,
psychological, and economic warfare, North Korea proceeded to detonate a nuclear
device on October 9 2006.

North Korea, one of the world's poorest and most isolated

countries, lives in constant fear of being subsumed by US power.

Having offensive

nuclear capability has enabled North Korea to present a viable and credible threat in
retaliating against US aggression. North Korea's leadership "had their military plan to
demonstrate that no one could [intimidate] them, and they weren't going to be deterred,
not even by the Chinese ... In the end, there was just no stopping them." 379 Since the

378 Feffer, North Korea 82.
379 David E. Sanger, "North Korea Reports First Nuclear Arms Test," New York Times Online, 9 Oct. 2006, 14 August
2007 <www.nytimes.com/2006/10/09/world/asia/09korea.html?n=Top%2fNews%2f World%2fCountries%20and%20
Territories %2fNorth %20Korea>.
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founding of the North Korean state, Kim Il-sung was "determined to [counter] the power
of the United States, and [was] acutely aware that General Douglas MacArthur had
requested nuclear weapons to use against his country." 3 80 According to the DPRK state
media, the DPRK's "intention to build up a nuclear deterrent force is not aimed to
threaten and blackmail others but reduce conventional weapons under a long-term plan
and channel manpower resources

and funds into economic

construction and the

betterment of people's living." 38 1 The acquirement of NW has enabled regimes that were
not necessarily in line with the US unipolar project (for example, Pakistan) to engage the

US and the states system.
Proliferation is one of a variety of negative effects that have devolved from an

aggressive, hegemonic, unilateral foreign policy.

Proliferation under the US ASA has

occurred due to considerable, unsolicited interference in the affairs of enemy states. Such
interference is not in line with a states system notion that allocates a modicum of
sovereignty to its constituent parts, that is, individual states. Although the US has a long
history of foreign intervention, the US strategy has exponentially grown, evolved with the
advent of 9/11.

Aggressive and explicit interference in other states' affairs and US

hyper-nationalism have reached unprecedented proportions, and inform the current policy
against North Korea, other rogue states, and any and all enemies of the US. Explicit US
interference in the internal and external affairs of states, rogue states in particular, has
generated violent resistance to US policy, sustaining and fueling the very thing that the

380
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US seeks to repress, that is, challenges to its supremacy and security.3 82

The hyper-

nationalist dimension of the US ASA provides grist for the mills of insecurity vis-a-vis
WMD and NW.

Indeed, as Gellner notes, it is the case that nationalism assumes an

indispensable and profound

role in regime preservation because it is primarily a political
principle, which holds that the political and the national unit
should be congruent. Nationalism as a sentiment, or as a
movement, can be best defined in terms of this principle.
Nationalist sentiment is the feeling of anger aroused by the
violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused
by its fulfillment. A nationalist movement is one actuated by a
3 83
sentiment of this kind.

While hyper-nationalism is condemned by the US, in practice it is as virulently
nationalist as the global enemies of peace and freedom. The US ASA holds that while it
is justifiable for the US to implement its nationalist policy at the global level, the US is
exempt from having to give credence to what it deems "unacceptable" nationalism.
Rogue states are therefore epistemic constructs, creations of US policy; the very notion of

a rogue state is derived from a US-based definition of global security/society.

Each

rogue state, before becoming "rogue," has experienced US interference, whether
explicitly or implicitly, and has, in turn, developed internal political systems premised on
hyper-nationalist hostility toward that interference.

382 Examples of sustained and significant US interference in the internal (and external) affairs of a variety of states

abound in the historical record. See Frank A. Ninkovich, The United States and Imperialism (Oxford: Blackwell,
2001); John Rees, Imperialism and Resistance (New York: Routledge, 2006); Thomas Kane, Theoretical Roots of US
ForeignPolicy: Machiavelliand American Unilateralism(New York: Routledge, 2006).
383 Ernest Gellner, "Nations and Nationalism," Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace
2 "d ed., ed. Richard K. Betts (New York: Pearson-Longman, 2005) 307. Also, see J. S. Mill, Considerationson
Representative Government (London: Parker, Son, and Bourn Publishers, 2006).
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In the Asia-Pacific region, "the US sword, by far the strongest in the region
(indeed, the strongest in the world), is regularly waved in the air to reassure allies and

threaten adversaries. At the same time, US policy is billed as defensive.
region,] US troops, bases, and the

7 th

[Within the

Fleet are advertised as a buffer separating the

conflict-disposed countries of the region from one another."38 4

The US is therefore

presented as being indispensable to the stability, integrity, and character of global order
by signaling out and subjugating threats to global order, peace, and stability. Yet, in
practice its security policy, historically and presently, fosters frustration, hostility, and
destabilization by dismantling and disregarding states' sovereignty to suit US interests.
Explicit US interference in the internal and external affairs of rogue states is a salient

feature of US security that has generated violent resistance to US policy, sustaining and
fueling challenges to US supremacy and absolute security.

384 Feffer, North Korea 127. For interpretations of hegemony and regional/global stabilization,
see Bradley Martin,

"The What-If Question," Nautilus Policy Forum Online, no. 00-02, 15 March 2000, 21 Aug. 2007 <http://www.nautilu
s.org/fora/security/0002 C_Martin.html>; K. S. Nathan, "South Asia and U.S. Security Policy: US Engagement Policy
in a Changing Asia," National Defense University's Twentieth Annual Pacific Symposium, 1-2 March 1999 (NAPSNET
Special Report, 23 July 1999), 21 Aug. 2007 <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/pacific99/ksnathan.html>; Sheldon
Simon, "Alternative Visions of Security in Northeast Asia," Journalof NortheastAsian Studies (Fall 1996).
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION

Security is a complex state of affairs, tinctured with subjectivity, diversity, and
fragmented along sundry political, ideological, and socio-cultural lines.

Given this

complexity, the US ASA, as an "objective" and ubiquitous system of knowledge and

truth, has profound consequences for the conduct of international affairs. In a post-9/11
security context, global security is articulated and promulgated by a single state that is
primus inter pares in the international system.

The US, the world's only hyper-power,

has actively implemented an absolutist security agenda in order to procure an ideal of a
zero-risk global security environment vis-a-vis elimination of polymorphous terror and its
accoutrements. As discussed and demonstrated in the previous chapters, the US ASA, in
theory and practice, has weighty consequences for the operative assumptions and

practices of a states system, creating a more insecure world. This is the case because, in
pursuing absolute security, the US state seeks to unilaterally and militaristically identify,
posit, procure, manage, and implement an ideal of an absolutist, zero-risk, and violence-

free security context wholly amenable to US interests. The US seeks to emplace security
in a totalizing public-safety ideal, with the US as the sole authority competent to
articulate and enforce idealistic zero-risk, militarized security policies. By marginalizing
and undermining notions such as sovereignty, diversity, and domestic individual and
group human and civil rights/liberties, the US assumes a plenipotentiary and quasitotalitarian power of contouring international relations to suit its particular interests. By
pursuing an absolutist security agenda, the US state is able to present its security agenda

as munificent and necessary, inspired by public safety, effectively retaining a fagade of
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traditional
antithetical

ordering principles

and concepts of international

to an absolutist security agenda-while

relations-which

concomitantly

divesting

are
such

principles and concepts of their basic realities.
Under the US ASA, global security is envisioned as a distinct, absolute system of

knowledge, of rectification, whereby the molding and transformation of international
actors, based on a single state's standards of reality, produces a distinct unipolar modality
of global security. "Reality becomes its own ideology through ... faithful duplication." 385
Hence, the US can assert in an evident and munificent manner that:

Homeland security requires a truly national effort, with shared
goals and responsibilities for protecting and defending the
Homeland. Our Strategy leverages the unique strengths and
capabilities of all levels of government, the private and nonprofit sectors, communities, and individual citizens. Mindful that

many of the threats we face do not recognize geographic
boundaries, we also will continue to work closely with our
international partners throughout the world ... Partnerships in
homeland security also extend beyond our Nation's borders.
International cooperation continues to be an enduring feature of
our approach to terrorism and violent extremism ... The US will
continue to develop and strengthen foreign partnerships and the
homeland security capabilities of our friends and allies. Security
at home ultimately is related to security abroad: as partners
protect and defend their homelands, the security of our own
Homeland increases (emphasis added).3 86

A major consequence

of subscribing to the 9/11

war-response

is that an

objectified US order-combine and its ideational and material accoutrements become
internally and externally self-referential, reverential, cyclically reified, disseminated, and

385

Adorno 63.

386 The White House, NationalStrategyfor Homeland Security October 2007,
gov/infoc us/homeland/nshs/2007/index.html>.
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19 Aug. 2008 <http://www.whitehouse.

grafted onto international order. Loss of the USSR to ballast US power, in conjunction
with the spectacle and event of 9/11, has enabled the US to pursue an unfettered ASA to
counter terror in the name of all states' security.

Yet, the boundless war on terror has

severe negative consequences for the stability and security of states in the international
system:

the incessant "repression of terrorism spirals around as unpredictably as the

terrorist act itself. No one knows where it will stop, or what turnabouts there may yet be.

There is no possible distinction, at the level of images and information, between the
spectacular and the symbolic, no possible distinction between the 'crime' and the
crackdown." 3 87
Under an ASA, security is treated as a state of affairs that is both true and
believed. This is the epistemological modus operandi of the US ASA and its relationship

to producing a global system of security. 3 88 The US ASA system of knowledge equates
belief and truth with US security, and therefore produces "genuine" knowledge that is
universal, incontestable, inexorable, authoritative, and just. The knowledge that devolves

from 9/11 as event, image, and moral/ethical judgment is centered around the US trying
to establish a globalized police-state based on overwhelming force, panoptic surveillance,
and criminalization measures designed to counter terror in any and all of its infinite,
polymorphous manifestations. US security has "evolved," so to speak, from being one of
a variety of global epistemic modalities of security to assuming an all-inclusive,
transcendent signification. In a post-9/11 world, the US ASA summarily and objectively

387 Baudrillard, Spirit 31.

388 See Timothy Chappel, "Plato on Knowledge in the Theaetetus," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
7 May, 2005,
27 Dec. 2007 <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-theaetetus/#9>; Plato, "Theaetetus," trans. Benjamin Jowett,
Project Gutenberg Release #1726, April 1999, 27 Dec. 2007, <http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext99/thtusl0.txt>;
Plato, The Republic, trans. Tom Griffith, ed. G.R.F. Ferrari (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
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condemns a state for what it is.389 A statement by an affiliate of the Council of Foreign
Relations, James Warburg, seems apt when considering US security and its ASA on the
conduct and character of international affairs: "We are willing to become citizens of the

world, but only if the world becomes an extension of the US." 390 Such a claim is in line
with the US being a "hyper-power," a unipolar structural referent that seeks to impose a
uniform and continuous global state of affairs that reflects the priorities, interests,

economics, politics, culture, security, and needs of a single state.
accomplish this by militarizing the polity.
Information

Sharing

The US seeks to

For instance, the US has established an

Environment (ISE) which specifically orders

all levels of

government in the US to have unobstructed data gathering and sharing capacities over
anything remotely resembling terror or the potential for terror, and that the national
government have the same power with respect to other states. "Today's ISE consists of

multiple sharing environments designed to serve five communities:

intelligence, law

enforcement, defense, homeland security, and foreign affairs," to the detriment of all
other competing values and states of affairs. 39 1
The proposition that the US ASA = Global Peace & Freedom, however, is not
self-evident; David Hume logically demonstrated that there is no necessary causality that
can be identified in any sequence of events (logical, natural, physical, etc.), and that

389 Michel Foucault, Power: Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Vol.

III, trans. Robert Hurley, intro. Colin

Gordon, ed. James D. Faubion (New York: New Press, 1994) 70-71.
390 James Warburg quoted in Clyde Prestowitz, Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failureof Good
Intentions, (New York: Basic, 2003). For analyses that contend the US is a rogue state see Prestowitz, Rogue Nation;
T. D. Allman, Rogue State: America at War with the World (New York: Nation, 2004); Michael Klare, Rouge States &
Nuclear Outlaws: America's Searchfor a New Foreign Policy (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995); "Chomsky Info.
The Noam Chomsky Website," 15 April 2008 <http://chomsky.info/>.
391 The White House, National Strategyfor InformationSharing October 2007, 19 Aug. 2008 <http://www.whitehouse.
gov/nsc/i nfosharing/index.html>.
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sequentialness in human affairs is best understood as an additive process as opposed to a
causal process.3

92

The US ASA, on the contrary, seeks to provide the means whereby, if

A, then B (that is, if the US ASA obtains, then global freedom and peace obtain) becomes
an objective, causal reality. The US ASA ambitiously seeks to initiate "the final phase of
the extensions of man-the technological, [political, economic, cultural, juridical, social,

and military] simulation of [a singular global] consciousness, when the creative process
of knowing will be collectively and corporately extended to the whole of human
society." 39 3
The US ASA functions so as to produce progressive adaptation to its ordering
schema of international affairs, molding the category and practice of security based on
pliable precepts of fear and loathing of terror and terrorists, and US power as the singular
basis for ensuring justice and peace.

The US ASA induces ideological conformity via

infiltration of the concepts and categories that have traditionally structured international

affairs, especially notions of self-determination, state sovereignty, and a diversity of state
interests. The "truth" postulated by the 9/11 war-response embodied in the US ASA,

which leads ineluctably to the "good" and the "just," assumes a multitudinous yet selfcontained

referentiality

based

on

tautologically

reifying

properties,

equivocating US domestic security with global security measures.

effectively
Furthermore,

knowledge and truth are producers and products of power; power produces right, good,
and justice in order to manufacture a potent machinery of psychic (conceptual) and

392 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,ed. Tom L. Beauchamp (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2006); D. F. Norton, The Cambridge Companion to Hume (New York: Cambridge University Press,

1993).
393 McLuhan, Understanding3-4.
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corporeal (physical) control. Beneath the veneer of global peace, freedom, and justice,
there is a deeper fundament of power and control that must be revealed, disaggregated,
and examined.

Under a war-on-terror-rubric, the US confidently asserts the primacy,

correctness, and inevitability of a US managed global system that supercedes the
premises of a states system. Belligerent, proactive, preventive, and illimitable war is the
hallmark of the 9/11 war-response to the advent of an "age of terror."

There is a clear

demarcation between "good" and "evil," the "right" side and the "wrong" side of a binary
division of the world into pro-US and anti-US, since the US campaign for democracy,
freedom, and global peace embodies all that is universally moral and superior in the
world.

The knowledge and modality of global society and global security produced by
the US ASA is "not a faculty or a universal structure. Even when it uses a certain number
of elements that may pass for universals, knowledge will only belong to the order of
results, events, effects." 394 The US ASA poses the problem of global security in terms of
highly subjective, vague, and relative macro-structural states of affairs, especially justice,
freedom, peace, democracy, state-corporate-market system, and stability. The US ASA,
at the level of rhetoric and justification, does not pose security in terms of a
society/system of states. To pose the problem of security within the terms of a particular

state results in "sovereignty" being divested of viability, efficacy. For a single state to
implement global security creates a context for repressive one-state power apparatuses,
such as unfettered police powers, unilateral military incursions and sanctions, and

394 Michel Foucault, Power: Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Vol.
Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: New Press, 1994) 14.
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III, intro.

Colin Gordon, ed. James D.

selective diplomatic isolation.

At its core, the US ASA

seeks to graft the moral,

ideological, social, economic, and political dictates of a single state upon global society.
Thus, "the [9/11] attacks are just a tactic to enable [terrorists] to spread their dark vision

of the world ... they will do anything they can to spread that ideology.

And it's our

charge, it's our calling to keep the pressure on these people, to defend America and to

spread an ideology of hope and an ideology of peace. 395
The US ASA is a modality of global security, of global public safety, that seeks to
procure subservience, adherence, and fealty to US power as the singular source for
quelling the anarchical international context.

9/11 as event and image has provided a

locus whereby traditional US policy can be elevated to a macro level as far as
applicability and propriety, especially when considering the moral/ethical and militaristic
character of the 9/11 war-response. The US ASA "speaks" to its audience in a manner
that co-opts and fixes signification vis-a-vis security concepts, molding security so as to

force other states into "the grip of ideas already fixed beforehand ... to reduce the nature
of language to a [particular] concept, so that this concept may provide a generally useful

view of [security] that will lay to rest all further notions about it." 396 The US ASA
becomes justified in itself, an object of absolute (police) power to repel and prevent
polymorphous threats to its order; threat, however, is not an objective condition. 397

395 George W. Bush, "President Bush Celebrates Independence Day With West Virginia Air National Guard 167th
Airlift Wing, C-5 Maintenance Hangar, Martinsburg, West Virginia," The White House, Office of the Press Secretary,
Washington, D.C., 4 July 2007, 5 July 2007 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20070704.html>.
396 Martin Heidegger, "Language," trans. Albert Hofstader, The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, eds.
Vincent B. Leitch, William E. Cain, Laurie A. Fink, Barbara E. Johnson, John McGowan, and Jeffery J. Williams (New
York: W.W. Norton, 2001) 1122.
397 See Hardt, Empire 13; David Campbell, Writing Security:

United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity

(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998) 1.
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The US ASA, via analytic, conceptual, material, and variegated discursive media,
casts conceptual nets of cognition so as to "capture" and name the objects, forms, and
substance of international affairs. Through acts of naming the constituent elements of the
world, formative dissertations of knowledge are able to establish "objective" frameworks
for global governance. 398 The US ASA, utilizing the conceptual language and signifiers

of the Westphalia system, is concomitantly utilizing states-system concepts and
principles while emptying them of substantive content. The simulation that is occurring
under the US ASA involves the lexicon of the states-system being employed that has no
states-system as a reference; rather, a single state forms the referent.

The US ASA

therefore seeks to co-opt the Westphalia framework within the following successive
phases of image-envelopment and simulation:

1., the image of the states-system as a

reflection of basic reality, 2., the image as masking and distorting the initial basic reality,
3., masking the absence of the initial basic reality, and 4., the images of the US ASA bear
no substantive relation to the initial basic reality being simulated. 399
It is important to note that the effects and consequences of the US ASA are not
relegated to the post-9/11 security context. The concentration and perpetuation of power

combined with a paranoiac, absolutist security policy can be observed in the annals of
modern history.

Communist Albania (1945-1986), Nazi Germany (1933-1945), the

USSR (1923-1953),

Maoist China (1949-1972),

fascist Spain (1939-1975), and

Communist Romania (1947-1989) are examples of states that have pursued, to some

398 Meghan L. O'Sullivan, "Replacing the Rogue Rhetoric: A New Label Opens the Way to a Better Policy,"
Brookings Review 18.4 (Fall 2000) 38-40.
399 Jean Baudrillard, Simulations, trans. Paul Foss, Paul Patton and Philip Beitchman (New York: Semiotext, 1983)
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11-

degree, an ASA. Each state experienced negative "blowback" from pursuing an ASA, and
was unable to sustain such an agenda. In light of the historical record, and the specific

case studies discussed in this study, any significant form of absolutist security breeds
instability, insecurity, and is deleterious to an ordered international state of affairs;
isolationism practiced by Albania, North Korea and Burma, World War II, the Korean

and Vietnam Wars,

the Gulf Wars, the invasion and occupation of Iraq and

Afghanistan-all of these conflicts can be analyzed through the prism of absolutist
security.
In light of the discussion and case studies, we can begin to answer the questions
that provided the impetus for this study.

Question 1. How is post-9/11 US and global security defined,
and has it eclipsed previous notions of security based upon a
system of states?
Hypothesis 1. If it is the case that the US is pursuing an ASA,
then the present global security agenda challenges security
notions based on a system of states because an ASA reflects a
unipolar world, wherein the values and interests embodied in US
security are the basis for global security.

Question 2. Has 9/11 provided an opportunity for the US to
implement an absolutist security agenda?
Hypothesis 2. If the US is pursuing an absolutist security agenda,
then 9/11 served to legitimate and justify its implementation.

In sum, the current manifestation of US security policy is eroding the traditional
conceptual and policy framework that has traditionally defined the international system.
Accordingly, global security is now conceived and implemented within an absolutist
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unipolar rubric with the US at the apex of the power-hierarchy in international affairs.
9/11, as event and image, has enabled the US to pursue a moralistic and militaristic
crusade based on intangible and non-measurable components such as good, evil, insanity,
and hatred.

The US ASA creates viable centers of resistance based on its notion of obtaining
absolute security at the expense of any and every state actor in the international system.

The US ASA systemically and systematically ignores the diversity of state actors (the
cultural, political, economic, juridical, religious, and social variegations, for instance),
and seeks to impose a single modality of security. An ASA rubric is unwieldy in that it is
an absolutist security project that utilizes vague concepts that have very little substance as

independent epistemic indicators, for example, good, bad, wrong, right, foe, friend,
threat, terror, evil, just, and immoral. Preemptive, preventive, and unilateral action on the

world stage by a unipolar power breaks down the states-system, creating an unstable
means of anchoring states in an anarchic system.
This is the case because the vast and potentially limitless homogenizing media of
globalization (economic, social, cultural, political, military), combined with US power as
the basis for global order via military supremacy, enables the US to monopolize and
effectively impose its modus operandi upon the totality of global society. The US thus
seeks to import and graft its modality of thought and being on global society via a
univocal, unipolar, unilateral, uni-dimensional formulation of global security policy. The
US ASA, therefore, produces systemic insecurity by forcibly imposing uniformity and a
linear, binary, obstinate modality of explaining/understanding security in a post-Cold
War, post-9/11 world. The US ASA is unlimited in scope and application, and has the
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capacitance to postulate and envelope any "threat" to the wellbeing and security of the
unipolar power; it is a system of security that is cyclical, possessing a universal logic
based on internal legitimacy ->
security.

external legitimacy ->

internal, ad infinitum, vis-a-vis

US security is assumed to be contiguous and constitutive of a "shared"

universe; under an ASA, however, states are "consumed" by the intra-reification of ASA
concepts because propositions flow from each other in a logical manner.

Prescriptive

imperatives of an ASA are presented as axiomatic concepts.

The US ASA arrogates the right to define international security policy for all
actors to the US, based on the US's power to control/impose violence, sanctions, military
incursions, psychological warfare, propaganda, economic resources, and the like-all
legitimate means, media, originating and ending with the unipolar power. State-to-state

relations become based on the moral, ideological, economic, cultural, and political
template of a single power. In a world that remains characterized by a diversity of state
actors, the US ASA breeds virulent violence and conflict based on anti-Americanism in
the form of terrorist acts, WMD proliferation, militarization, and strengthening those

actors that resist and challenge US power on the world stage. For a single nation to
attempt to macro and micro manage the entire world system is logistically unfeasible,
resulting in great costs that can weaken rather than strengthen the unipolar state, while

also resulting in a loss of legitimacy to "lead" the world community.
It is this study's contention that the Westphalia states-system attempts to

ameliorate the insecurity that devolves from an anarchical, self-help system.

By

"institutionalizing" the notion of sovereignty, states (as well as non-state actors) have
been able to situate themselves in an anarchical context, establishing relatively high
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degrees of security given the chaotic nature of the international system, creating stable

epistemic and empirical bases of identity and reality formation. When referring to the
"institutionalization" of sovereignty, the term is used in what can loosely be termed a
"constructivist" sense, that is, an "institution is [viewed as] a relatively stable set or

'structure' of identities and interests. Such structures are often codified in formal rules
and norms, but these have motivational force only in virtue of actors' socialization to and
participation in collective knowledge.

Institutions are fundamentally cognitive entities

that do not exist apart from actors' ideas about how the world works." 40 0

Furthermore,

Alexander Wendt observes that, "it is collective meanings that constitute the structures

which organize our actions.

Actors acquire identities-relatively stable, role-specific

understandings and expectations

about self-by

participating in such

collective

meanings. Identities are inherently relational." 40 1
The institution of state sovereignty embodied in the Westphalia system is under
assault by a seemingly benevolent US ASA.

Global political and security issues are effectively settled by a
directorate of the US [and its allies,] world economic issues by a
directorate of the US [and its allies] ... all of which maintain
extraordinary close relations with each other, and decisions made
at the UN Security Council or in the [IMF] ... are presented as
reflecting the desires of the world community. The very phrase
'the world community' has become the euphemistic collective
noun (replacing the 'Free World') to give global legitimacy to
402
actions reflecting the [singular hegemonic] interests of the US.

400 Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International

Organization 46.2 (Spring 1992) 391-425.
401

Wendt, "Anarchy" 392-400.

402 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," Foreign Affairs 72.3 (Summer
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1993); Betts, Conflict 44.

Unilateralism, militarism, preemptive war, preventive war, exceptionally selective and
unbridled intervention(s) in other states affairs, imposed political (procedural democracy)
and economic (state-corporate managed "free" trade policies, globalization) modalities,
morality (the war on terror, freedom, peace) and "correction" policies (for example,

targeting rogue states for destabilization, occupation, exploitation, isolation, establishing
a presence within rogue states, and an arduous program of political, economic, moral, and
social "reeducation") all contribute to the destabilization of a global order that has been
based on the implicit and explicit notion of sovereignty as fundamental factor in ordering
international affairs.

To maintain a critical self-awareness of the media, constructs,

power-effects, and control-mechanisms employed to champion a particular notion of
truth, right, and justice is, therefore, simply indispensable to the enterprise of explaining

and understanding global security in a post-9/11 world.
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